DECLASSIFIED

K717.0423-39
1964-1965
SUPPORTING
DOCUMENTS

Declassified IAW EO 13526
By ~~AFHRA SAFE PAPER Office~~ PACAF
Date 12/15/14 Reviewer

K717.0423-39
10 Aug 66
v.2
RETURN TO
HQ, USAFHRC
MAXWELL AFB, AL 36112

PROJECT CHECO SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT

SCANNED BY ACD
2006

DECLASSIFIED FROM 04 JAN 1996
DECL
REFER TO

USAF OPERATIONS FROM THAILAND,

1964--1965

CONTINUING REPORT
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

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DECLASSIFIED

PROJECT CHECO REPOR

USAF OPERATIONS FROM THAILAND

1964 - 1965
(SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS)

10 August 1966

RETURN TO
HQ, USAFHRC
MAXWELL AFB, AL 36112

K 717.0423-29
10 Aug 66
v.2

HQ PACAF

Directorate, Tactical Evaluation

Prepared by: MSgt Robert T. Helmka
And
TSgt Beverly Hale
SE Asia Team
Project CHECO

Declassified IAW EO 13526
By ~~AFHRA SAFE PAPER Office~~ PACAF
Date 12/15/14 Reviewer SB

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DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

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S-0044

2-0003-1

LIST OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1. Msg (S) PFLMO-R 6516-64, PACAF to CSAF, 12 Jun 64.
2. Hq PACAF SO G-81, 10 Jun 64.
3. Msg (S) AFOMOAC 92940, CSAF to PACAF, 3 Jul 64.
4. Msg (S) 13CVS 11884, 13AF to CHJUSMAGTHAI, 17 Jul 64.
5. Msg (S) 20DC 800 64, 2AD to Det 2, 35 Tac Gp, 25 Jul 64.
6. Msg (S) PFCVC 555, PACAF to 13AF, 18 Jul 64.
7. Msg (S) 20DC 836 64, 2AD to Det 2, 35 Tac Gp, 3 Aug 64.
8. Msg (S) DO-929H, 35 Tac Gp to 333ABSq, et al, 7 Aug 64.
9. 2AD Regulation 23-9, 18 Sep 64 (S).
10. Msg (S) PFLDC 1127-64, PACAF to 2AD, 19 Jul 64.
11. Ltr, PFLMO, "Manpower Requirements, Udorn, Thailand," PACAF to Hq USAF, 25 Aug 64.
12. Hq PACAF SO G-114, 18 Sep 64.
13. Msg (S) 2AD to PACAF, dtg 070430, month unk, but believe prepared in Jul 65.
14. Msg (S) DCE 74257, CINCPACAF to CSAF, 10 Nov 65.
15. Msg (S) DPL 53384, CINCPACAF to CINCPAC, 23 Nov 65.
16. DAF SO AA-1690, 16 Nov 65.
17. Narrative B-1 (S), "Threat," CINCPAC, 15 May 65.
18. Narrative D (S), "Political and Economic Analysis," CINCPAC, 15 May 65.
19. Msg (S) AIRA CITE 02201, USAIRA Vientiane to CSAF, 12 Mar 65.
20. Msg (S) NOFORN AIRA CITE 02636, USAIRA Vientiene to CSAF, 5 Jun 65.
21. Msg (S) NOFORN AIRA 02804, USAIRA Vientiane to CSAF, 12 Jul 65.
22. Msg (S) NOFORN AIRA 02760, USAIRA Vientiane to CSAF, 3 Jul 65.

Supporting Documents - Cont'd

23. Msg (S) LIMDIS AIRA 02772, USAIRA Vientiane to CSAF, 6 Jul 65.

24. Msg (S) CITE JANAF Msg 0001, JANAF Attaches Vientiane to DIA, 27 Jul 65.

25. Msg (S) CITE ARMA CS 353, USARMA Vientiane to CIA, 28 Jul 65.

26. Narrative C-1 (S), "Past Accomplishments - Army," CINCPAC, 15 May 65.

27. Narrative B-2B (S), "Capabilities Analysis - Army," CINCPAC, 15 May 65.

28. Narrative C (S), "Past Accomplishments - General," CINCPAC, 15 May 65.

29. Narrative B-2 (S), CINCPAC, 15 May 65.

30. Msg (S) 2DCT 00032, 333ABRON to 2AD, 17 Nov 64.

31. Msg (S) LIMDIS/DEP CHIEF-AF 20915, DEPCHJUSMAG THAI to CINCPAC, 17 Nov 64.

32. Msg (S) NOFORN DOP 00189, USAFSAWC Eglin AFB to USAIRA Vientiane, 7 Nov 64.

33. Msg (S) AIRA CITE CX-6-3, USAIRA Vientiane to CSAF, dtg 03/1857Z, month unk but believed dtd Sep 64.

34. Record of Meeting, AIRA Bangkok, 16 Sep 64.

35. Memo for Record, DEPCHJUSMAG, 8 Oct 64.

36. Msg (S) LIMDIS/DEP CHIEF-AF 20753, DEPCHJUSMAG THAI to AIRA AMEMB Vientiane, dtg 24/0920Z, month unk but believed dtd Sep 64.

37. Ltr (S) Hq JUSMAG THAI, 1 Oct 64.

38. Memo of Understanding (S), DEPCHJUSMAG, 4 Jan 64.

39. Msg (S) DEP CHIEF-AF 20878, DEPCHJUSMAG to CINCPAC, 30 Oct 64.

40. Ltr (S), 333ABW Maint Officer to Colonel McCreery, 333ABS Comdr, nd, but believed dtd Nov 64.

Supporting Documents - Cont'd

41. Msg (S) ADM 25022, Det 6 to 2AD, 4 Nov 64.

42. Msg (S) DEP CHIEF-AF 20897, AIRA AMEMB Vientiane to Det 6, 12 Nov 64.

43. Msg (S) 200T 00572, 2AD to Dep Cmdr 2AD Udorn Thailand, 24 Nov 64.

44. Msg (S) DEP CHIEF-AF 21044, DEPCHJUSMAG THAI to AMEMB Vientiane, 22 Dec 64.

45. Msg (S) 2DCT 00049, Dep Cmdr 2AD Thai to 2AD, 27 Nov 64.

46. Msg (S) AIRA CITE 02002, USAIRA Vientiane to CSAF, 12 Mar 65.

47. Msg (S) CITE ARMA CX-39, USARMA to RUEPDA, 21 Jan 65.

48. Msg (S) CITE ARMA CX-350, USARMA Vientiane to DIA, 23 Jul 65.

49. Situation Report (S) FOV 8544, 27 Jul 65.

50. Situation Report (S) FOV 8549, 28 Jul 65.

51. Msg (S) AIRA 02918, USAIRA Vientiane to C SAF, 31 Jul 65.

52. Msg (S) AIRA 02976, USAIRA Vientiane to CSAF, 12 Aug 65.

53. Msg (S) AIRA 03274, USAIRA Vientiane to 2AD, 13 Sep 65.

54. Msg (S) DCI-I 20672, DEPCHJUSMAG THAI to CINCUSARPAC, 17 Sep 65.

55. Msg (S) CITE ARMA CX-474, USARMA Vientiane to DIA, 13 Nov 65.

56. Msg (S) CITE ARMA CX-355, USARMA to DIA, 30 Jul 65.

57. Msg (S) CITE ARMA CX-360, USARMA to DIA, 1 Aug 65.

58. Msg (S) NOFORN AAIRA AOO319, AAIRA Savannakhet to CSAF, 23 Sep 65.

59. Msg (S) VC 00082, CINCPACAF to 5AF et al, 20 Jan 65.

60. Msg (S) 2CAS/2307L, AIRA Bangkok to 13AF, 25 Jan 65.

Supporting Documents - Cont'd

61. Msg (S), "Yankee Team," CINCPAC to COMUSMACV et al, 21 Aug 64.

62. Msg (S) 20DC 00315, 2AD to 13AF, 26 Jan 65.

63. Ltr (S), "Report of Staff Visit," 20DC to 2DDR et al, 22 Jun 64.

64. Msg (S) 20DC 1221 64, 2AD to Det 1, 35 Tac Gp, Sep 64.

65. Msg (S) 2DCT 10925, Dep Cmdr 2AD Thai to 2AD, May 65.

66. Ltr (S), "Rescue Airborne Command Post," Dep Cmdr 2AD Thai to 2AD, nd, but believed dtd Jun 65.

67. Msg (S) Telecon 562, 2AD to Dep Cmdr 2AD Thai, Jun 65.

68. Msg (S) 2DCT 11393, Dep Cmdr 2AD Thai to 2AD, Jul 65.

69. Ltr (S) "SAR Task Force Procedures," nd but believed dtd Nov 65.

70. Msg (S) 00012, 35 Tac Gp to CHJUSMAGTHAI, 12 Nov 64.

71. Ltr (S) (end of tour report), Col. Jack H. McCreery, 27 May 65.

72. Ltr (U), "TDY Trip Report," Information Officer to 6232 CSGp Cmdr, 27 Sep 65.



~~SECRET~~

ROUTINE

PACAF

CHAF

DIST:
PPDOP
PPLAD

6516-64

~~PRIORITY SPECAT AIR FORCE EYES ONLY~~/PFLMO-R

FOR ARMY and AFOMO. Subject: Operations at Udorn Thailand.

Reference PFLOC 1059-64, 6 Jun 64.

1. Det 2, 35 TAC Group has been established at Udorn to provide for an Air Support Operation Center and base support. This unit is established to:

a. Clarify relationships under all operational conditions.

b. Precludes interference from MAC/MAT and JUSMAG/TAT.

c. Provide capability at Udorn to meet adviser requirements to AMB Unger.

d. Provide complete ASOC operational coverage in conjunction with the ACC Hq 2 Air Div.

e. Provide unit to which allocation of manpower resources and/or assignment of personnel can be made to meet any set of circumstances.

2. Operational command and control of this unit will be vested

JUNE 1964

PFLMO-R

SMSGT A.L. TAYLOR/hln
444032

1 3

J. TOD MILNEROW
Colonel, USAF
Director, Mnpwr & Orgn
AC/S Plans

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PACAF

In Hq 2 Air Div Deputy Commander for Laos Affairs.

3. Manpower requirements:

TITLE	GRADE	AFSC	NO.
Commander			
ASOC			
Ops Staff Off	Lt Col	1416	1
Ops Staff Off	MAJ	1416	2
Air Ops Off	CAPT	14352	3
Intel Staff Off	Maj	8016	1
Intel Off	Capt	8054	3
Cmd Post Tech	Tsg	20470	2
Cmd Post Specl	SSG	20430	3
Admin Specl	AIC	70250	2
Gnd Radio Op	SSG	29350	1
Gnd Radio Op	AIC	29350	1
Gnd Radio Eq Repm	AIC	30454	1
Unit Admin			
Admin Specl	SSG	70250	1
Dining Hall			
Cook	SSG	62250	1
Cook	AIC	62250	2

Commander is additional duty authorized Hq 2Air Div.

Dining Hall is to provide food service for PCS and TDY personnel.

~~SECRET~~

APLMO-K

2 3

~~SECRET~~

PACAF

LT COL	MAJ	CAPT	TOTAL OFFICER
1	3	6	10

TSGT	SSG	AIC	TOTAL AIRMEN	AGGREGATE
2	6	6	14	24

4. Request the 24 manpower spaces listed above be authorized on a supplement to MAV 66-3 effective FY 2/65 to provide manning under STEAMPIPE, GP-4

FFLM0-4

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS
PACIFIC AIR FORCES
United States Air Force
APO 953, San Francisco, California

1137-65

CHECO

SPECIAL ORDER
G-81

10 June 1964

1. Detachment 2, 35th Tactical Group, is designated and organized effective 11 June 1964 at Udorn Airfield, Thailand.

a. Personnel will be furnished from parent unit.

b. Unit will be equipped in accordance with Air Force Regulation 400-32 and Volume IV, Air Force Manual 67-1.

c. Personnel authorizations will be as contained in appropriate Unit Manning Document.

d. Detachment will not prepare Morning Reports. Strength accountability is the responsibility of the parent organization. Reference Air Force Manual 171-6.

e. Processing code C5KH41 is assigned this unit.

f. Air Force Organizational Status Change Report (RCS: AF-01) will be submitted in accordance with Air Force Regulation 20-49.

g. Special Instructions: In the event the 6039th Tactical Squadron is activated under Headquarters PACAF OPlan 99-64 manpower, personnel and equipment will be absorbed in the 6039th Tactical Squadron.

h. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

ROBERT V ELLIOTT
Colonel, USAF
Director of Administrative Services

DISTRIBUTION
20 - 5AF; 13AF
20 - 2ADiv
10 - 35 Tactical Gp
5 - CINCPAC
68 - PACAF Staff
18 - USAF (IAW AFM 10-3)
2 - ARRC
1 - AU(AUL)
1 - File

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PFCAS-AO G-81

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

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JUL -3 1964 486

LRA697

ACTION A-5		
CNC	DAL	DOP A-1
A-2	A-3	A-4 A-5
A-6	A-7	A-8 CIG
COI	CCH	ADS CAS
CSG	CJA	COC SR
ARS	ISI	SSO SMO

VV HQA194
RR RUHLKM
DE RUEAHQ 521 02/2301Z
R 022492
FM CSAF
TO PACAF
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ AFOMOAC 92940

REFERENCE PFLMO-R 6515-64. MANPOWER SPACES REQUIRED FOR AIR SUPPORT OPERATIONS CENTER AND BASE SUPPORT AT UDORN APPROVED. TEN OFFICER AND FOURTEEN AIRMAN SPACES IN GRADES REQUESTED WILL BE REFLECTED IN YOUR NEXT MAV EFFECTIVE FY 3/65 ON. PEC 339 APPLIES TO ASOC SPACES REMAINDER PEC 344. STEAM PIPE PROCEDURES DO NOT APPLY. DY MANNING IS NECESSARY PENDING ESTABLISHMENT OF NORMAL PIPELINE.
2 4
T

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals
declassified after 12 years

24

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NNNN

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

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Mgt 7-3-3

File Jan-June 65 3

5-4

JUL 17 3 03 PM '64

ODC - Action
CEC - Info
MOC - Info
POC - Info
IDC - Info
ADC - Info
EDC - Info
CMO - Info
CCE - Info
ATC - Info
SLE - Info
CoI - Info
CSG - Info
AFGP (Bangkok) - Info

33 cp

~~R 171532Z~~ JUL 64

FM 13AF CLARK AB PI

TO RUMBDC/CHJUSMAG THAI DON MUANG

INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

RUHLKM/PACAF

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

RUMSBJ/2AD TSN

RUMBDC/35 TAC GRP DON MUANG

RUMBDC/AFSEC JUSMAG DON MUANG

RUMBDC/DEP CHJUSMAG DON MUANG

RUMBDC/E & E DIV

RUAUAZ/5AF FUCHU AS JAPAN

RUAUAE/313AD TACHIKAWA AB JAPAN

RUAUAL/CNP WEST TRANS OFC TACHIKAWA AB JAPAN

BT

~~SECRET~~ JCVC 11884

SUBJECT: ~~ARP~~/ASOC TO UDORN.

A. CHJUSMAG THAI 161420Z.

B. PACAF 141624.

1. 2AD ADVANCE PARTY WILL ARRIVE UDORN 18 JULY 64. PARTY WILL CONSIST OF FOLLOWING:

COL [redacted] - OPS - 2AD

MATERIEL OFFICER - 35 TAC GP

LT [redacted] - CIVIL ENG - 2AD

MAJ [redacted] - AC & W - 619 TAC CONT SQ.

(1-2)

MC 7-17-197

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 2 RUMALB 11 S E C R E T

MAJ SMITH - COMM & ELEC - 1964 COMM GP

MAJ PECK - INTERIM COMMDR 6039 SUP SQ - 33RD TAC GP.

13AF PARTICIPANTS WILL ARRIVE ASAP AFTER PASSAGE OF STORM ELSIE AND WILL CONSIST OF FOLLOWING:

COL PAYNE - DCS/CIVIL ENGINEERING

LOGISTIC PLANNER

OPS GROUND ENVIRONMENT PLANNER

DESIGNATED DIRECTOR OF CRP

2. SCHEDULE FOR MOVEMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND PREDICTED OPERATIONALLY READY DATE WILL BE FORWARDED ASAP AFTER RESOLUTION OF DETAILS AND REQUIREMENTS MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF REF A.

GP-4

(2-2) NMC 7-17-157

57



130

SECRET

TOR 1333Z
25 JUL 64
BD

5 72

CINCPAC

CD McCree

LWVV LOA93

VV DEN177

OO RUMUC
DE RUMSDJ 103A 25/0955
RUMUC T RUMSDF
DE RUMUC L3D465
VV SLA029VV UUCOAD

OO RUMSDF RUMSDC
DE RUMSDJ 123A 25/0958
O P 250956
FM 2AIR DIV TAN SON NHUT VIETNAM
TO RUMSDF/DET 2 35TAC CP UDORN A THAILAND
INFO RUMSDC/35 TAC CP DON MUANG APRT THAILAND
RUMSDC/13AIR FORCE CLARK AB PI

SECRET 250C 64.
FOR COL MCCREERY
1. YOU ARE APPOINTED DEP COMDR 2AD FOR THAILAND/LAOS. ASSUME OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ALL USAF UNIT IN AREA. ALLACTICAL OPERATION TO BE IN ACCORD WITH DIRECTIONS OF COMDR 2AD AND DCM'S COUNTRY TEAMS OF THAILAND AND LAOS.
2. INTERIM MISSION GUIDANCE IS CONTAINED IN PACAF MSG PFLDC 1127 6 RETRANSMITTED TO YOU ON 21 JUL 64. FORMAL MISSION STATEMENT WILL BE FORWARDED UNDER SEPARATE COVER.
3. COMUSMACTHAI, 333 FAKASP, FORWARDED UNDER SEPARATE COVER.
4. COMDR 35TAC CP, TRU DET 2 WILL PROVIDE ADMINTRATIVE AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR ALL ASSIGNED AND ATTACHED UNITS. GP-4.

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

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DE RUMLKR 1822C 1840Z

O 130342Z

PACAF

TO RUMALC/13AF CLARK ABPHIL

INFO RUEAHQ/CSAF

RUMS

~~SECRET~~ PFCVC 555, SEC 1 OF 2

SUBJECT: PACAF RESPONSIBILITIES AT UDORN

REFERENCES:

B. PFEP 3049-64, DTG

C. PFCVC 527, DTG 102345Z

D. PFAME 3137, 16 JUL 64

THIS MESSAGE IN SEVEN PARTS. PART

ASSISTANCE TO YOU IN DEVELOPING PROPOSALS ON FACILITIES AND OTHER

REQUIREMENTS AT UDORN TO PROVIDE US SUPPORT FOR CURRENT AIR EFFORT

July 1964

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 2 RUHLKN 1020C ~~S E C R E T~~

LAOS. OUR PURPOSE IS TO SUGGEST [illegible] OPERATIONAL AND SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WILL BE RESPONSIVE TO FUTURE REQUIREMENTS AND PROVIDE ANBASIS FOR EXPANSION. OUR OPERATIONAL CONCEPT IS TO RETAIN COMMAND AND CONTROL RESPONSIBILITIES AS PART OF THE 2AD. MAW SUPPORTING ELEMENTS ASSIGNED UNDER THE 2AD GROUP. CONTROL CAPABILITY SHOULD BE DIRECTLY UNDER [illegible] AND IMMEDIATELY RESPONSIVE TO AMBASSADORUNGER'S REQUIREMENTS IN LAOS. WILL PROVIDE THE NECESSARY LIAISON AND ASSISTANCE TO [illegible] AT LAKHON MARTIN IN BANGKOK. OUR RATIONALE IS THAT A DEPUTY OR ASSISTANT COMMANDER, 2AD IS THE APPROPRIATE OFFICER, BY VIRTUE OF HIS HEAD RESPONSIBILITIES, TO EXERCISE, ONBEHALF OFTHE COMMANDER [illegible] COMMAND OVER THE 56TH SOW GP (NOT AS THE GP COMMANDER) AS WELL AS ALL ELEMENTS ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO THE 2AB. HE RETAINS THOSE RESPONSIBILITIES WHETHER HE IS INSAIGON OR THAILAND. PART II. CURRENT OPERATIONAL AND SUPPORT POSTURE AT UDORN AS UNDERSTOOD HERE:

A. CRP/ASOC PCSE [illegible] NOW BEING MOVED, 200 PERSONNEL.

B. AIRCRAFT- 38 T-RTJLVI C.

C. CONTROL - COM2AD THRU DEPUTY TO [illegible] ONE DET 2 AT UDORN.

UNDERSTAND AIRCRAFT MAY BE CONSIDERED AS BEING UCVER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF AIRA IN VIENTIANE, ADS. [illegible] DIRECT TO 2AD DEPUTY FOR

JMC-2-19-1

~~S E C R E T~~

~~SECRET~~

P3 3 RUHLKH 1028C ~~S E C R E T~~

RESPONSIBILITIES AS TLE ED IN PARAGRAPH

D. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRO[illegible]

E. SUPPORT -

(1) PERSONNEL [illegible]

34 - TDY FROM 34TH TAC [illegible]

(2)FACILITIES: PERSO[illegible] IN HOTELS AND [illegible]

NEALSWITH AIR AMERICA.

F. POSSIBLE ADDITI[illegible]

(1) AIRCRAFT - [illegible] PROPERTY OF CIVILIAN

MAP).

(2) OPERATIONS - PPC [illegible]

(3) SUPPORT - PERSONNEL [illegible] C-47'S AND

40 INCREASE IN POL & AND [illegible]

(4) TENT CAMP CANONNY.

PART III. PROPOSED MISSION AND TASKS OF USAF IDENTIFIED IN RELATION TO

LAOS OPERATIONS:

A. MISSION: AS THE DEPUTY COMMANDER, [illegible] CONTROL,

AND COORDINATE ALL USAF MATTERS PERTAINING TO ASSIGNED AND ATTACHED

AIR FORCE UNITS, ACTIVITIES AND PERSONNEL IN SUPPORT OF U.S. AND

ALLIED/AIR OPERATIONS IN LAOS.

DPC-7-19-1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 4 RUHLKM 1620C S [illegible]

C. TASKS:((3& [illegible])) CONDUCT AIR [illegible] AS DIRECTED BY APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY.

(2) EXERCISE OPERATIONAL CONTROL [illegible] DEPLOYED DUAL ALL AF OPERATIONAL UNITS IN THAILAND.

(3) ESTABLISH AND [illegible] AS REQUIRED.

(4) RL ESTABLISH AND OPERATE ASOC/ANCC TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN LAOS.

(5) PROVIDE JUICE AND ASSISTANCE AS REQUESTED AND AS CAN

POPNT OF CONTACT TO COORDINATE WITH U.S. EMBASSY BANGKOK AND VIENTIANE ON ALL MATTERS PERTAINING TO [illegible] AIR OPERATIONS IN LAOS.

YL PROVIDE OPERATIONAL, TRAINING, MAINTENANCE, AND LOGISTICS ASSISTANCE TO ALLIED UNITS AS NECESSARY (INCLUDES ALL DET 6 TASKS RELATED TO RTAF).

P [illegible] I PV. PROPOSED COMMANDCHANNELS.

A. THE 2AD DEPUTY WLL EXERCISE OPERATIONAL COMMAND OVER DET 1, D2 3 -9[illegible]/CRP AT UDORN (RLAF OPERATIONS).

B. COMDR 35TH TAC WP, [illegible] DET 2, WILL PROVIDE ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR ALL ASSIGNED AND ATTACHED UNITS AT UDORN.

C. DET 2 IS ASSIGNED TO 35TH TAC WG.

D. THE DEPUTY COMMANDER WILL EXERCISE COMMAND OF THE 35T

[illegible]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 5 RUHLKM 1628C [illegible]

TAC GP PLUS ALL OPERATING [illegible]

PART V. PROPOSED SUPPORT CONCEPT.

AM 4. BASE SUPPORT WILL BE PROVIDED BY [illegible] SKANDIA AS REQUIRED.

B. SUPPLY SUPPORT: PACAF MESSAGE [illegible] AND 627, 15 JUL 64, INFO 13AF AND 2AD APPLIES. [illegible] USAF PERSONNEL SUPERVISE SUPPLY FUNCTION.

C. MAINTENANCE: PACAF MESSAGE CONF [illegible], 15 JUL 64, INFO APRFE AND 13AF, APPLIES.

PART VP. ADDITIONAL FACTORS.

A. LT COL D. J. WOOD WILL DEPART HICKAM 17 JULY TO ASSESS C ESTABLISHING ORGANIZATION AND MANPOWER REQUIRED AT UDORN.

B. WE WISH TO EMPHASIZE THAT ALL OF THE ABOVE PLANNING AND CONSIDERATIONS APPLY TO THE SPECIFIC OPERATIONS CURRENTLY CONDUCTED IN LAOS AT THIS TIME AND ARE NOT REPEAT NOT A PART OF OUR CONTINGENCY PLANS ALTHOUGH THE IMPROVED MILITARY POSTURE AT UDORN DOES PROVIDE A BASIS FOR PREPARING TO OPERATE UNDER [illegible] OF OUR PERTINENT CONTINGENCY PANS.

C. IT IS ASSUMED THAT THERE WILL BE NO ESCALATION OF USAF SUPPORT FOR AIR OPERATIONS IN LAOS, AND THAT SUCH SUPPORT WILL CONTINUE FOR AN INDETERMINATE PERIOD OF TIME. (S-2-9)

BT MC-7-18-1

~~SECRET~~



Till Jan Jan 65
1144-65

3 Aug 65

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FOR OSD/ISA

NMV LBD462VV SLA621VV SAA576
FM HQPACAF RUMBDF
TO RUMSBJ 142A 03/11352
R 031135Z
INFO AAR DIV TSN RVN
RUMBDF/DET 2 35 TAC GP UDORN THAI
RUMBDE/35 TAC GP DON MUANG THAI
RUMBLE/13AF CAB PI

~~SECRET~~ 20DC 836 64. A. 20DC 800-64, 25 JULY 64. B. PACAF PFLDC 1127-64. FOR COL MCCREERY. 1. ~~REQUIRED~~ PARA 1 REF A. AT PRESENT YOUR MISSION AS ~~DEPUTY~~ COMMANDER 2AD, THAILAND IS OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF USAF UNITS BASED AT UDORN. 2. FOR PLANNING PURPOSES ~~ASSUME~~ YOU PREPARE YOU UNIT TO ASSUME OPERATIONAL ~~CONTROL~~ OF ALL USAF UNITS IN THAILAND/LAOS AS DEP CMDR ~~IN~~ IN CASE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF CINTIGENCY OPERATIONS. ~~REF~~ B IS PROPOSED CONCEPT AND SHOULD BE USED ONLY ~~AS A BASE~~ FOR PLANNING. FOR THE PRESENT THERE SHOULD

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 2 RUMSBJ 142A ~~S E C R E T~~
~~IN~~ NO IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE PROPOSALS. MP F11/16 ~~WILL~~ BE RESPONSIBLE TO RTAF AIR DEFENSE NET AND RTAF PER ~~SAMOD~~ WILL BE INTEGRATED IN SUFFICIENT NUMBERS TO ~~ACCOMPLISH~~ AIR DEFENSE REQUIREMENT AND TO RECEIVE ~~NECESSARY~~ AND OPERATIONS RAINING. GP-4.

~~SECRET~~

4

BT



1145-65

7 Aug 65

V

#582

TOR 07/1625Z

V MMF460 ROO RUMBDA RUMBDB RUMBDF
DE RUMBDC 77 07/1130Z
O 071130Z

GO RUMBLM RUMSBJ
DE RUMBDC 77 07/1130Z
O 071130Z
FM 35TAC GP DON XUANG AB THAI
TO RUMBDA/31ABSQ TAKHLI AB THAI
RUMBDB/32ABSQ UBON AB THAI
RUMBLM/DET 1 35TAC GP KORAT AB THAI
RUMBDF/DET 2 35TAC GP UDORN AB THAI
RUMBDA/DET 1 3TFW TAKHLI AB THAI
RUMBDF/DET 6 1ST AIR COMMANDO WG UDORN AB THAI
INFO RUMSBJ/2ADIV TAN SON NHUT RVN
BT
SECRET DO-929H. SUBJ: OPERATION DIRECTIVE (U).
1. REFERENCE MSG 2ODC 836 64, 5 AUG 64.
2. USAF UNITS VIN THAILAND WITH EXCEPTION UDORN WILLBE OPERATIONALLY CONTROLLED BY 35TAC GP UNTIL NOTIFIED BY 2ADIV. SEE PARA 1 OF REFERENCED MSG. GP-4
BT



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2AIRDIVR 23-9

2D AIR DIVISION REGULATION

HEADQUARTERS 2D AIR DIVISION
APO 143 18 September 1964

ORGANIZATION AND MISSION-FIELD

Deputy Commander, 2d Air Division, Thailand

PURPOSE. To delineate the mission and responsibilities and outline operational command and control relationships of the Deputy Commander, 2d Air Division, Thailand.

1. MISSION. The mission of the Deputy Commander, 2d Air Division, Thailand is to conduct, control, and coordinate all USAF matters pertaining to assigned and attached Air Force units, activities and personnel in support of U. S. and allied air operations in Laos.

2. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS:

a. Deputy Commander, 2d Air Division, Thailand is directly responsible to Commander, 2d Air Division and will:

(1) Exercise operational command/control over all 2d Air Division units assigned or attached to Det 2, 35th Tac Gp, Udorn.

(2) Provide liaison with and be immediately responsive to requirements of Chief, Country Team in Laos.

(3) Provide liaison with and assistance as required to JUSMAG and Chief, Country Team in Thailand.

3. RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. Deputy Commander, 2d Air Division, Thailand, will:

(1) With resources provided, establish an ASOC (reduced) at Udorn, Thailand that will be immediately responsive to Commander, 2d Air Division and upon his direction be prepared to function as follows:

(a) Provide sortie apportionment and mission planning support for close air support, interdiction, reconnaissance, airlift, search and rescue, and other functions of air as required.

(b) Prepare and issue operations and fragmentary orders, as appropriate, based on guidance provided.

(c) Provide intelligence and weather reports as required.

OPR: 2OTE
DISTRIBUTION: X (See Page 2)

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(2) With resources provided, establish, jointly manned USAF/ TAC CRP at Udorn, Thailand with capabilities as follows:

(a) Conduct radar surveillance to the maximum extent possible.

(b) Lateral tell later surveillance information with the Ubon, Korat, and Phitsanulok GCIs and forward tell to the Don Muang, CRC.

(c) Provide for communications with friendly aircraft.

(d) Pass information received from friendly aircraft to the ASOC.

(e) Pass information and control directives to friendly aircraft as directed by the ASOC.

(f) Provide navigational assistance and warning of the proximity of other aircraft to friendly aircraft.

(g) Detect and verify hostile aircraft in accordance with the rules of engagement.

(h) Be prepared to control air defense actions against hostile aircraft to include alert, scramble, interception and return to base of aircraft provided for air defense.

(i) In addition to normal forward and lateral tell procedures, provide warning information on unknown and hostile aircraft to the ASOC.

b. Commander, 35th Tac Gp will provide administrative and logistical support to all units under the operational command/control of the Deputy Commander, 2d Air Division, Thailand.

4. Deputy Commander, 2d Air Division, Thailand is authorized direct communication with such other U. S. military services and United States and Allied Government agencies as may be necessary to execute its responsibilities as specified in this directive. Commander 2d Air Division will be apprised, however, of all actions taken under this authority.

5. References: PACAF Message, SECRET PFOC 555 DTG 18C342Z JULY 1964 (MC 7-19-1).

OFFICIAL:

J. P. MOORE
Major General, USAF
Commander

PETER J. F. GRAHAM
Major, USAF
Director of Admin Services

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

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DE RUHLKM 1997F 1

R 191157Z

FM PACAF

TO RUHSSJ/2AIRDIV TAN SON NHUT AFB VIETNAM

INFO RUHALC/13AF CLARK AB PHIL

RUHBEC/35TACGP DON MUANG APT THAILAND

ST

~~S E C R E T~~ C/FTLBC 1127-68.

REFERENCES: A. 20BC 7AR68, DTG 171340Z JUL 68

B. FTDUC 599, DTG 171122Z JUL 68

THIS MESSAGE IS IN THREE PARTS.

PART I. REF A REQUESTS MISSION DETAILED FOR CRP/ ASOC AUTHORIZED FOR UDORN. REF B IS A PROPOSED CONCEPT OF FACILITY RESPONSIBILITIES AT UDORN. IT ALSO SUGGESTS 2AD COMMAND AND CONTROL REPONSIBILITIES FOR THE OPERATIONS IN LAOS.

PART II.

THE MISSION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE CRP AND THE ASOC UNITS AT UDORN

SECRET

ARE INDICATED BELOW AND ARE CONSIDERED ADEQUATE FOR BOTH (1) BEFORE COMMITMENT OF U.S. AIRCRAFT AND (2) FOLLOWING COMMITMENT OF U.S. AIRCRAFT. THE MISSION OF THE CTF AND ASOC AT UDORN IS TO PERFORM BASIC TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM FUNCTIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS BY LAOTIAN AND UNITED STATES AIR FORCES IN LAOS.

1. ASOC FUNCTIONS:

A. PROVIDE SORTIE APPORTIONMENT AND MISSION PLANNING SUPPORT TO THE ROYAL LAOTIAN AIR FORCE (RLAF) AIR OPERATIONS CENTER (AOC) AT VIENTAIANE, LAOS, FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, INTERDICTION, RECONNAISSSNACE, AIRLIFT, SEARCH AND RESCUE, AND OTHER FUNCTIONS OF AIR AS REQUIRED.

B. PREPARE AND ISSUE OPERATIONS AND FRAGMENTARY ORDERS, AS APPROPRIATE, BASED ON GUIDANCE PROVIDED OR DIRECTION ISSUED BY THE RLAF AOC, FOR THE CONDUCT OF AIR OPERAT TNS BY THE RLAF. THIS INCLUDES ORDERS FOR THE MOVEMENT OF AIRCRAFT O AND FROM DISPERSED OPERATING BASES.

C. THROUGH SUPERVISION OF U.S. OR ALLIED AIR LIAISON AND FORWARD AIR CONTROLLER PERSONNEL WHO MAY BE MADE AVAILABLE, PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO RLAF IN ESTABLISHING DIRECT AIR REQUEST

(2085)

JMB-7-12-80

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PAGE 3 RUHLKM 0071 S E C R E T

NETS. THESE NETS WILL EXTEND FROM THE AIR COORDINATORS AND FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS TO THE UDORN CRP ASSC FOR PROCESSING CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, RECONNAISSANCE, AND AIRLIFT REQUESTS OF THE SURFACE FORCES INVOLVED.

D. IN COORDINATION WITH THE RLAF AOC, DETERMINE AND FORWARD TO THE TACTICAL OPERATIONS DIVISION OF THE 2D AIR DIVISION COMMAND POST (TOD, 2ND AADCP) INFORMATION REGARDING REQUIREMENTS FOR US AIR FORCES OPERATIONS IN LAOS TO INCLUDE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, INTERDICTION, RECONNAISSANCE, COUNTER AIR, AIRLIFT, SEARCH AND RESCUE AND SPECIAL AIR WARFARE REQUIREMENTS.

E. COORDINATE WITH THE RLAF AOC TO INTEGRATE U.S. AIR FORCES MISSIONS, TO BE CONDUCTED IN LAOS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE TOD, 2ND AD COMMAND POST, WITH RLAF MISSIONS.

F. MONITOR, THROUGH THE UDORN CRP COMMUNICATIONS AND RADAR FACILITIES, THE CONDUCT OF AIR MISSIONS IN LAOS BY U.S. AND RLAF AIR FORCES. PROVIDE DATA TO THE RLAF AOC AND THE TOD, 2ND ADCP ON THE PROGRESS AND RESULTS OF THESE MISSIONS.

G. PASS, AS MAY BE DIRECTED BY THE RLAF AOC OR THE TOD 2ND ADCP OR AS OTHER REQUIRED, CONTROL INSTUCTIONS THROUGH THE UDORN CRP TO RLAF AND U.S. AIRCRAFT CONDUCTING MISSIONS IN LAOS.

NNA-7-19-80 (3535)

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M. OBTAIN FROM THE RLAF AOC, FOR RLAF AIRCRAFT, AND FROM THE TOD, 2ND ADCP, FOR U.S. AIRCRAFT, REPORTING IN AND OUT PROCEDURES TO BE USED BY THE UBON CRP FOR AIRCRAFT OPERATING OVER LAOS.

I. DISSEMINATE WARNING INFORMATION, PROVIDED BY THE UBORN CRP, ON UNKNOWN OR HOSTILE AIRCRAFT TO THE RLAF AOC, TO THE TOD, 2ND ADCP, AND ELSEWHERE AS MAY BE REQUIRED.

J. PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE AND WEATHER SUPPORT.

2. CRP FUNCTIONS:

A. CONDUCT RADAR SURVEILLANCE TO THE THE MAXIMUM EXTENT PRACTICAL OVER NORTH CENTRAL LAOS.

B. RECEIVE FROM THE UBON CRP, RADAR SURVEILLANCE INFORMATION ON AIRBORNE AIRCRAFT OVER SOUTHERN LAOS.

C. PLOT AIRCRAFT MOVEMENT OVER LAOS AS NECESSARY FOR CONTROL OF ALL AIR OPERATIONS IN LAOS.

D. PROVIDE FOR COMMUNICATIONS WITH FRIENDLY AIRCRAFT OVER LAOS. FOLLOW REPORTING IN AND OUT PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED BY COM2AD AND COM RLAF.

E. PASS INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM RLAF AND U.S. AIRCRAFT TO THE ASOC.

(4785)

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PAGE 5 RUMLJO 139 ~~SECRET~~

F. PASS INFORMATION AND [illegible] TO CLAD AND C.S. AIRCRAFT AS REQUIRED [illegible]

G. PROVIDE MANEUVERING [illegible] OF OTHER AIRCRAFT [illegible] OVER LAOS.

H. LATERAL-TELL [illegible] CRP AND FORWARD-TELL [illegible] MUANG CRC AND SAIGON CRC.

I. DETECT AND VERIFY HOSTILE AIRCRAFT IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULES OF ENGAGEMENT PROVIDED BY SEA CRC AND ADCP.

J. BE PREPARED TO CONTROL AIR DEFENSE ACTIONS AGAINST HOSTILE AIRCRAFT TO INCLUDE ALERT, [illegible], INTERCEPTION AND RETURN TO BASE OF AIRCRAFT PROVIDED FOR AIR DEFENSE.

K. IN ADDITION TO NORMAL [illegible] AND LATERAL TELL PROCEDURES, PROVIDE WARNING INFORMATION ON FRIENDLY AND HOSTILE AIRCRAFT TO THE ASOC.

PART III. YOUR COMMENTS AND [illegible] RECOMMENDED CHANGES ARE WELCOME. GP-4

BT [illegible] 7-19-80

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

HEADQUARTERS
PACIFIC AIR FORCES
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
APO 953, San Francisco, Calif.

File Jan-Jun 65 2865-6

REPLY TO ATTN OF: PFLMO

SUBJECT: Manpower Requirements, UDORN Thailand

TO: Hq USAF (AFOMO)

25 AUG 1964

CD

1. References (Tab A):

a. PACAF message PFLMO-R 6516-64, 12 June 1964.

b. CSAF message AFOMOAC 9240, 2 July 1964.

c. CINCPAC message 153044Z July 1964.

d. CINCPAC message 082339Z August 1964.

2. The marked increase in USAF operations at UDORN Thailand in support of the Royal Laotian Government has resulted in a requirement for TDY personnel in excess of 600 (Tab D). A chronology of escalation to the current level of support follows:

a. Detachment 6, First Air Commando Wing (Water Pump) was deployed in March 1964.

b. Selected PACAF personnel (Maintenance and Supply) were placed on TDY May-June 1964 to augment Water Pump's accelerated training and operational activity.

c. CINCPAC directed PACAF to formulate plans for command and control of USAF operations and support activity at UDORN. In response, Deputy Commander 2nd Air Division, Thailand, assumed command/operational command of all USAF forces at UDORN, and Detachment 2, 35th Tactical Group was activated as a holding unit, references a and b.

d. The Royal Laotian Air Force was expanded from 6 to 30 (plus) T-28 aircraft at UDORN by transfer on a loan basis from USAF and other MAP resources. PACAF Aircraft Maintenance and Supply TDY personnel were increased to support the program.

e. CINCPAC directed, reference c, an additional deployment of approximately 200 personnel. Included was an ASOC, CRP, communications and support personnel.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEARS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

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OAD (2CMO)

PFXD 915-64

4 SEP 1964
1300

f. CINCPAC, reference d, directed PACAF to furnish for an indefinite period the personnel required to support and maintain 40 aircraft (33 T-28's and 7 C-47's) at 50 hours per month. The maintenance manpower requirements total 193 spaces (including Munitions Load Teams). It is planned that Air America will later assume a portion of the maintenance support at UDORN; however, the degree or timing of this capability cannot be assured.

3. The significant number of USAF TDY personnel in SEA during recent months has been a matter of concern and particularly since the PCS tour for the area is one year. Presently, there are approximately 2,571 USAF TDY personnel in Southeast Asia; 1,590 of these are from PACAF. The severe manpower (personnel) limitation in PACAF resulting from the Clear Water programs emphasizes the need to return TDY personnel as rapidly as possible. Therefore, it is essential that fixed requirements be recognized and manpower spaces allocated to support the operations. At UDORN Thailand, 529 spaces (28 officers, 450 airmen, 51 LN civilians) are required for PACAF effective FY 2/65 to establish a permanent Air Force operation.

4. Tabs B and C are grade and PEC summaries of PACAF requirements by officer, airmen, and civilian spaces. Tab D is base population at UDORN, including PACAF and non-PACAF requirements. The USAF non-PACAF requirements are estimates obtained from representatives of Air Force Communications Service and Air Weather Service. Tabs E, F, G and H are the proposed manning documents for PACAF units at UDORN. Tab I is an increase in Headquarters 2nd Air Division to authorize a Deputy Commander 2nd Air Division, Thailand. This increase will require a headquarters ceiling increase. Tab J is additional manpower for 35th Tactical Group which supports the UDORN operation augmentation and is required for the administrative services, procurement, accounting and finance, military personnel and supply functions. Tab K is the backup support requirements at Clark Air Base in functions of military personnel and base supply. Manpower requirements for non-PACAF units are not included in the total additive requirements.

5. Detachment 2, 35th Tactical Group, will be discontinued. Request you issue appropriate DAF AFOMO letter to organize an AFCON Air Base Squadron (333) at UDORN, with assignment to the 35th Tactical Group effective 15 October 1964.

6. In summary the following action is requested as soon as practical:

a. Approval of organization action requested in paragraph 5.

b. Authorization of 28 officers, 450 airmen and 51 Local National manpower spaces to PACAF. See Tab B.

c. Increase the PACAF headquarters ceiling by two spaces for Headquarters, 2nd Air Division. See Tab I.

d. Authorization of the necessary manpower spaces to AFCS and MATS, approximately 87 spaces. See Tab D.

7. Separate action is being taken to request a Republic of Vietnam ceiling increase.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

WILLIAM BURKE
Colonel, USAF
AC/S Plans

11 Atch
1. Tab A-PACAF msg PFLMO-R 6516-64, 12 Jun 64; CSAF msg AFOMOAC 9240, 2 Jul 64; CINCPAC msg 150442Z Jul 64, CINCPAC msg 082339Z Aug 64
2. Tab B-Recap of Manpower Rqr
3. Tab C-PEC Requirement
4. Tab D-UDORN Rqr, Base Pop
5. Tab E-Proposed Increase for 33th AB SQ
6. Tab F-Proposed AB SQ UDORN
7. Tab G-Proposed Det 4, 619 TCT SQ
8. Tab H-Proposed Det 8, 8 Aerial Port Sq
9. Tab I-Proposed Increase for Hq 2AD
10. Tab J-Proposed Increase for 35th Tactical Group
11. Tab K-Proposed Increase for Clark Air Base

Copies to: AFPMPE, AFPMPF
13AF(13CMO)
2AD(2CMO)

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RECAP OF MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

OFFICERS

	COL	LTC	MAJ	CPT	1LT	TOT OFF
Required	1	3	7	21	6	38
Authorized		1	3	6		10
Additive	1	2	4	15	6	28

AIRMEN

	CMS	SMS	MSG	TSG	SSG	SGT	AMN	TOT AFM
Required	4	8	21	42	129	157	103	464
Authorized				2	4	4		14
Additive	4	8	21	40	123	151	103	450

CIVILIAN

1S (GS-5) 21

AGG TOTAL

	Required	Authorized	Additive
Officer	38	10	28
Airmen	464	14	450
Civilian	21	--	21
	523	24	499

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Tab B

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TAB C

PEC REQUIREMENT

PEC	REQUIRED OFF	REQUIRED ENL	REQUIRED CIV	AUTHORIZED OFF	AUTHORIZED ENL	AUTHORIZED CIV	ASSIGNED OFF	ASSIGNED ENL	ASSIGNED CIV
[illegible]	20	64		10	10		10	54	
[illegible]	9	188	36		4		9	184	36
[illegible]	1	1					1	1	
[illegible]		5						5	
[illegible]	2	13	15				2	13	15
[illegible]	4	149					4	149	
[illegible]	2	4					2	4	
TOTAL	38	464	51	10	14		38	450	51

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TAB B

[redacted] REQUIREMENTS
[redacted] Consolidation

UNIT	ACT	ASN	TOT ASN	SIX
[redacted]				
ASOC (DS AS Sq)	15	14	27	
_____ AS Sq	15	352	367	30
Sqs 4, 610 TCT Sq (CMP)	7	30	37	
Sqs 8, 8 ARS Sq	2	13	15	15
TOTAL	37	409	446	45
[redacted] (Continued)				
[redacted]			76	
[redacted] - Weather			11	
[redacted] - Sqs 6, 1ACS Sq			56	
TOTAL			143	
[redacted]			609	45

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TAB E

33 AB SQUADRON

1300 OPERATIONS - ASOC (PEC 333)

GRADE	AFSC	REQUIREMENT
LTC	0036	1
MAJ	1416	1
MAJ	1416	1
CPT	1435	3
MAJ	1435	1
CPT	1435	1
MAJ	8816	1
CPT	8835	3
MSG	27170	1
SSG	27150	5
MSG	30470	1
TSG	30470	2
SSG	30450	2
SSG	70250	2
AIC	70250	3
	TOTAL	27

RECAP

LTC Maj Capt TSgt

MSgt SSgt SSgt AIC TOTAL

SECRET

TAB F

333 AS SQ NUMBER

1000 Chaplain (FEC 344)

CPT	8024	2
AIC	701540	1
AIC	701580	1
		4

1100 Admin Service (FEC 344)

CPT	7024	1
AIC	70250	1
AIC	70250	1
SSG	70250	1
TSG	70870	1
MSG	70250/20130	1
		6

1200 Material (FEC 344)

MAJ	6816	1
SSG	64730	1
AIC	74850	1
		3

[illegible] Transient Aircraft (FEC 340)

SSG	30150	1
ASC	42153	1
AIC	43151A	2
TSG	43171A	1
		5

[illegible] Chief of Maintenance (FEC 773)

LTC	4816	1
AIC	70850	1
		2

[illegible] Quint Control Roads/Reports Material Control (FEC 773)

CMS	43150	1
MSG	43370	1
TSG	43370	1
MSG	43171A	1
SSG	43330	1
MSG	64670	1
SSG	64650	1
AIC	[illegible]	2
ASC	[illegible]	2
MSG	[illegible]	1
		12

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3116000 Qual Cont Tng/Stan (PEC 773)

SMS	43190	1
SSG	43151A	2
TSG	46270	1
TSG	43271	1
MSG	43171A	1
		6

3200000 Org Maint Sr (PEC 773)

CPT	4344	1
CMS	43190	1
A2C	70250	1
		3

3210000 Flight Line (PEC 773)

SMS	43190	1
MSG	43171A	3
TSG	43171A	4
SSG	43151A	24
A1C	43151A	16
A2C	43151A	14
		62

3220000 Periodic (PEC 773)

MSG	43171A	1
SSG	43151A	2
A1C	43151A	2
A2C	43151A	5
		10

3230000 Field/Comm/Arm/Elec/Mun Sr (PEC 773)

CPT	4344	1
SMS	43190	1
A1C	70250	1
		3

3231000 Electric Sys (PEC 773)

SSG	43150	1
A2C	43050	1
		2

3240000 Valve (PEC 773)

A1C	55251	1

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2b1000 Radio (PEC 773)

TSG	30170	1
BIG	30150	1
AIC	30150	2
A2C	30150	2
		6

2321000 Radio Eng (PEC 773)

MSG	43271	1
TSG	43271	2
SSG	43251	3
AIC	43251	2
A2C	43251	4
		12

23[illegible] Pseudraulics (PEC 773)

SSG	42152	1
AIC	42152	1
A2C	42152	1
		3

23[illegible] Instrument (PEC 773)

TSG	42270	1
AIC	42250	2
A2C	42250	1
		4

23[illegible] Machine (PEC 773)

SSG	53150	1

23[illegible] [illegible]smelter (PEC 773)

[illegible]	42151A	1
AIC	42151A	1
A2C	42151A	2
		4

23[illegible] Sheet Repair (PEC 773)

SSG	53450	1
A2C	53450	1
		2

23[illegible] Welding (PEC 773)

AIC	53250	1

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~~SECRET~~

[redacted] Survival Equip (PEC 773)

SSG	58150	1
TSG	58170	1
A3C	58250	1
A1C	58250	1
		4

[redacted] ASE (PEC 773)

TSG	42173	1
SSG	42153	1
A1C	42153	1
A3C	42153	1
SSG	54850	1
A1C	54850	1
		6

[redacted] Munitions Services (PEC 773)

LT	3275A	1
CMS	46250	1
MSG	46270	2
TSG	46270	2
		6

[redacted] Radar (PEC 773)

A1C	301518	1

[redacted] Munitions Loading (PEC 773)

SSG	46250	14
A1C	46250	14
A3C	46250	14
		42

[redacted] Munitions Storage (PEC 344)

SSG	46131	1
TSG	46171	1
A3C	46150	2
A1C	46150	2
TSG	[redacted] 46150	1
MSG	46170	1
SSGT	46150	2
SSGT	46130	4
SSGT	46010	4
		18

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

[redacted] Unit Command (PEC 344)

LTC	0046	1
AIC	70250	1/2

[redacted] Unit Admin (PEC 344)

AIC	70250	1
SMS	1090	1
TSG	70270	1
AIC	70251	1
SSG	732508	1/5

4120 Unit Supply (PEC 344)

LT	6434	1
MSG	64670	1
SSG	64650	2
AIC	64650	4
AIC	64650	1
SSG	64750	1
AIC	64550	1
AIC	70850	1/12

4130 Unit Fuel Supply (PEC 344)

AIC	64350A	2
AIC	64350A	2
SSG	64350A	1
TSG	64370A	1/6

4210 Transportation (PEC 344)

AIC	60351	1

4210 Transportation Spec (PEC 334)

SSG	60351	1
TSG	60370	1
AIC	60350A	2
MSG	60330A	1/16

[redacted]

4250 Transportation Maint (PEC 344)

AIC	47150	2
AIC	47151	2
AIC	47151	1
SSG	47151	1
AIC	47152	2
SSG	47152	1
TSG	47170	1
AIC	64650	1
AIC	70250	1
		12

4810 Weapon Systems Secy (PEC 344)

AIC	77150	6
AIC	77150	4
SSG	77150	3
TSG	77170	1
		14

4820 Civil Engr (PEC 344)

CPT	5544	1
AIC	70250	1
MSG	80330	1
		3

4820 Eng/Surveyr (PEC 344)

LT	5530	1
MSG	55270	1
AIC	22[illegible]0	1
AIC	70250	1
		4

4850 Fire Prot/Crash (PEC 344)

AIC	57150	4
AIC	57150	8
SSG	57150	3
TSG	57170	1
		16

4860 Maint and Repair (PEC 344)

SSG	55250	1
AIC	55250	1
SSG	54851	1
AIC	54850	1
SSG	54850	1
AIC	54850	1
SSG	54850	1

AIC	55151	2
AIC	55530	1
TSG	55570	1
NSG	55170	1
SSG	55250	1
SSG	55255	1
AIC	55255	1
TSG	55679	1
AIC	70250	1
WAGE	54650	1
WAGE	55010	3
WAGE	55131	1
WAGE	55132	1
WAGE	55230	2
WAGE	55231	1
		26

4070 Utility Open (PEC 344)

AIC	54350	2
AIC	54350	3
SSG	54350	1
TSG	54370	1
AIC	56350	2
SSG	56350	1
NSG	54650	1
AIC	56650	1
WAGE	56010	2
WAGE	56350	1
		15

4200 Personnel Services (PEC 344)

SSG	74151	1
SSG	75151	1
		2

4250 Open Space (PEC 344)

SSG	62450	1
TSG	62470	1
		2

4270 Food Service (PEC 344)

AIC	62150	1
SSG	62150	1
ASC	62250	7
AIC	62250	9
SSG	62250	6
TSG	62270	1
NSG	62270	1
		26

[redacted]

[redacted] Base Operations (PEC 346)

CPT	14352	1
TSG	27170	1
AIC	27150	1
AIC	27150	1/2

[redacted] Medical Staff (PHY) (PEC 755)

CPT	3326	1

[redacted] Air Force Clinic (PEC 755)

SSG	30650	1

[redacted] General Dental Clinic (PEC 755)

AIC	302548	1
SSG	302548	1/2

[redacted] Dental Dets (PEC 755)

CPT	3826	1
AIC	38150	1/2

[redacted]

[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
2	1	9	3	15

[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
3	7	16	30	33	131	82	352

[redacted]	[redacted]	
30	Off	15
	Amn	352
	Civ	30
		397

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

Detachment 4, 619 TacCon Squadron

UDORN CRP

FUNCTIONAL CODE	GRADE	AFSC	REQUIREMENTS
2340 AGE MAINT (PEC 339)	A1C	542502	1
	A2C	54350	1
	SSG	54350	1
	A1C	54550	1
	A2C	42153	1
	SSG	42153	1
			6
2620 GND RADIO MAINT (PEC 339)	A2C	30454	2
	A1C	30454	1
	SSG	30454	1
			4
2630 GND RADAR MAINT(PEC 339)	CPT	3044B	1
	A2C	30352	2
	A1C	30352	4
	SSG	30352	2
	TSG	30372	1
	MSG	30372	1
			11
2670 TELEPHONE (PEC 339)	SSG	36251B	1
			1
3000001 UNIT COMMANDER (PEC 339)			
	MAJ	1716	1
			1
3000010 UNIT ADMINISTRATION (PEC 339)			
	A1C	70250	1
	SSG	70250	1
			2

~~SECRET~~

Tab G

~~SECRET~~

Det 4, 619 TGT SQ

3143 GND RADAR OPNS (PEC 339)	LT	1744A	2
	CPT	1744A	3
	A2C	27350A	6
	A1C	27350A	7
	SSG	27350A	7
	TSG	27370A	3
	MSG	27370A	1
	SMS	27370	1
			30
4120 UNIT SUPPLY (PEC 339)	A1C	64650	1
	SSG	64650	1
			2

RECAP

MAJ	CPT	LT	TOTAL
1	4	2	7

SMS	MSG	TSG	SSG	A1C	A2C	
1	2	4	15	16	12	50

~~SECRET~~

TAB H

DET 8, 3 AERIAL PORT SQ

UDORN

[redacted] Unit Command (PEC 427)

MAJ	6016	1

[redacted] Terminal Services (PEC 427)

LT	6044	1
A2C	70050	1/2

[redacted] Freight Services (PEC 427)

A2C	60551	1
A1C	60551	1
SSG	60551	3
TSG	60570	2
MSG	60570	1
[redacted]	60550	2
[redacted]	60530	7
[redacted]	60010	1/2

[redacted] Passenger Transport (PEC 427)

A1C	60550	1
SSG	60550	1/2

[redacted] Space Control (PEC 427)

SSG	60551	1
TSG	60570	1/2

MAJ	SEC	LT	TOTAL	MSG	TSG	SSG	A1C	A2C	TOTAL	GRAND TOTAL
1	-	1	2	1	3	5	2	2	13	15

SECRET

TAB 1

HQ 2 AIR DIVISION

1010 Command (PEC 347)

Deputy Commander 2AD/Thailand

Col	70366	1
536	70250	1/2

SECRET

TAB J

35 TAC GP (DOM HUMAN)

1100 Admin Services (PEC 344)

AIC	70250	2
SSG	70250	1/3

1251 Procurement (PEC 344)

SSG	65150	1/1

1511 Accounts Control

AIC	67153	1/1

1512 Military Pay (PEC 344)

AIC	67153	1/1

1680 Military Personnel (PEC 344)

SSG	73250B	1/1

412077 ABW (PEC 344)

CMS	64790	1
TSG	64670	1
SSG	64650	1
AIC	64650	4
AIC	64750	2
AIC	70250	1
A2C	64650	4
A2C	70250	1/15

4810 Trans Operations (PEC 344)

AIC	60350A	1
W4SG	60350A	5/6

4890 Quartermaster/Troop Sup (PEC 344)

SSG	64250	1/1

SECRET

RECAP:

CMS	SMS	MSG	TSG	SSG	AIC	A2C	TOTAL	LH Civ
1			1	5	12	5	24	5

~~SECRET~~

405 FIGHTER WING (Clark Air Base, PI)

1620 Military Personnel (PEC 344)

AIC 73250A	1/1

4111520 Research (PEC 344)

TSG 64570	1
SSG 64550	1/2

4111548 Stock Control (PEC 344)

SSG 64550	1
AIC 64550	1/2

4113486 Receiving (PEC 344)

TSG 64770	1
AIC 64750	1/2

4113552 Storage and Issue (PEC 344)

SSG 64750	1
A2C 64730	2
N458 64730	1/4

RECAP

N458 CIV	TSG	SSG	AIC	A2C	TOTAL
1	2	3	3	2	11

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS
SECOND AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO San Francisco 96307

SPECIAL ORDER 2 August 1965
P-6

1. COL HENRY A FISCHER JR, 8301A, Hq 2nd Air Div, APO SF 96307 with permanent duty stn APO SF 96237, is assigned primary duty as Director of Materiel, DAFSC 0046 with Dep Commander, FAC 1010002, PEC 247, effective 27 May 65, DEROS 27 May 66. AUTH: AFM 35-1.

2. COL JOHN R MURPHY, 8944A, Hq 2nd Air Div, APO SF 96307 with permanent duty stn APO SF 96237, is assigned primary duty as Dep Commander Thailand with Dep Commander, DAFSC 0066, FAC 1010002, PEC 347 effective 27 May 65, DEROS 27 May 66. AUTH: AFM 35-1.

3. LT COL GEORGE E HODSDON JR, 49286A, 2nd Air Div, APO SF 96307 is assigned primary duty as Manpower Mgmt Staff Off, DAFSC 7426 with Manpower & Organization, FAC 1080000, PEC 347 effective 25 Jun 65, DEROS 24 Jun 66. AUTH: AFM 35-1.

4. LT COL ROBERT M LOEFFLER, 36504A, 6250 Cmbt Spt Gp, APO SF 96307 is assigned primary duty as Opns Staff Off, DAFSC 1416 with JT Research & Test Act, FAC 7374000, PEC 773 effective 5 Jun 65, ADSC & DEROS 3 Jun 66. AUTH: AFM 35-1.

5. MAJ ROLLAND G HULL, 24056A, 2nd Air Div, APO SF 96307 with Permanent duty stn 33 Air Base Sq, APO SF 96307 is assigned primary duty as Opns Staff Off, DAFSC 1411 with Air Opns Cen, FAC 1300081, PEC 339 effective 10 May 65, DEROS 10 May 66. AUTH: AFM 35-1.

6. MAJ JOHN G CORLEY II, 40917A, 33 Air Base Sq, APO SF 96307 is assigned primary duty as Air Liaison Off, DAFSC 1451 with Air Opns Cen, FAC 1300081, PEC 339, effective 23 Jun 65, DEROS 22 Jun 66. AUTH: AFM 35-1.

7. MAJ LEWIS S DAUGHERTY, 30314A, 1st Air Commando Sq, APO SF 96227 is assigned primary duty as Plt Tac Ftr, DAFSC 1111Z with AIE Acft Opns, FAC 3110010, PEC 336 effective 21 Jun 65, DEROS 21 Jun 66. AUTH: AFM 35-1.

8. MAJ BILLY G HALBERT, 25581A, 33 Air Base Sq, APO SF 96307 is assigned primary duty as Air Liaison Off, DAFSC 1451 with Air Opns Cen, FAC 1300081, PEC 339, effective 16 Jun 65, DEROS 16 Jun 66. AUTH: AFM 35-1.

9. CAPT RODGER P BLEDSOE, AO3080651, 33 Air Base Sq, APO SF 96307 is assigned primary duty as Forward Air Controller, DAFSC 1441 with Air Opns Cen, FAC 1300081, PEC 339 effective 10 Jun 65, DEROS 8 Jun 66. AFSC 1441 is awarded as an additional AFSC. AUTH: AFM 35-1.

P-6

10. CAPT JOHN E GRIFFITH, A03087562, 33 Air Base Sq, APO SF 96307 is assigned primary duty as Trnsp Off, DAFSC 6044 with Transportation, FAC 4200000, PEC 344, effective 5 Jun 65, DEROS 5 Jun 66. AUTH: AFM 35-1.

11. CAPT HUGH C ROGERS, A03141581, 6236 Cmbt Spt Sq, APO SF 96303 is assigned primary duty as Med Off Aerospace, DAFSC 9356 with Med Staff/Physician, FAC 5201000, PEC 755, effective 16 Jun 65, DEROS 15 Jun 66. AUTH: AFM 35-1.

12. CAPT FREDERICK LARABEE, A03066282, 1st Air Commando Sq, APO SF 96227 is assigned primary duty as Pilot AIE, DAFSC 1111Z with Acft Opns AIE, FAC 3110010, PEC 336, effective 21 Jun 65, DEROS & ADSC 19 Jun 66. AFSC 1111Z is awarded as an additional AFSC. AUTH: AFM 35-1.

13. CAPT JAMES A WOODS, 30256A, Det 1, 34 Tac Gp, APO SF 96295 is assigned primary duty as Maint Engr, DAFSC 5544 with Civil Engr, FAC 4400000, PEC 344, effective 28 May 65, DEROS & ADSC 26 May 66. AUTH: AFM 35-1.

14. CAPT JOE I LUCAS, 71841A, 1st Air Commando Sq, APO SF 96227 is assigned primary duty as Plt Tac Ftr, DAFSC 1111Z with AIE Acft Opns, FAC 3110010, PEC 336, effective 15 Jun 65, DEROS 15 Jun 66. AFSC 1111Z is awarded as an additional AFSC. AUTH: AFM 35-1.

15. CAPT ALBERT L PERZACCA, 57066A, 1st Air Commando Sq, APO SF 96227 is assigned primary duty as Plt Trans, DAFSC 1045Z with Acft Opns C-47, FAC 3110023, PEC 336 effective 15 Jun 65, DEROS 15 Jun 66. AUTH: AFM 35-1.

16. CAPT WILBUR A DARSEY, 57064A, 1st Air Commando Sq, APO SF 96227 is assigned primary duty as Plt Tac Ftr, DAFSC 1111Z with AIE Acft Opns, FAC 3100010, PEC 336, effective 22 Jun 65, DEROS 22 Jun 66. AFSC 1111Z is awarded as an additional AFSC. AUTH: AFM 35-1.

17. CAPT JOHN F NAGLE, A03080231, 33 Air Base Sq, APO SF 96307 is assigned primary duty as Air Opns Off Other, DAFSC 1431Z with Air Opns Cen, FAC 1300081, PEC 339 effective 8 Jun 65, DEROS 3 Jun 66. AFSC 1431Z is awarded as an additional AFSC. AUTH: AFM 35-1.

18. 1ST LT JOHN J JACHIMCWICZ, A03154810, 33 Air Base Sq, APO SF 96307 is assigned primary duty as Sec & Law Enforcement Off, DAFSC 8124 with Wpns Sys Sec, FAC 4310000, PEC 344, effective 17 Jun 65, DEROS & ADSC 15 Jun 66. AUTH: AFM 35-1.

FOR THE COMMANDER

GORDON A HAGGARD
Major, USAF
Asst Director of Admin Svcs

DISTRIBUTION
"B"



[illegible] 1 KORSALA
ZAT S 5588
O 270430
FM 2AIRDIV CP
TO ZEN/PACAFCC
INFO ZEN/13AFCC
RUMSALH/DEP COMDR 2AD UDORN
ZT
S E C R E T/AIR FORCE EYES ONLY. SUBJECT SEA
ORGANIZATIMC.
REF: PACAF SECRET DPL 55559 JUL 68.
THIS MSG IN V PARTS.
PART I. THE POSITION TAAKEN BY CINCPACAF QUOTED IN REF MSG IS RECOGNIZED AS BEING FIRM AND THAT REDLANA ACTION NOW MAY NOT BE TIMELY. COMPLETE REPORT WILL BE UNDERTAKEN TO IMPLEMENT THESE INSTRUCTIONS. IT IS BELIEVED, HOWEVER, THAT CERTAIN SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIES APPARENT AT THIS TIME SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO ATTENTION OF CINCPACAF.

PART II RUMSALA 173T S E C R E T AIR FORCE EYES ONLY
PART II. IN RVN, ONLY INCONSISTENCY IS DESIGNATION OF [illegible] 35D TAC GP AS A COMBAT SUPPORT GP RATHER THAN A TAC WG IN VIEW OF CURRENT OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES ASSOCIATED WITH PRESENT 35D TAC GP AND WHICH ARE FULLY EXPECTED TO CONTINUE.
[illegible] LAT IN THAILAND, ASSUME CSAF DECISION TO [illegible] ALL COMBAT SUPPORT GPS TO INCLUDE DON MUANG, TO [illegible] TAC FTR WG AT KORAT, IS PREDICATED ON DESIRE [illegible] MAYE NO LAYERING AND THAT 6234TH TAC FTR WG W/B [illegible] LEVEL USAF ORGANIZATION IN THAILAND. ALSO [illegible] PACAF/2ADIV PROPOSAL FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF ADDITIONAL [illegible] HEAD FOR PRESENT TIME. (B) ALTHOUGH [illegible] OF COMBAT SUPPORT GROUPS TO 6234TH TAC FTR WG [illegible] SOLUTION FOR MANY OBVIOUS REASONS, BELIEVE [illegible] ORGANIZATION POSSIBLE IF RECOGNITION IS GIVE [illegible] RESPONSIBILITIES WHICH ARE NOW BEING [illegible] BY PRESENT DEP CMDR 2ADIV FOR THAILAND [illegible] TO BE ACCOMPLISHED REGARDLESS OF ULTIMATE [illegible] ARRANGEMENT. SOLUTION PREDICATED ON [illegible] DESIRES OF CSAF AS WELL AS SIMPLIFYING [illegible] IN THAILAND, A MATTER CONSIDERED OF

PART III RUMSALA 174T S E C R E T AIR FORCE EYES ONLY
[illegible] IMPORTANCE PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF CONFUSION WHICH [illegible] ON ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS IN THAILAND. IT [illegible] THAT PRESENT ASOC AT UDORN CONTINUE TO [illegible] UNDER PRESENT DIRECTOR. DEP CMDR 2ADIV [illegible] AND STAFF WOULD MOVE TO KORAT ASSUMING COMMAND [illegible] TAC FTR WG AND STILL RETAINING FUNCTIONS AND [illegible] DEP CMDR 2ADIV THAILAND, WITH TITLE "CMDR [illegible] TAC FTR WG/DEP CMDR 2ADIV THAILAND". RESPONSIVE [illegible] CMDR 2ADIV HE WOULD [illegible] TO EMPHASIZE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF PRESENT FUNCTIONS [illegible] USAF REPRESENTATIVE IN THAILAND, WITH TWO HS [illegible] TACTICAL AIR DEFENSE, AND RETAIN OPERATIONAL CONTROL AS DIRECTED BY CMDR 2ADIV OVER THAI BASED TACTICAL FORCES. THE ACTUAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR

SECRET

1270
(22)
1117
5
IMMEDIAT
7/1630
1. Col M
2. Col C

THE 6234TH TAC FTR WG AND [illegible] WOULD BE DELEGATED TO HIS DEPUTY WING [illegible] ITUTE. THE PRESENT WING CMDR, AND WOULD [illegible] CARRYING OUT AREA RESPONSIBILITIES. AT [illegible] ALL UNITS IN THAILAND WOULD HAVE CLEAR [illegible] TO WHOM THEY ARE RESPONSIBLE, AND DIRECT, SIMPLIFIED [illegible] OF COMMAND FROM

PAGE 4 RUMSALA 173T [illegible] EYES ONLY
CMDR 2ADVI TO ONE INDIVIDUAL IN THAILAND WOULD BE ESTABLISHED. A HQ COMBINING PERSONNEL EARMARKED FOR DEP CMDR 2ADIV AT UDORN ANT THOSE ASSIGNED TO PRESENT 6234TH TAC FTR WG WOULD BE ESTABLISHED WITH PROBABILITY OF SOME PERSONNEL SAVINGS. (C) PRESENT CSAF DECISION STILL RETAINS UNDESIREABLE BASE STRUCTURE AT UDORN, UBON AND TAKHLI IN THAT COMBAT WUPPORT GROUP COMMANDERS WOULD CONTINUE TO BE SENIOR OFFICERS AT THOSE BASES YET BE SEPARATE FROM TACTICAL UNITS BEING SUPPORTED AND NOT POSSESSING OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE TO COMMAND OPERATIONAL UNITS. A SINGLE OPERATIONAL CMDRNTS STILL MANDATORY AT EACH BASE TO WHOM THE COMBAT SUPPORT GP CMDRS WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE TO AND WHOM THE 6234TH TAC FTR WG CMDR WOULD GIVE DIREKVION TO AS HIS SENIOR, RESPONSIBLE CMDR AT EACH BASE. THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN OFFICER IN GRADE OF COLONEL TO BE OPERATIONAL CMDR AT UBON, UDORN AND TAKHLI IS CONSIDERED THE BEST SOLUTION. FOR THE PRESENT THEY WOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED WING CMDRS, NOT HAVE A WING STAFF, BUT COULD PROVIDE THE NUCLEOUS FOR A WING ORGANIZATION AT SOME FUTURE DATE.

PAGE 5 RUMSALA 173T [illegible] EYES ONLY
PART IV. (A) CSAF MSG INFERS LOGISTIC RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THAILAND W/B RESPONSIBILITY OF 13AF. IT IS RECOGNIZED CSAF MOTIVES FOR SUCH SPLIT OF LOGISTICS SUPERVISION UNDOUBTEDLY IS PREDICATED ON INTENTION OF RELIEVING 2ADIV FROM LOGISTICS BURDENS, BUT IN EFFECT, THE SOLUTION INTENDED WILL RESULT IN GREATER COMPLEXITY AND INEFFICIENCY FOR 2ADIV. SEPARATION OF OPERATIONAL AND LOGISTIC RESPONSIBILITIES, ALTHOUGH CAPABLE OF EXECUTION, IS POOR SOLUTION WHICH WILL CAUSE DUPLICATION OF FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL AT BOTH HQ 13AF AND 2ADIV, INEFFICIENCOF EXECUTION, ADDS COMPLEXITY, AND OF GREATEST IMPOTANCE, WILL PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES TO EFFECT ADVERSELY ON CONDUCT OF AIR OPERATIONS. CMDR 2 ADIV MUST LOOK TO HIS OWN STAFF TO SOLVE LOGISTICS PROBLIMS HAVING URGENT IMPACT. (B) THE MUNITIONS FROM THAILAND TO MEET EMERGENCY SHORTAGES IN VIETNAM MUST BE AT THE DIRECTION OF CMDR 2ADIV FOR IT IS THE OPERATIONAL CMDR WHO WILL KNOW FIRST MUNITIONS NEEDS TO MEET THE FOLWG DAYS MISSIONS. THE AMMO CONTROL POINT FOR BOTH COUNTRIES END OF SECTION ONE TELECON NBR 173T ~~SECRET AIR FORCE EYES ONLY~~
GT

SECRET

fo1

~~SECRET~~ TOR

07/1130Z

DCT

1125

VV SAA280 ALC183
OO RUMSATA
DE RUMSALA 174T 1880435
RUMSATA-T-RUMSALH
Y SSSSS
O 1804352
FM 2ADCP
TO ZEN/PACAFCC
INFO ZEN/13AFCC
RUMSALH/DET CMDR 2AD DJOM...
BT

~~S E C R E T AIR FORCE EYES ONLY~~ SECTION TWO OF TWO. TELSYON NBR 174T
MUST BE. A FUNCTION OF 2ADIV, [illegible] 2ADIV
WILL ABSOLUTELY REQUIRE OF 13AF [illegible] POSTURE WHEN
FRAGGING FOR THAILAND, AND LACK OF RETURN TIME TO OBTAIN
FROM 13AF. FOR 13AF TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR MUNITIONS
SUPPORT OF THAI UNITS PLACES THE 2ADIV ACP IN UNDESIREABLE
POSITION OF MONITORING RESUPPLY ACTIONS OF A LATERAL
COMMAND. A REVISION OF 'SPECIAL EXPRESS' W/B REQUIRED
TO SUPPORT A COUNTRY SYSTEM RATHER THAN THE PRESENTLY
DESIGNED CENTURY SERIES (ALPHA) AND THE A1E/B-57 SERIES
(BRAVO). THERE W/B NUMEROUS OTHER AREAS OF DUPLICATION

PAGE 2 RUMSALA 174T ~~S E C R E T AIR FORCE EYES ONLY~~
AND CONFUSION, ALL WHICH COULD POSSIBLY BE ELIMINATED
BY A 13AF LOGISTICS LIAISON UNIT BEING PLACED ON DUTY
AT HQ 2ADIV, BUT THIS WOULD CREATE FURTHER DUPLICATION
OF FUNCTIONS.
PART V. IN BRIEF, CSAF MSG CAN BE IMPLEMENTED BUT WITH
ADVERSE EFFECTS AS COMPARED TO PREVIOUS PACAF/2ADIV
POSITION. APPROVAL OF PROPOSALS SET FORTH IN PART III
WILL PERMIT EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION. THIS HQ WILL
DEVELOP PLAN WITH 13AF TO DETERMINE LOGISTICS RESPONSIBILITIES.
THE BASIS FOR SUCH DETERMINATIONS W/B EFFECTIVE MISSION
ACCOMPLISHMENT UTILIZING PRINCIPAL OF DUPLICATED CHANNELS
OF COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS.
END TELECON NBR 174T SEC SON [illegible] ~~S E C R E T AIR FORCE EYES ONLY~~
BT

~~SECRET~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ROUTINE

1965 NOV 14 22 07

M/C 14/2118-(35) FOR 14/2215

2783

V3

VV BDH094VV SXB155LDBGWQRLA974C2B1482CKMC299

RR RUMBDK RUMBDF
DE RUHLKM 80 3142339
ZNY CCCCC
R 142252Z
FM CINCPACAF
TO RUEAHQ/CSAF
RUHABA/13AF CLARK AB PHIL
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUHSRJ/2AIRDIV TAN SON NHUT AFLD VIETNAM
RUMBDK/6234CMBTSPTGP KORAT AB THAILAND
RUMBDF/DEP COMDR 2 13 THAILAND UDORN AB THAILAND
BT

2 COPIES RECEIVED
ACT ON: 1 - 20 CTAF
INFO: 1 - DPM
14/2215

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ DCE 74257 NOV 65.
FOR AFOCE/JC. SUBJ: P341 PROJECT KRT XX-6,CONST COMMAND HQ (ACC NO:, TIC $200 000.
1. REQ IMMED APPROVAL FOR SUBJ P341 PROJ. PROJ PROVIDES FOR TTE CONSTRUCTION OF A 9500 SF SEMI-PERMANENT COMD HQ BLDG INCLUDI G APPROX 25 TONS ACND ELECT SERVICES VEHICLE PARKING ACCESS ROAD AND UTILITIES REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THIS FACILITY.
2. THIS IA NEW ANDURGENT REQUIREMENT DICTATED BY THE ESTABLISHMENT OFA DEP COMDR 2/13-THAILAND AND STAFF ORGANIZATION TO BE LOCATED AT KORAT. THE DEP COMDR 2/13-THAILAND WILL REPRESENTBOTH

PAGE 2 RUHLKM 80 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
2AD AND 13AF AS THE SENIOR SINGLE USAF REPRESENTATIVE IN THAILAND. THE 2AD COMDR WILL EERCISE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THAILAND FORCES THROUGH THE D/COMDR 2/13-THAILAND;THE 13AF COMDR WILL ACCONPLISH HIS SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITIES IN THAILAND THROUGH THE D/COMDR 2/13-THAILAND. THE D/COMDR 2/13-THAILAND WILL BE A GENERAL OFFICER. THIS REQUIREMENT IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE CONCLUSIONS REACHED ON COMMAND RELATIONSHIP IN THAILAND DURI G THE MQUSAF/IACAF CONFERENCE HELD AT HICKAM AFB 20
21 OCT 65. THIS FACILITY PROVIDES THE FLD HQ FOR TTE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER THROUGH WHICH HE CAN CONTROL DIRECT AND COORDINATE THE FULL RANGE OF AIR OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF A MAJOR MILITARY OPERATION.
3. REQ EARLY APPROVAL OF THIS URGENT P341 REQUIREMENT WHICH WILL INSURE EFFECTIVE COMMAND ORGANIZATION IN THAILAND. IT IS NEEDED IMMEDIATELY AND CANNOT WAITFOR NORMAL FUNDING.
4. BY ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES UPON FURNISHING CINCPAC A COPY OF THIS MSG THEIR CONCURRENCE CAN BE ASSUMED UNLESS OTHERWISE ADISED. MACTHAI COORDINATION SHALL BE FORWARDED IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT.
5. FOR 13AF: DESIGN FOR SUBJPROJ IS HEREBY AUTHORIZED. REQ EARLIEST TRANSMITTAL OF PROJ NUMBER AND MACTHAI COORDINATION. GP-4
BT



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONTROLLED DOCUMENT
RETURN TO ADMIN

2 COPIES RECEIVED
ACT ON: 1- Cmdr
INFO: 1- RIF
24/1002

VV LQA192LB7[illegible]CRYB3032CKMA120

[illegible] 33 3272042

[illegible]
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[illegible]
[illegible] CINCPACAF
[illegible] AIRA RUH/CINCPAC
[illegible]/CSAF TAN RVN
[illegible]/DEP COM 2/13 UDORN THAILAND
[illegible]/3AF

[illegible] DPL 53384 NOV 65.
[illegible] DEP COMDR 2/13 THAILAND.
[illegible] MSG FROM CINCPACAF, CITE DPL 53381 NOV 65, DTG [illegible] QUOTED BELOW FOR YOUR INFORMATION: QUOTE:
[illegible] DPL 53381 NOV 65.
[illegible] DEP COMDR 2/13 THAILAND
[illegible] COMUSMACTHAI MSG JTG 161620Z NOV 65.
1. [illegible] IN REFERENCE IS GENERALLY CORRECT. A POSITION [illegible] ESTABLISHED IN THAILAND TO REPRESENT BOTH 2D AIR DIV AND [illegible] AS THE SINGLE SENIOR PACAF REPRESENTATIVE IN

[illegible] 33 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
[illegible] POSITION IS IDENTIFIED AS D/CMDR 2/13-THAILAND. [illegible] AIR DIV COMMANDER WILL EXERCISE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF [illegible] PACAF FORCES THROUGH THE D/CMDR 2/13-THAILAND; [illegible] WILL PROVIDE SUPPORT THROUGH THE D/CMDR 2/13-THAILAND. [illegible] 2/13-THAILAND, AS THE SINGLE SENIOR PACAF REPRESENTATIVE AND COORDINATING AUTHORITY, WILL DISSEMINATE INSTRUCTIONS [illegible] AND ADMINISTRATION PROMULGATED BY THE U.S. EMBASSY [illegible] AND WILL REPRESENT CINCPACAF, 2D AIR DIV OR [illegible] AS APPROPRIATE, IN ALL MEETINGS OF THE PRINCIPALS.
[illegible] CHARLES R. BOND, JR., HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO DUTY [illegible] 2/13-THAILAND, REPORTING NLT 7 JAN 66. BRIG GEN [illegible], CURRENTLY PERFORMING DUTIES OF D/CMDR 2/13-THAILAND, [illegible] ASSIGNED TO HQ 2/13 AND WILL BE SENIOR OFFICER IN [illegible] OF HQ 2/13-THAILAND DURING COMMANDER'S ABSENCE. ASSIGN- [illegible] WILL BE EFFECTIVE UPON GEN BOND'S ARRIVAL. THE D/CMDR [illegible]-THAILAND AND STAFF WILL REMAIN AT UDORN UNTIL SUCH TIME [illegible] ADEQUATE FACILITIES AND COMMUNICATIONS NET ARE AVAILABLE [illegible] OPERATIONAL AT NKHAT AB. IN ADDITION, A SMALL LIAISON [illegible] WILL BE ESTABLISHED AT A SUITABLE LOCATION IN BANGKOK [illegible] THE COMMUNITY TEAM WILL HAVE A PROXIMATE CONTACT WITH THE [illegible] PACAF REPRESENTATIVE.

SIN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

SPECIAL ORDER
AA-1690

15 November 1965

BRIGGEN JOHN R MURPHY, FR8944, Hq 2 Air Div, PACAF, APO San Francisco 96307 with duty station APO San Francisco 96237 is relieved from duty as Deputy Comdr, 2 Air Div (Thailand); assigned duty as Asst Deputy Comdr, 2 Air Div (Thailand), effective upon arrival of MAJGEN CHARLES R BOND, FR1937.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE:



J. P. McCONNELL
General, U.S. Air Force
Chief of Staff

R. J. TUCH
Colonel, USAF
Director of Administrative Services

DISTRIBUTION
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

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THREAT

LAOS

NARRATIVE B-1

1. (S) The threat to Laos has both political and military aspects, bothof which derive from the refusal of the Communist Pathet Lao, backed up by North Vietnam and Communist China, to observe their commitments under the 1962 Geneva Accords. Under the 1962 settlement, including the internal Lao agreements that preceded it, the Royal Lao Government (RLG) was to be a tripartite coalition with balanced conservative, neutralist and leftwing representation. However, from the beginning the left wing Neo Lao Hak Xat (NLHX) refused to open territory controlled by Pathet Lao Forces to central government authority and its representatives obstructed efforts at reconciliation and genuine reunification. After April 1963 NLHX participation in the government virtually ceased and interminable exchanges of messages and occasional meetings among factional leaders have produced no progress toward reconstruction of the coalition.

2. (S) Pathet Lao Forces, meanwhile, sought to take over exclusive control of areas in which they had formerly shared occupancy with Neutralist Forces and, by a combination of subversion, pressure and outright attack, attempted to destroy the Nuetralist Force on which Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's political power rested. Concurrently, attacks were launched in violation of the ceasefire in widely scattered areas of Laos to whittle away at areas controlled by anti-communist Meo tribesmen (who in many cases provided a buffer for the Neutralist and regular conservative forces) and from time to time to contest conservative control in the fringe areas of free Laos. The Pathet Lao has been reinforced by Viet Minh formations for concentrated attacks on key points and have generally maintained the initiative, resulting in progressive loss of additional points and areas by non-communist forces and bringing the Pathet Lao now close to the point at which further significant advances would threaten key points of access to the Mekong Valley.

GROUP-4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years.

CINCPAC
15 May 1965

SECRET

3. (S) Initially, the communist pressure and attacks had the effect of stimulating progressively greater collaboration between neutralist and conservative forces and political elements. Resentment and suspicion left over from the earlier period of hostilities diminished at a remarkably rapid rate. However, progressive communist nibbling away of additional bits of territory, combined with the seriously limited effectiveness of the central government eroded conservative confidence that a stabilization could be achieved. These conservative pressures for reform and a tougher policy against the communists produced the attempted coup d'etat in April 1964 against the Souvanna Phouma government. Although Souvanna has been restored as Prime Minister, the pressures have not subsided. Communist Military and political action therefore not only threatens the strategic Mekong but also creates conditions in which the functioning part of the Royal Lao Government may be overthrown from within.

4. (S) Operation TRIANGLE, which Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma approved in 4 June 1964, did, however, strengthen to some extent his position as Prime Minister because of the success attained. In this operation involving the removal of a potentially dangerous pocket of PL/VM forces around the junction of Route 7 and Route 13, the combined FAR and Neutralist forces, by the end of July, succeeded in bringing this operation to a successful close, aided by Meo units and greatly expanded Royal Laotian Air Force support. Although this operation attained its immediate objectives of clearing Route 13 and eliminating the Communist pocket, the measures which the PL/VM will take in an attempt to recoup their losses remain unknown.

5. (S) Continued military support is required to endow Lao Forces with the strength to contain communist military attacks and to reassure Conservative and Neutralist Forces of backing (including diplomatic and political support) enabling them to resist effectively. There is no present prospect that the Neo Lao Hak Xat (Lao leftist Communist Front) will in good faith resume participation in the RLG. Rather, the campaign

is aimed at further communist expansion into areas of free Laos and simultaneously sapping the vitality of cohesion of the government to destroy it from within. Should the Chinese Communists and North Vietnamese, who ultimately control the Pathet Lao, so decide, they have the capability of intervening swiftly and in force sufficient to overwhelm the combined Conservative and Neutralist defensive forces.



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POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC [illegible] LAOS
NARRATIVE D

1. (S) The goal in the United States in Laos is to prevent the loss of this strategically vital [illegible] to communist control. To achieve this end without direct military intervention by the US or other pro-western powers it is necessary to provide economic aid to the Royal Lao Government and complete logistical support to the Laos Armed Forces.

2. (S) The MAP for Laos is designed to provide the Royal Laos Armed Forces with the capability of defeating insurgency in the areas they now generally control and for providing the means for limited initial resistance to either internal or external aggression and subversion. Currently and in the foreseeable future the Royal Laos Armed Forces will not achieve the capability to resist successfully any determined communist aggression. Thus, the ultimate protection of Laos from internal or external aggression depends on external political and military assistance and pressures.

3. (S) The magnitude of the US MAP will undoubtedly be varied and adjusted to meet the changing political and military situations pertaining to Laos. The present flood situation imposes an essential requirement for both flexibility and speed in providing assistance under the MAP. The effort in Laos is for the moment at best a holding one with the main effort in Vietnam; if we are to hold successfully, the means must be provided to continue at least the current level of activity. This requires more generosity than appears contemplated in MAP projections.

4. (S) The Laos economy is unable to support the present level of its military forces within its own resources. It is unable to produce even those basic supplies not requiring sophisticated manufacturing techniques or earn the foreign exchange to purchase them abroad. The Laotian Armed Forces are thus completely dependent on foreign aid for logistical support and will continue in this state in the foreseeable future. In addition, taxable income in the economy is not sufficient to meet local military expenses, particularly with respect to the payroll. These expenses must therefore be met by deficit financing i.e., government issuance of new money (kip), and the economy in turn cannot expand fast enough to meet a fraction of the demand resulting from the increased purchasing power thus created. To avoid a resultant inflationary bidding up of the prices of existing commodities and services, the US and other aid giving countries must finance imports to meet the excess demand. The problem is further aggravated by the fact that the military

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years. D-1

CINCPAC
15 May 1965

SECRET

service remove needed manpower which, under normal conditions, would be available for the production of consumer commodities and services necessary to establish a firm foundation for a viable economy.

5. (S) The Laos Armed Forces responsive to the central government are divided into two groupings, FAR and Neutralists. These groupings are further divided into factions with varying personal loyalties to individual political and/or military leaders. This has resulted in periodic abortive "coups" undertaken in protest against centralization of political/military authority in the administrative capital, Vientiane. While Phoumi Nosavan is technically in exile in Bangkok, Thailand, his presence is still close enough to Laos to constitute an unsettling influence and vitiate attempts toward a successful consolidation of the military/political effort.

6. (S) Pathet Lao failure to participate in the established tripartite government or to comply with the Geneva Agreements has resulted in a de facto division of the country. The Pathet Lao with Viet Minh assistance and support continues to violate the ceasefire agreement by aggressive actions, and loss of territory by the FAR/Neutralist forces continues to occur at the option of the Pathet Lao.

7. (S) The future position on military aid to Laos will be greatly influenced by the course of events in South Vietnam and the military actions required of FAR to inhibit infiltration through its territory. Laos is the natural route for communist penetration into Southeast Asia. Without adequate forces and sufficient support to strengthen and maintain the FAR, a deteriorating situation will result.



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FROM: USAIRA VIENTIANE LAOS

TO: CSAF
DIA
1127TH USAF FAG

INFO: SECSTATE
DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI
CINCPAC
CHIEFJUSMAGTHAI
CINCPACAF
USAIRA BKK
CINCPACFLT
35 TAC GP DON MUANG APRT THAI
13AF
333 ABRON UDORN
5AF
DET 5/6099TH SPTGP BKK
COMUSMCV
DEP COMUSMACTHAI

~~S E C R E T~~ AIRA CITE 02201 MAR 65.

1. It is our opinion that General Ma is a dedicated military leader with no political ambitions except patriotic feelings for future of Laos. He has continually demonstrated unswerving loyalty to improvement of Laotian Government, to better Laotian people rather than improve his own position. He had coordinated air-ground acty withhis army associates in the southern area of Laos to make joint forces the most effective fighting units in Laos.
2. In spite of these admirable traits and accomplishments, Gen Ma is obviously being subjected to unwarranted derogatory and potentially damaging attacks by someone, or possibly several groups of indiv. A CAS report states that Gen Ma is included on a list of officers to meet a mil tribunal, along with Thao Ly, Sang, (four other names garbled). It is obvious that removal of Gen Ma is design of efforts that have been noticeable in

12
Mar 65

LtCol Van Bibbar/rgo ROBERT L. F. TYRRELL, COL, USAF, AIRA

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local acty for several months. Certain people, including Gen. Kouprasith, have openly condemned Gen Ma for various reasons although reasons for doubting his veracity or ideals is not made clear. The effect of forcing Gen Ma out of his comd psn would be far reaching and, we believe, seriously impair the continued improvement of RLAF. Ref our previous msg, 02188, Part II, there are continuing indic that Gen Ma is not popular with ctn other mil leaders.

3. It has been rec that an officer fr RLAF be atch to Gen Staff to insure better coordination of air and gnd acty. There has been very little guidance passed fr gen staff to Gen Ma, and certainly any improvement in coord would help. However, adding an AF off to Gen Staff would enhance Gen Ma's psn, and therefore this proposal may be turned down by Chief of Staff for that rsn alone. As was demonstrated during last coup, RLAF is an important or poss deciding factor in balance of power consideration. There will undoubtedly be a continual struggle by pol aspirants to either gain control of the RLAF or insure allegiance of Commander to a particular party. So long as Gen Ma is commander, there is little doubt that he will not align himself or RLAF with any single pol faction but will continue to support a party or parties who genuinely work for the good of country.

GP-3

5 JUN
6 JU

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244-65

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PRIORITY

05/1 FILE

5 JUN 65

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FM USAIRA VIENTIANE LAOS
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RUEANQ/1127TH USAF FAG FORT BELVOIR VA
RUEKDA/JCS
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUHLKM/CINCPACAF
RUHLML/CINCPACFLT
RUMABA/13AF CLARK AB PI
RUMAAZ/5AF FUCHU AS JAPAN
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUMBAJ/DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI BANGKOK THAI
RUHSBJ/2ADIV TSN RVN
RUMTBK/USAIRA BANGKOK THAI
RUMSATA/333 ABRON UDORN AB THAI
RUHSBJ/DET 6 6499TH SPTGP SAIGON RVN
BT

~~S E C R E T NOFORN~~ AIRA 02636 JUN 65. THIS MSG TWO PARTS.
PART I. A. GEN MA RECENTLY TOLD AAIRA HE BELIEVES IF THERE IS NO CHANGE IN PRESENT TREND OF LAOTIAN GOVERNMENT POLICY, THE COMMUNISTS WILL SOON TAKE OVER. COMMENT: IT IS BELIEVED HIS THINKING IS BASED ON THE FACT THERE HAVE RECENTLY BEEN MANY RUMORS OF AN IMMINENT SPLIT BETWEEN GEN OUAN AND GEN KOUPRASITH. SOME SOURCES BELIEVE KOUPRASITH WITH INFLUENCE OF SANNIKONE FAMILY AND ENCOURAGED BY FRENCH MIGHT NEGOTIATE SOME SORT OF NEUTRALIST ARRANGEMENT IF HE ATTAINED A SUFFICIENTLY DOMINANT POSITION IN GOVERNMENT.

~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFOR~~

PAGE 2 RUMSATA 6 ~~S E C R E T~~
B. MA FURTHER STATED THE GM COMMANDERS IN SOUTH PLAN TO TAKE ACTION TO STOP SUCH A "CAPITULATION" TO THE COMMUNISTS IF IT SHOULD APPEAR IMMINENT. HE DID NOT ELABORATE OTHER THAN SAYING A STEPPED-UP DRIVE AGAINST COMMUNISTS COULD BE EXPECTED IN HOPES OF RECEIVING DIRECT AMERICAN ASSISTANCE OR POSSIBLY HELP THRU SEATO. COMMENT: MA HAS RECENTLY ATTENDED MANY CONFERENCES WITH SOUTHERN FAR LEADERS AND WITH GEN VANG PAO. HE POSSIBLY VOLUNTEERED THIS INFO ATTEMPTING TO TEST US REACTION. IT IS BELIEVED, HOWEVER, THAT MA AND OTHER MILITARY LEADERS FROM SOUTHERN LAOS ARE GENUINELY CONCERNED THAT LAOTIAN GOVERNMENT UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS MIGHT SELL OUT TO COMMUNISTS BY ACCEPTING SOME SORT OF "NEUTRALIST" AGREEMENT WHICH TO THEM WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE AS LONG AS THEIR ANTI-COMMUNIST STRUGGLE IS SUPPORTED.
PART II. AN EXTENSIVE ROAD BLOCK SYSTEM WAS IN OPERATION IN VIENTIANE NIGHT 4-5 JUNE. ALL VEHICLES WERE STOPPED, PASSENGERS WERE USUALLY REQUIRED TO DISMOUNT AND SHOW IDENTIFICATION.
GP-3.
BT.

~~SECRET~~ NOF



14 JUL 1965

AIRA 12 Jun 2355

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INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUHLKM/CINCPACAF
RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
RUMABA/13AF
RUAUAZ/5AF
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUMBAJ/DEPCHIEFJUSMAGTHAI
RUMSBJ/2AD
RUMTBK/USAIRA BANGKOK
RUMBC/DET 5/6499TH SPTGP BANGKOK
~~RUMBDF/333ARON IDORN~~
BT

~~S E C R E T NOFORN~~ AIRA 02304 JUL 65. HQ USAF FOR AFNIN.
PACAF FOR PFICO. 13AF FOR 13IDC. 5AF FOR 5FITG.
1. GEN MA, ON MORNING 12 JULY ASKED AAIRA SAVANNAKHET TO COME VIENTIANE AND GIVE FOL INFO TO AIRA AND AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN. HE SAID RUMORS ARA? SQEHRCULATED BY KOUPRASITH FACTION THAT HE (GEN MA) WILL SOON INUEP53 :97D -A-3,= 89;34,,3,=. HE BELIEVES THESE RUMORS WILL BE SPREAD AND INTENSIFIED UNTIL EMCTIONS REACH A CRESCENDO AND THEN KOUPRASITH WILL TRY TO MOVE AGAINST HIM SAYING THAT MA UNITIATED HBE ACTION. HE POINTED OUT THAT THIS TECHNIQUE HAS BEEN USED IN P

OKLOUS COUPS.

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

HE ALSO SAID KOUPRASITH HAD VISITED GEN PHASOUK AT PAKSE ON 10 JULY AND TOLD HIM THAT MA WAS PLANNING A COUP AND ASKED PHASOUK FOR HELP IN STOPPING IT. PHASOUK SUPPOSEDLY REPLIED HE THOUGHT A COUP WAS A GOOD IDEA AND WOULD NOT PLEDGE HIS SUPPORT TO KOUPRASITH.

MA ALSO SAID THAT GEN OUDONE SANANIKONE HAD CALLED MEETING TWO NIGHTS AGO OF SEVERAL COLONELS IN VIENTIANE AND ASKED FOR THEIR HELP IN REMOVING MA FROM COMMAND OF RLAF AND RESTORING GEN SOUKITH FAR COMMANDER OF ZONE 1 TO COMMAND.

DSCOMMENT: GEN SANANIKONE TOLD G.L.A ON NIGHT 11 JUL THAT HE HAD SENT COL ETAM, FAR G-2, TO SAVANNAKHET ON 10 JUL AND THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THE COUP RUMORS WITH MA. IT IS POSITIVELY KNOWN THAT THIS IS NOT TRUE.

2. GEN MA ASKED THAT THE AMBASSADOR BE INFORMED THAT HE HAS NO INTENTION OF STARTING A COUP BUT IF HE IS ATTACKED HE WILL DEFEND HIMSELF. HE ALSO SAID A CONSTITUTION HAS BEEN SECRETLY WRITTEN AND A SLATE OF PERSONS TO FILL VARIOUS GOVERNMENT SLOTS HAS BEEN DRAWN UP AND THAT A GOVERNMENT WOULD BE ESTABLISHED ON THIS BASIS SHOULD IT TNEEME NECESSARY FOR HIS GROUP TO ASSUME POWER. HE SAID THIS CONSTITUTION WOULD BE GIVEN TO THE AMERICANS FOR REVIEW,

RECOMMENDATIONS AND APPROVAL BEFORE PUBLICATION. GEN MA TOLD AAIRA THAT HE KNOWS HE HAS THE POWER NECESSARY TO WAGE A SUCCESSFUL COUP IF HE WANTED TO DO SO, BUT HE WOULD DO NOTHING THE AMERICANS DO NOT APPROVE OF EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER THE ELECTIONS.

HE SAID HE COULD COUNT ON SUPPORT FROM GM11, 12, 13, 16 17, 18 AND 21. GM-16 WOULD NOT MOVE AGAINST HIM. HE SAID 1500 PARATROOPS WOULD VOLUNTEER TO JUMP IN VIENTIANE AND HE COULD DROP 500 AT ONE TIME AND HE COULD HAVE 3000 TROOPS IN VIENTIANE IN A MATTER OF HOURS. HE SAID THERE WOULD BE 10,000 TROOPS ON HIS SIDE WITHIN TWELVE HOURS IF HOSTILITIES DID ERUPT. HE AGAIN EMPHASIZED HOWEVER, THAT HE WOULD NOT INITIATE A COUP AND WOULD ACT ONLY IF ATTACKED.

COMMENT: GEN MA IS SENCERELY CONCERNED THAT THERE WILL BE A MOVE AGAINST HIM AND HAS AGAIN INCREASED SECURITY AT SAVANNAKHET AIR BASE. THREE COMPANIES OF INFANTRY ARE DEPLOYED ON OR AROUND THE AIRFIELD WITH ONE COMPANY IN PLAIN CLOTHES. THE T-28'S HAVE BEEN DISPERSED TO REDUCE THEIR VULNERABILITY TO MORTAR ATTACK.

GP-3

BT

NNNN



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TO RUEAHQ/CSAF
RUEKDA/DIA
RUEAHQ/1127TH USAF FAG FT BELVOIR VA
INFO RUHLKM/CINCPACAF
RUMABA/13AF CLARK AB PHIL
RUAUAZ/5AF FUCHU AS JAPAN
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUMBAJ/DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI BANGKOK THAI
RUMSBJ/2ND AIRDIV TAN SON NHUT RVN
RUMBDF/333 ABRON UDORN THAI
RUMBC/DET 5 6499TH SPTGP BKK THAI
BT

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN AIRA 02760 JUL 65.

THIS REPORT IS BASED ON INFORMATION COLLECTED IN CONVERSATIONS WITH GEN MA AND ON PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS MADE BETWEEN 21 JUN AND 30 JUN 65 RELATING TO CURRENT MILITARY-POLITICAL SITUATION IN LAOS.

1. GEN MA WAS INFORMED ON 21 JUN THAT THE AIR ATTACHE ACFT, WITH AMB SULLIVAN ON BOARD, HAD BEEN HIT BY GND FIRE ON DEPARTURE FR SAVANNAKHET (REMY 02712 JUN 65). GEN MA IMMEDIATELY REQUESTED THAT AIRA MEET HIM AT UDORN, THAILAND TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER. AT MEETING, GEN MA EXPLAINED

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 2 RUMSATG 3 ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

HAD INSISTED ON UDORN AS SITE FOR MEETING BECAUSE HE THOUGHT IT UNWISE TO LET IT BE KNOWN THAT HE HAD COME TO VIENTIANE TO CONSULT WITH THE AMERICANS. AS FOR THE INCIDENT INVOLVING AIRA ACFT, HE SAID IT WAS NOT PL BUT A POLITICAL FACTION JEALOUS OF HIM WHO HAD CAUSED IT AND ASKED AIRA TO EXPRESS HIS SINCERE REGRETS TO AMBASSADOR.

2. IN DISCUSSING THE INCIDENT AND HIS EXPLANATION OF IT, GEN MA EXPRESSED GRAVE CONCERN ABOUT COMING ELECTIONS. HE SAID IT WOULD BE A VERY CRITICAL PERIOD BECAUSE GEN KOUPRASITH, BACKED BY THE SANANIKONES, MAY ATTEMPT A COUP-D'ETAT IF THINGS DON'T APPEAR TO BE GOING WELL FOR THEIR PARTY. GEN MA SAID COL THONGLITH HAS CONTROL OF THREE BATTALIONS WHICH WOULD BE LOYAL TO KOUPRASITH IN SUCH A STRUGGLE. HE ALSO EXPRESSED PERSONAL OPINION THAT NEITHER NEUTRALISTS NOR GOVERNMENT DOMINATED BY THE SANANIKONES WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO FIELD TROOPS BECAUSE EITHER WOULD PERPETUATE SITUATION IN WHICH THE CLIQUES IN VIENTIANE, MORE INTERESTED IN PERSONAL GAIN THAN IN FIGHTING COMMUNISTS, CAN MANIPULATE AMERICAN AID FOR THEIR OWN FINANCIAL BENEFIT AT EXPENSE OF TROOPS IN FIELD.

3. GEN MA WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE BELIEVES THAT UNLESS REFORMS ARE EFFECTED IN VIENTIANE, LAOTIAN MILITARY WILL EITHER REBEL OR DIS-

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 3 RUMSATG 3 SECRET NOFORN
INTEGRATE. HE BELIEVES GEN STAFF WITHOLDS SUPPORT FROM THE FIELD UNITS SO THEY CAN START NO NEW OFFENSIVES OR IN ANY WAY DISRUPT STATUS QUO AND IN MEANTIME US AID CONTINUES TO FLOW IN WHICH CAN BE MAVNIPULATED BY VIENTIANE CLIQUES FOR PERSONAL GAIN. FOR EXAMPLE, SINCE OPERATION TRIANGLE LAST JULY, ALL GND OPNS HAVE BEEN PLANNED AND CARRIED OUT BY LOCAL COMMANDERS, NOT BY GEN STAFF.
4. MA FEELS THAT GEN STAFF WANTS TO CONTROL RLAF AND USE IT TO FURTHER THEIR OWN POLITICAL AIMS. THEY KNOW THAT MA WILL NEVER ALLOW THIS SO LONG AS HE IS COMMANDER SO THEY WANT TO DESTROY OR DISCREDIT HIM. THERE HAVE BEEN NO PROMOTIONS IN RLAF FOR MORE THAN A YEAR. GEN MA NO LONGER HAS AUTHORITY TO PROMOTE THE ENLISTED GRADES AND IN EFFECT HAS ABOUT SAME AUTH AS A BATTALION COMMANDER. HE HAS NEVER REALLY BEEN ACCEPTED BY GEN STAFF AND THEY CONSIDER HIM SOMEWHAT OF A REBEL BECAUSE HE REFUSES TO BE INVOLVED WITH ANY OF THE POLITICAL FACTIONS. THERE HAS NEVER BEEN AN RLAF REPRESENTATIVE AT THE GEN STAFF MEETINGS ALTHOUGH IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED BY AIRA. THE SMALL AF DETACHMENT IN VIENTIANE HAS BEEN BOUGHT OFF BY GEN STAFF AND TAKE THEIR ORDERS FROM COL THONGLITH. GEN STAFF RECENTLY ORDERED AN INSPECTION OF BASE AT SAVANNAKHET AND GEN MA HAD AGREED TO IT. BUT BEFORE THE INSPECTION

SECRET

PAGE 4 RUMSATG 3 SECRET NOFORN
COULD TAKE PLACE, THE INSPECTING OFFICER FROM MILITARY REGION III SAID IF ANY UNAUTHORIZED WEAPONS WERE FOUND, GEN MA WOULD BE TRIED BY MILITARY COURT AND IMPRISONED. HE WAS TOLD BY GEN BOUN PONE THAT GEN OUDONE SANANAKONE HAD MADE SAME STATEMENT. GEN MA HAS NOW REFUSED TO ALLOW INSPECTION BUT IS QUITE WILLING TO ALLOW AMERICANS TO COME IN AND INSPECT.
5. GEN MA IS GENUINELY CONCERNED FOR SAFETY OF BASE AT SAVANNAKHET AND FOR HIS OWN PERSONAL SAFETY. HE HAS INCREASED SECURITY PRECAUTION AT THE BASE AND WILL NOT SPEND THE NIGHT IN VIENTIANE BECAUSE HE CONSIDERS IT UNSAFE. HE BELIEVES HE COULD NOT LAST AS COMMANDER OF THE RLAF UNDER A GOVERNMENT DOMINATED BY THE SANANIKONES. GEN MA HAS ATTENDED SEVERAL MEETINGS RECENTLY WITH GEN PHASOUK, GEN VANG PAO AND VARIOUS FIELD COMMANDERS FROM THE SOUTH AND MAY BE REFLECTING THINKING OF ENTIRE GROUP IN CONVERSATIONS WITH AIRA.
COMMENTS: A. BASED ON PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS DURING PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, GEN STAFF HAS NOT PROPERLY SUPPORTED FIELD UNITS WITH DIRECTION OR MATERIAL. THERE HAVE BEEN MANY REPORTS OF GRAFT AND CORRUPTION AS CITED IN NUMEROUS AIRA MESSAGES.
B. THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN DISCUSSED BY THE COUNTRY TEAM AND

SECRET

PAGE 5 RUMSATG 3 SECRET NOFORN
CONSENSUS IS THAT DISCONTENT ON PART OF FIELD UNITS TOWARD GEN STAFF AND VIENTIANE GOVERNMENT MAY REACH SERIOUS PROPORTIONS IN NEAR FUTURE. AMBASSADOR PLANS TO TAKE ACTION BY HAVING STAFF MEMBERS CONTACT VARIOUS FIELD COMMANDERS POSSIBLY INVOLVED IN AN EFFORT TO DISSUADE THEM FR ACTING IF THINGS ERUPT IN VIENTIANE. IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE INDEED IF POLITICAL INSTABILITY COUNTERED PAST SUCCESSES OF LAO MILITARY.
GP-3
BT.



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V-4-MC

6 JUL 1965

TOR/0545

53

~~SECRET~~

LIMDIS

AIRA 2 AFOI

919

VV TAG919
PP RUMBDF RUMBC RUMBAJ RUMTBK
DE RUMSATG 1 1870415
ZNY SSSSS
O P 060412Z
FM USAIRA VIENTIANE LAOS
TO RUEAHQ/CSAF
RUEKDA/DIA
RUEAHQ/1127TH USAF FAG FORT BELVOIR VA
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUHLKM/CINCPACAF
RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
RUMABA/13AF CLARK AB PHIL
RUAUAZ/5AF FUCHU AS JAPAN
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUMBAJ/DEPCHIEFJUSMAGTHAI BANGKOK THAI
RUMSBJ/2AIR DIV TAN SON NHUT AFLD RVN
RUMTBK/USAIRA BANGKOK THAI
RUMBDF/333 ABRON UDORN THAI
RUMBC/DET 5 6499TH SPTGP BANGKOK THAI
BT

INTEL

VLP

~~S E C R E T LIMDIS~~ AIRA 02772 JUL 65. HQ USAF FOR AFNIN. PACAF FOR PFICO. 13AF FOR 13IDC. 5AF FOR 5FITG.
IT APPEARS PROBABLE THAT GEN MA WAS THE TGT OF AN ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT WHILE IN VIENTIANE NIGHT OF 5 JULY. THE GENERAL AND SEVEN RLAF OFFICERS WERE IN VIENTIANE TO ATTEND A SMALL FAREWELL PARTY GIVEN BY AAIRA FOR DEPARTING AIRA AND AAIRA. THE PARTY WAS INITIALLY PLANNED TO INCLUDE ONLY AMERICAN MEMBERS OF AIRA OFFICE BUT SINCE NONE OF THE RLAF OFFICERS HAD BEEN ABLE TO ATTEND THE PREVIOUS FUNCTION IN HONOR OF AIRA IT WAS DECIDED TO INVITE GEN MA AND A FEW OF HIS OFFICERS TO ATTEND

PAGE 2 RUMSATG 1 ~~S E C R E T LIMDIS~~
THIS ONE. THE INVITATION WAS TENDERED BY AAIRA ON 2 JUL THROUGH AAIRA SAVANNAKHET AND WAS KNOWN ONLY TO HIM AND GEN MA UNTIL GEN MA ACCEPTED THE INVITATION ON MORNING 5 JUL. AT THAT TIME, APPROX 0400Z, AAIRA WHO WAS VISITING SAVANNAKHET FROM JUL 4 CELEBRATION SENT CODED MSG TO AIRA IN VIENTIANE THAT RLAF PERSONNEL WOULD ATTEND PARTY BUT DID NOT INDICATE THAT GEN MA WOULD COME. NOT UNTIL AAIRA RETURNED FROM SAVANNAKHET AT APPROX 0730Z 5 JUL DID ANYONE IN AIRA OFFICE HAVE FIRM INFORMATION THAT GEN MA WOULD ATTEND PARTY.
GEN MA, SIX OFFICERS, AND TWO YOUNG LADIES (COUSINS OF GEN MA),

AND SEVERAL OTHER LAO PASSENGERS ARRIVE IN VIENTIANE VIA RLAF C-47 AT 11502 5 JUL. THEY WERE MET AT AIRPORT BY AIRA AND AAIRA AND PARTY WAS DRIVEN DIRECTLY TO AIRA OFFICE WHERE SOME FLYING EQUIPMENT WAS STORED. GEN MA WENT BRIEFLY TO AIRA'S HOME AND THEN PROCEEDED TO PARTY AT HOME OF AAIRA, ARRIVING APPROX 12302. THE PARTY WAS ATTENDED ONLY TO AMERICAN FM AIRA OFFICE AND RLAF OFFICERS. ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN MADE FOR GEN MA AND TWO OTHER OFFICERS TO SPEND NIGHT AT HOME OF AIRA AND REST TO STAY IN HOMES OF TWO AAIRA'S RESIDENTS IN VIENTIANE. WHEN PARTY BROKE UP AT APPROX 15452 GEN MA DECIDED TO ACCOMPANY HIS TWO YOUNG COUSINS TO THEIR MOTHERS

PAGE 3 RUMSATG 1 ~~S E C R E T~~ LIMDIS
HOME WHERE THEY WERE TO SPEND NIGHT AND WERE DRIVEN THERE USING AIRA'S CAR AND DRIVER. AS GEN MA WAS RETURNING TO AIRA'S HOME AT APPROX 16302 AN AUTO IMMED IN FRONT OF HIS WAS VIRTUALLY DESTROYED BY EXPLOSION OF SOME DEVICE APPARENTLY PLANTED IN ROAD. THE TWO OCCUPANTS OF VEHICLE WERE USAF AIRMEN ATTACHED TO AIRA OFFICE IN SUPPORT OF T-28 OPS AT VIENTIANE. MIRACULOUSLY, NEITHER APPEARS TO BE SERIOUSLY INJURED BUT ARE BEING TAKEN TO KORAT, THAILAND FOR COMPLETE CHECK-UP.
AT TIME OF EXPLOSION THE VEHICLE CARRYING THE TWO AIRMEN WAS MOVING VERY SLOWLY BECAUSE THROTTLE LINKAGE HAD BECOME DISCONNECTED AND THEY WERE ABLE TO DRIVE ONLY IN FIRST GEAR AT ABOUT THREE TO FIVE MILES PER HOUR. THIS MECHANICAL TROUBLE HAD DEVELOPED ONLY SHORT DISTANCE FM THEIR QUARTERS SO THEY HAD DECIDED TO DRIVE ON HOME RATHER THAN ATTEMPT REPAIR WITHOUT LIGHTS OR TOOLS. BY COINCIDENCE ONE OF THE AIRMEN IN THE DAMAGED VEHICLE IS AN EOD SPECIALIST AND HE BELIEVES THE BLAST WAS CAUSED BY ABOUT TWO-TO-THREE LBS OF EXPLOSIVE POSSIBLY FIRED MECHANICALLY OR ELECTRICALLY.
COMMENTS: GEN MA HAD PREVIOUSLY STATED IT WOULD BE UNSAFE FOR HIM TO SPEND NIGHT IN VIENTIANE BECAUSE HE FEARED ASSASSINATION.

PAGE 4 RUMSATG 1 ~~S E C R E T~~ LIMDIS
GEN MA IS CONVINCED HE WAS PRIME TGT OF INCIDENT. IMMED AFTER INCIDENT GEN MA REQUESTED TO BE EVACUATED IMMED TO UDORN, THAI. AIRA CONVINCED HIM IT WOULD BE SAFER TO STAY IN VIENTIANE AND HAVE MARINE GUARDS REMAIN AT AIRA HOME RATHER THAN DEPART FOR UDORN AT THAT TIME OF NIGHT. GEN MA AGREED TO REMAIN UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES.
GP-3
BT.

~~SECRET~~
~~LIMDIS~~

108



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RR RUMBDL
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ZNY SSSSS
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FM JANAF ATTACHES VIENTIANE LAOS
TO RUEKDA/DIA
INFO RUEPDA/DA
RUEAHQ/CSAF
RUEHCR/SECSTATE
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUHLHS/CINCUSARPAC
RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
RUHLKM/PACAF
RUMABA/13 AF
RUMSBJ/2D AD
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUMBC/CHJUSMAGTHAI
RUMBAJ/DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI
RUMTBK/ALUSNA BANGKOK THAI
RUMTBK/USAIRA BANGKOK THAI
RUEAHQ/1127TH USAF FAG
RUAUAZ/5TH AF
RUMBDL/333 ABRON UDORN
RUMBC/DET 5/6499TH SPT GP BANGKOK
BT

~~S E C R E T~~ CITE JANAF MSG 0001. DA FOR ACSI. THIS IS A JOINT ARMA-AIRA MSG. SUBJ: INTRODUCTORY VISITS TO LAO GENERALS AND CHIEF, FMM.

PART I.

1.(U) ARMA ACCOMPANIED NEW AIRA AND ARMA REPLACEMENT TO PRESENT NEW ARRIVALS TO GEN OUANE, GEN BOUN PONE, GEN KOUPRASITH 22 1000 JULY.

2.(C) SIGNIFICANT POINTS OF DISCUSSION:

A. ALL GENERALS PLEASED WITH ELECTION RESULTS, NETTLED BY THAI ENGLISH LANGUAGE NEWSPAPER REPORTING WHICH HAD WILDLY EXAGGERATED ENTIRE ELECTION TENSIONS ETC.

PAGE TWO RUMBSL 634A ~~S E C R E T~~

B. KOUPRASITH TOOK THE FLOOR INITIALLY STRESSING NEED FOR ATTACHE SUPPORT IN OPERATIONAL PLANNING PARTICULARLY IN AREAS WHERE SEPARATE COMMANDERS (SPECIFICALLY GENERAL MA AND GEN VANG PAO) KEPT TOO FAR FROM GENERAL STAFF CONTROL AND COORDINATION.

C. GENERAL OUANE ELABORATED ON NEED TO HOLD GENERAL MA IN LINE AND STATED THAT HE WAS ABOUT TO PUT OUT A NEW DIRECTIVE ON CONTROL OF THE C-47 TRANSPORT AIR LIFT WHICH HE FELT NEEDED MORE GENERAL STAFF CONTROL. ASKED AIRA TO ASSIST IN BRINGING GENERAL MA TO APPRECIATION OF NEED FOR GENERAL STAFF CENTRALIZED PLANNING AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL.

D. KOUPRASITH EXPLAINED THAT AN RLAF 5 YEAR EXPANSION PROGRAM WAS ALREADY WELL UNDER WAY TO BRING EFFECTIVES FROM APPROX 600 TO APPROX 1500, THAT GENERAL MA VERY EFFECTIVE AS RECRUITER.

E. OUANE EXPLAINED THAT AS MORE AREA WAS WON FROM THE PATHET LAO THE NEED INCREASED FOR CIVIC ACTION BY THE FAR AND THAT THE ATTACHES COULD BE OF GREAT HELP AS ADVISORS AND PARTICULARLY IN LIAISON WORK WITH THE EMBASSY; OUTLINED HIS OWN CONCEPT OF 6 MAN TEAMS MADE UP OF VETERANS WHO WOULD BE

SPECIALLY SCHOOLED TO SUPPORT THE [illegible] READERS.

F. URGED NEWLY ARRIVED ARMA AND AIRA TO COME DIRECTLY TO THE GENERAL STAFF WITH ANY PROBLEMS BUT PARTICULARLY WHEN SOME PROBLEM NEEDED A QUICK GENERAL STAFF INTERPRETATION, AND TO COME DAY OR NIGHT, TO FEEL FREE TO ADVISE, TO VISIT ANYWHERE IN FRIENDLY TERRITORY DESIRED.

3. (C) COMMENT:

A. ARMA HAS MADE (7119Z) A SPECIAL FAREWELL PLEA TO GENERAL STAFF THAT THEY QUIT NEEDLING GENERAL MA, GIVE HIM ADEQUATE RECOGNITION AND CEASE TREATING HIM AS ON PRECISE PARALLEL WITH CHIEF OF SIGNAL CORPS OR RIVER FLOTILLA, TO RECOGNIZE NEED TO STUDY HIS PROBLEMS WITH HIM NOT TO SIMPLY LECTURE HIM, TO RECOGNIZE THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE IN THEIR SEATS TODAY WITHOUT HIS LOYALTY DURING RECENT PAST. AIRA WILL CONTINUE EFFORTS TO BRING MA TO RECOGNIZE NEED FOR CLOSER LIAISON WITH GENERAL STAFF.

B. ARMA WILL AGAIN URGE NEED FOR BETTER LIAISON ALL AROUND, PERHAPS WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION ZONE II AND RLAF.

C. GENERAL BOUN PONE GENIAL DURING MEETING BUT HAD LITTLE TO SAY; KOUPRASITH TALKED A GREAT DEAL INITIALLY

SECRET

BUT GAVE WAY TO GENERAL OUANE MORE READILY THAN USUAL.

D. ARMA HAS OBSERVED THAT KOUPRASITH MORE RELAXED SINCE ELECTIONS WHICH COULD HOPEFULLY INDICATE BETTER RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS COLLEAGUES. THE AUSTRALIAN MILITARY ATTACHE HAS COMMENTED SIMILARLY.

PART II.

1. (S) SAME GROUP ATTACHES VISITED GENERAL LE FORT 22 1100 JULY TO PAY COURTESY CALL. GENERAL LE FORT RECEIVED THEM WITH GREAT CORDIALITY AND WARMTH. KEY POINTS HIS DISCUSSION:

A. HIS OWN ROLE A BIT FRUSTRATING - WISHED HE COULD BE ON AN " OPERATIONAL BASIS AS WERE THE AMERICAN ATTACHES."

B. DON'T WORRY ABOUT MINOR DIFFERENCES OF FRANCO-AMERICAN POLICY - BASICALLY BOTH COUNTRIES SOLIDLY ANTI-COMMUNIST BUT GO AT THE PROBLEM DIFFERENTLY.

C. HE ADMIRES US ADVANCES IN VARIOUS FIELDS IN LAOS, BUT HAS DIRECTIVES FROM PARIS HIMSELF WHICH FORCE HIM TO BE LARGELY AN ONLOOKER. HE FEELS HE HAS HAD MINOR SUCCESS WITH AN NCO TRAINING PROGRAM (OJT) WITH LOCAL ENGINEER DEPOT ALSO WITH SIGNAL CORPS RADIO REPAIR SHOP, AS WELL AS [illegible] INSTRUCTORS AT MILITARY ACADEMY AND AT GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL [illegible]ER

SECRET

REGRETTED THAT ONLY SMALL PERCENTAGE HIS MISSION SO ENGAGED.

D. LOOKED FORWARD TO INCREASING COOPERATION AND HOPED NEW ATTACHES WOULD VISIT HIM FREQUENTLY.

2. (S) COMMENT:

A. GENERAL LE FORT MADE EXCELLENT IMPRESSION AS ALWAYS. HIS FRIENDLY MANNER GENUINE AND FRANK.

B. HIS DIG ABOUT "OPERATIONAL" ASPECT OF US ATTACHES NOT SO MALICIOUS AS ENVIOUS.

C. HIS REFERENCE TO RESTRAINING DIRECTIVES FROM PARIS ABOUT AS STRAIGHT AS CAN BE HAD.

D. HIS FRUSTRATION AT LACK OF FULL EMPLOYMENT HIS MISSION UNDERSTANDABLE.

COORD: EMBASSY AIRA CAS



~~SECRET~~

FROM: USARMA VIENTIANE LAOS

TO: DIA

DATE: 28 JULY 1965

SECRET CITE ARMA CX-353. DIA FOR DIAAQ. SUBJECT: Conversation With General Ouans (U)

1. ~~(C)~~ ARMA visited General Ouane 271030 arriving just as General Kong Le was departing. General Ouane expressed to ARMA satisfaction at improved relations with Kong Le; that Kong Le's liaison officer Col Soulivanh now had office adjacent to him and Gen Kouphrasith's, had been given radio contact with Vang Vieng-Muong Soui. Specifically cited that just prior to elections Neutralist troop movements had caused worry to Zone V in view tension and coup rumors involving Kong Le, but that the improved liaison had calmed the whole thing down "in time".

2. ~~(C)~~ ARMA discussed problem of apparent lack of above liaison with General Ma, and (with concurrence of AIRA and CHARGE) discussed Gen Staff-RLAF relations in some detail. ARMA emphasized that without loyalty of General Ma the Gen Staff could not have weathered the attempted coup 3 Feb 65 and subsequent "revolts" March and April, that Ma was a brilliant fighter pilot and an aggressive leader commanding wide loyalty of indispensable value to a unified military structure. ARMA commented that it appeared as if Gen Ma were treated as if he were not more than a GM Comdr; that the increasingly vital and essential role of the RLAF was not receiving appropriate Gen Staff recognition; than Gen Ma was most sensitive and occasionally moody as the Gen Staff well knew, and that a recent pre-election flood of rumors, plus a narrow escape

~~SECRET~~

from a mine explosion in Vientiane (CX-332), had led him to seriously believe he was marked down for removal by the General Staff. ARMA stated that AIRA continued to do all possible to bring Gen Ma to better understanding with Gen Staff but that it was not a one way street.

3. (S) ARMA suggested that Gen Staff attention be given to RLAF promotion lag which Gen Ma feels is hurting morale of his people, also to ensuring prompt arrival monthly pay roll which inordinately delayed recently, also to effort brief Gen Ma on overall operational plans well in advance in order that RLAF could respond quickly; above all improve liaison.

4. (S) General Ouane admitted gravity this situation; stated he had given it much thought, that he now proposed to authorize General Ma two deputies, one for tactics and one for logistics. He stated Ma was outstanding as tactical pilot, but was so deeply involved in tactics that he had neglected his logistic air lift planning; Ouane felt a logistic deputy (which he could furnish Ma if necessary) would permit the air-lift planning which Ouane feels now neglected or at least not responsive to wider requirements of FAR or as desired by Gen Staff. Ouane emphasized that he realized Gen Ma must remain as CG RLAF.

5. (C) Gen Ouane stated he would "soon" discuss with Gen Ma this increase and reorganization of RLAF staff and hoped that it would correct many present difficulties.

6. (C) Gen Ouane stated that he was irked at Gen Ma failure to recommend promotion two Captains who were graduates of French Air Force Flying School in France, four years ago. Four or five

pilots who failed to graduate from same school now Colonels and Majors, not to mention Ma himself who now Brig General. Nevertheless, he would look into possibility improving promotion rate per Gen Ma's recommendation. ARMA suggested that Gen Ma might be given increased authority to promote his own people. Ouane stated this was contrary to FAR regulations (above higher NCO grades).

7. (C) Gen Ouane stated would check on late payrolls etc, and particularly would again invite Gen Ma to s end him a competent officer as permanant liaison.

8. (C) ARMA (at instruction of CHANGE) raised question of 800 new refugees dumped in USAID lap in North West SAYABURY where recent FAR drive (successful) by BY 2 had cleaned out batch of Pathet Lao; in process of drive, 3 villages were burned by the FAR Bn and thoroughly looted, in apparant retaliation for "sheltering PL". ARMA cited 300 regugees at QB 1490 and 500 at QB 0191.

9. (C) Such reprisal t actics had been old style FAR measure, but Gen HOUMPHAN NORASINGH, CG Zone VI, had specifically guaranteed that such was over and done with, and villagers (who could not prevent PL residing in force) would be respected in hope convincing them that FAR their "liberators".

10. (C) General Ouane considerably shaken by this move, denied all knowledge, and stated would investigate at once. Stated PL in past had set fire to villages prior departure and spread word that FAR did it. (In this case USAID evidence seems clear it was FAR, and FAR soldiers seen carrying pots pans driving goats and cows did not appear to be doing so to help villagers.) General Ouane, who

preaches civic action at every opportunity, appeared sincerely distressed this development and will undoubtly make investigation, although ARMA doubts if much comes of it since BY 2 Cmdr will assert fires set by PL, and loot will have disappeared.

11. (S) General Ouane turned to Gen Vang Pao, stating he like Gen Ma in interesting himself solely in fighting, giving no time to plans or coordination with Gen Staff. To improve Vang Pao's staff ability, and also to beef up qualified officer strength in Vang Pao's forces, Ouane stated he would release to Vang Pao "about sixty" junior officers all recent graduates of military schools in Thailand; they would give Vang Pao a needed lift, and hopefully improve his attitude toward the General Staff.

12. (C) After dealing with his "three problems, Kong Le, Ma and Vang Pao", Ouane went on to add that General Phasouk was now in high favor with the Gen Staff where a few months ago he had been suspect. Phasouk had recently requested Gen Staff assistance in planning current operations in his Zone and Col Bounchanh (Operations) was spending this week with Zone IV staff; such zone coordination with the Gen Staff had been most heartening. (Note: Col Bounchanh until one year ago commanded GM 16, was greatly admired by Phasouk who most upset by his June 64 transfer to Gen Staff Opns.)

13. (U) Gen Ouane again expressed satisfaction with elections and stated return of Souvanna Phouma 28 July should "further stablize" situation.

14. (U) Gen Ouane took ARMA on brief tour of new Gen Staff Hq which being rebuilt out of Gen SIHO former DNC HQ (Camp Phong Khang) on north edge of city. Old Hq (adjacent US Embassy) Hq for

Vientiane Hq Co (Cdt "la Place"). Although building badly shot up by 105 Howitzers, 3 Feb, now pretty well repaired and should make excellent Gen Staff compound. Neutralist liaison has one four room bldg. Football practice in progress reminispent of SIHO's better days, but also indicative of reduced tension.

15. ~~(C)~~ ARMA told Gen Ouane that it was hoped DNC weapons were being used to rearm GM 21 in its important role north of Dong Hene and Muong Phalane (Route 9 to mountains). Ouane replied that certain units of GM 21 had received arms, but that the Neutralist Bn at Savannakhet had been completely rearmed (700 men); this plus heavy losses of weapons sent across to Thailand by pro-Phoumi rebels in Paksane and Takhek, had about exhausted the DNC resources. The Thai authorities would only admit a small fraction of such weapons as they actually held. (This answer not completely convincing to ARMA). RO continues efforts establish firm inventory with FAR G-4, which should improve situation.

16. ~~(C)~~ Comment:

a. A generally satisfactory conversation, but favorable results promised will need similar work with Kouprasith, Thong Lith, Thongphan, etc, and continued pressure to see what action carried through.

b. No question but what pre-election tension abating at least with Gen Staff. This can last till next needling, real or fancied, by intrigue feud-loving subordinates in staff and Cmdrs in field.

28 July 1965

WILLIAM IAW
Colonel, CS, Army Attache

GROUP-3



Jan - Jun 65
1-1

SECRET

PAST ACCOMPLISHMENTS - ARMY LAOS

NARRATIVE C-1

1. (S) With the inception of US Military Assistance to Laos, the Laotian Army has expanded from a force of some 25,000 to its present size of approximately 78,000, being equipped mostly with basic US material and weapons. Their ability to support themselves logistically in the field is very limited. Supply discipline and lack of adequate trained personnel are two great limitations. While MAAG training improved the professional competence of many of the NCO and officer personnel, the MAAG stay in Laos was unquestedly too brief to enable the Laotian Army to continue sufficient training on their own. Consequently, there remains a continuing need for more adequately trained NCO and officer personnel, particularly in artillery, signal and ordnance. A bright spot has been the improved ability of the Laotian Army in their maintenance capability of aircraft, ordnance and vehicles. Most of this improvement can be directly attributed to past military assistance, but they still have much to learn in the field of radio communications, artillery and armor techniques. It should be stated that prior to US Military Assistance, the Laotian Army's performance in these latter areas was deficient. It might be estimated that even without the interference of insurgency activities a period of many years training and experience would be necessary to achieve operational competence.

2. (S) On the political side, the maintenance of an adequately armed force has provided an inherently explosive environment where one faction may take over another. This is evidenced not only by the Kong Le coup of August 1960, the attempted Rightist coup of 19 April 1964, and the attempted Phoumi coup in February 1965, but also by the present day situation where the possibility of internal armed conflict is always present. Economically, Military Assistance has provided the Laotian Army with a respectable and desirable way of life for the average Laotian in a country which provides little opportunity for education and/or self improvement.

3. (S) The program has contributed to US objectives, since the mere presence of a military force has undoubtedly deterred the communists from forcibly taking over the country.

GROUP-4
Downgraded at 3 Year Intervals;
Declassified after 12 Years.

DSAA/PAM
15 May 1965

SECRET



Jan June 65
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CAPABILITIES ANALYSIS - ARMY

NARRATIVE B-2B

1. (S) Existing FAR numbering approximately 66,000 officers and [illegible], are organized into approximately 61 infantry battalions plus 79 local militia companies, supporting troops and headquarters. The Neutralist Forces of some 12,000 are organized into some 17 battalions with only token administrative and logistical support forces. These forces, when in combat operations, are limited to short duration operations with battalion forces loosely controlled by group headquarters. An additional, non-RLAF supported armed force of an estimated 16,200 tribesmen cooperate with FAR/NEUT forces operating in their areas.

2. (S) The FAR has exhibited a reasonable capability to maintain vehicles and ordnance material at acceptable standards.

3. (S) The limitations of FAR can be attributed to the following:

a. Lack of qualified officer leadership, educational background, and professional competence of arms.

b. General low education index of rank and file, due to the low literacy rate in Laos. This severely limits technical training in arms and services, which in turn, adversely affects logistics and competence of arms.

c. Paucity of logistics due to organization of the FAR over prescribed support levels of the US Military Assistance Program. This is further compounded with inadequate logistic control and supervision within the FAR.

d. Lack of mobility due to inadequate road nets and difficult terrain. As a consequence, the primary means of movement and resupply is by air.

e. Insufficient size of FAR to accomplish the mission causes over-extended deployment of forces into isolated defensive posture over long distances. This precludes any significant mobile reserve from being available for rapid deployment to counter a major threat.

f. National characteristics of the Lao inhibits those aggressive fighting qualities necessary for an effective soldier. This is in part due to Buddhist influence, a peaceful nature, a propensity for internal politicking and natural indolence. These characteristics, when coupled with backwardness and vague nationalism, prevent the Lao soldier from being motivated equally with his Viet Minh or Chinese counterpart. However, with adequate leadership the Lao soldier undoubtedly could make a much better showing than has been the case in the past.



SECRET

PAST ACCOMPLISHMENTS - GENERAL LAOS

NARRATIVE C

1. (S) The FAR has increased in size from a small constabulary force at the inception of military assistance to a fully organized national army with reserve and home guard units. The FAR was equipped initially with a variety of weapons from French, Communist and US sources, complicating training and logistic support. These units have been re-equipped, the the majority, with US equipment. The Neutralists still retain some of their initial Bloc equipment, but the Neutralist Forces supported by MAP, are being re-equipped with US arms.

2. (S) Progress has been made in the tactical employment of FAR and Neutralist units. Rather than practice the static defense system advocated by the French, the RLG Forces have increased their patrolling techniques and now, to a degree, seek out and engage scattered Pathet Lao. The use and appreciation of a mobile defense system can be attributed to training received from the MAAG prior to October 1962, and more recently by members of the Army Attache staff. On the other hand, the size and relative lack of discipline of the army has led to some instances of exploitation and maltreatment of rural peoples with consequent negative effect on the attitude of the villagers toward the RLG.

3. (S) The training formerly conducted by MAAG personnel in country and with out-of-country facilities has resulted in a limited self-teaching capability in service schools and their military academy. Presently, in the absence of MAAG, MAP has continued this support as follows:

a. In FY 1964 some 83 officers and men received training in the United States.

b. At the end of FY 1965, 112 officers and men will have received US training. This program should be continued in order to increase FAR capability for self training.

c. In 1964, 2,144 Laos soldiers were trained in Thailand mostly in company-sized unit courses at Lopburi. Also in FY 1964, 42 Ordnance and Signal specialists and 14 Psy Ops equipment specialists were trained there (the latter from Neutralist units).

d. In FY 1965 the following training is being given:

In the US, 89 officers and 23 enlisted men.

GROUP-4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years.

Third Country

(1) Individual: 127 Officers, 204 EM

(2) Unit: 1,733 men

4. (S) The political impact of MAP has been pronounced, since the armed forces are the most influential and dominant forces in Laos. Abrupt termination of MAP would trigger collapse of the RLG and reduction of defensive capability to local or guerrilla levels. re-equipping of Neutralist Forces according to the U.S. Ambassador, Laos, has been a major factor in maintaining their western alignment.

5. (S) A major demobilization, which is not presently foreseeable, would substantially reduce the requirement for US financing of imports to offset the inflationary effect of the large RLG defense budget deficit. On the other hand, new assistance would be needed for re-integration of the demobilized personnel into the civilian economy.



Jan June 65
1-1

SECRET

CAPABILITIES ANALYSIS - GENERAL LAOS

NARRATIVE B-2

1. (S) The FAR is generally capable of maintaining internal security in populated regions and along major communications routes presently held against guerillas and pure PL military forces. However, FAR has not exhibited much capability to defend against overt offensives by PL Forces if cadred with Viet Minh (VM) or by pure VM Forces. The recent battle of Dong Hene was an exception. There FAR officer trainees, supported by RLAF planes fought valiantly against several hundred Viet Minh/PL and succeeded in driving off their attack, with the latter suffering heavy losses. The Neutralists Forces under General Kong Le only complement FAR, since they are limited in size and resources, however, the Neutralists, being strategically located, figure prominently in RLG defenses. Following the dissolution of the National Police battalions in the February, 1965 battle in Vientiane, members of the battalions are being used to reconstitute the Group Mobile 14.

2. (S) FAR is capable of short, limited objective operations with up to battalion size units loosely controlled under a group headquarters. Combat operations are hampered by lack of qualified leadership, inability to use combined arms techniques, and poor logistics. This latter weakness stems largely from the habit of maintaining much larger forces than can be adequately supported. Currently MAP support level is 67,200 troops. The American Embassy belives actual forces total in neighborhood of 73-75,000. Discussions have been initiated to find ways to improving the situation (AMEMBASSY, VTN msg 1752 to State).

3. (S) With the continuation of the MAP, coupled with civic-economic aid from the US, the following are expected to occur during the planning period:

a. Continue training of military leaders, technicians and specialists to improve quality of leadership and increase logistical capability.

b. Continue educational projects, training and economic assistance to strengthen the local economy, western orientation, improvement of living conditions, fostering national pride and the will to fight.

c. Continuation of basic military training for units and individuals in Thailand by Royal Thai Army and Air Force. While the number of individuals and units trained under this program is small it has proved most effective from a political, economic and military viewpoint.



~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~

Jan-June 63 File

O 171329Z

FM 333RD ARRON UDORN [illegible]

TO RUMSBJ/2ADIV TSN [illegible]

INFO RUMSATG/AIRA VIENTIANE

RUMBAJ/DEPUTY CHIEF [illegible]

ZEN/DET 6 1ST AIS CMD [illegible]

BT 2CAS-20157/1329Z

~~S E C R E T~~ 2DCT 00352. NOFORN. REF A, 6TH CONSUMATION OF C-28/C-47 TRAINING UDORN THAILAND 22 OCT 6 (SAN), REF B, 2AD 20DCT 02454, DTD 15/1306Z, REF CINCPACAF [illegible] DTD 11/0512Z, REF C CINCPAC DTD 13/2212Z NOV., AND REF D [illegible] 03075A DTD 11 NOV 63.

THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS FORWARDED AS REQUIRED BY REF A. THIS MSG IN 4 PARTS.

PART I. REF C. IS BEING ANSWERED BY DET 6, 333RD THIS DATE, INFO TO YOU HEADQUARTERS AND USOM. CONTENT OF DSP CHIEF ANSWER IS UNKNOWN AT THIS TIM

HOWEVER, DET 6 (SAM) DID PROVIDE INPUTS.

PART II. REF B. PARA 2 A AND B STATISTICS ARE BEING PROVIDED BY

MC-11-17-374 (1993)

ODC-A
CP-X
(2)

Col Johnson called 17/1230 Hrs

2nd one Here

~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~

DET 6 THIS DATE. PARA 2C THE PROPOSED EXTENSION OF DET 6 PERSONNEL SHOULD SATISIFY ALL TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR CURRENT SCOPE OF OF OPERATIONS. THE RLAF WILL HAVE TRAINED ALL PRESENTLY AVAILABLE AIRCREW PERSONNEL AND THE RLAF SHOULD HAVE AVAILABLE SUFFICIENT QUALIFIED CREWS TOSUPPORT THE PROGRAMED POOL FOR OPERATION IN LOAS. IN ADDITION THE RLAF WILL HAVE TWO QUALIFIED INSTRUCTOR PILOTS TRAINED WHO SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF TRAINING ANY ADDITIONAL RLAF AIRCREWS. IT IS ANTICIPATED HOWEVER THAT THE REQUIRSMENT FOR CONTINUED OPERATIONS (AOC), MAINTENANCE AND ARMAMENT SUPPORT WITHIN LAOS, SEE PART III BELOW, WILL BE REQUIRED FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, BUT SHOULDBE SUPPORTED FROM OTHER THAN DET 6 RESOURCES.

PART III. REF B, PARA 3. DET 6 (SAM) PROVIDES THE FOLLOWING SUPPORT TO RLAF COMBAT OPERATIONS A. 1(MAINTENANCE/ARMAMENT PERSONNEL AT VIETAINE, 1 OFFICER (OPERATIONS) IN THE AOC AT VIENTAINE AND 9 MAINTENANCE/ARMAMENT PEOPLE AND 1 OPS OFFICER AT SAVANNAKHET. THE AOC UDORN IS PRESENTLY PROVIDING ONE (1) INTELLIGENCE AND ONE (1) OPS OFFICER TO THE AOC AT VIENTAINE, 2 AIR DIV IS PROVIDING ONE (1) OFFICER AND ONE (1) AIRMAN FOR THE AOC VIENTAINE AND ONE OFFICER AT SAVANNAKHET. IT HAS BEEN PRO-

MC-11117-374 (pg 3)

POSED BY THIS HQ REF D THAT [illegible] OF U S MAINTENANCE/
ARMAMENT PERSONNEL BE REPLACED [illegible] AR 90 MAINTENANCE PEOPLE
THUS RELEASING DET 6 PERSONNEL FOR PERFORMANCE OF PRIMARY TRAINING
MISSION AND EVENTUALLY RETURN [illegible] 6 PERSONNEL TO UDORN.
PART IV. THE ABOVE COMMENTS HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE AIRA
VIENTAINE. GP-4.
BT MC-11-17-374 (3of3)

NNNN



SECRET

R 179915Z

FM DEPCHIEFJUSMAG THAILAND

TO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

INFO RUMUDN/AIRA AMEMB VTN

RUMJFQ/ARO/USAID AMEMB VTN

RUFARQ/CSAF

RUMSDF/DET 6 1ST AIR COMMANDO WG UDORN THAI

RUMSATA/DEP COMDR 2ND ADIV UDORN THAI

RUMSBJ/COMDR 2ND ADIV TAN SON NHUT AB VIETNAM

CINCPAC	
J001	
J003	
J005	
J006	
J020A	
J05E	
J05P	
CACC	
FILE	

2850 Zulu
Jan-Jun
1-2

OTC-A
CEC-A

RT: 2C NS-1645L/13 nov 69

SECRET INDIS/DEP CHIEF-AF 20915 INFO VTN 1785

CONTINUATION OF T-28 TRAINING UDORN (U)

A. DEPCHIEF-AF 23691 NIC

B. VIENTIANE 9211

C. CINCPAC 179213Z NIC

1. REF A REQUESTS REPLACEMENT OF SAW DET 6 PERSONNEL AT UDORN TO CONTINUE T-28/C-47 TRAINING.

2. REF B IS OUTLINED REQUIREMENTS FOR TRAINING AS ESTABLISHED AT AMEMB VIENTIANE. THIS MESSAGE RETRANSMITTED TO CINCPAC IN YOUR CHANNELS.

NC-JK-17-318 (1/3)

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

3. REF C IS CINCPAC REQUEST FOR [illegible] TRAINING INFORMATION REQUIRED PRIOR TO INITIATION OF [illegible] IN REF A.

4. SUMMARY OF TRAINING BY PROJECT BY GROUP FROM SAWC IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. FIVE (5) EACH RLAF C-47 [illegible] HAVE BEEN TRAINED. NINE (9) EACH ARE IN THE CURRENT CLASS AND WILL COMPLETE TRAINING DURING THE PERIOD 13-31 DEC 64.

B. TWENTY (20) RLAF C-47 MECHANICS AND THREE (3) C-47 RADIO OPERATORS HAVE COMPLETED A TRAINING COURSE. EIGHTEEN (18) ARE CURRENTLY UNDER GOING TRAINING AND WILL COMPLETE THE CURRENT COURSE DURING THE PERIOD 13-31 DEC 64.

C. SEVEN (7) RLAF T-28 PILOTS HAVE BEEN TRAINED.

D. SIX (6) RLAF T-28 MECHANICS HAVE BEEN TRAINED. FOURTEEN (14) WILL COMPLETE TRAINING DURING THE PERIOD 13-31 DEC 64.

E. NINETEEN (19) THAI PILOTS HAVE COMPLETED THE T-28 COMBAT TAINING COURSE.

F. ELEVEN (11) CIVILIANS (AIR AMERICA) PILOTS HAVE COMPLETED THE T-28 COMBAT TRAINING COURSE.

5. PROJECTED TRAINING OF RLAF TO BE PERFORMED BY PERSONNEL REQUESTED IN REF A INCLUDES TWELVE (12) TO EIGHTEEN (18) T-28 PILOTS

MC-11-17-318 (4/3)

~~SECRET~~

THREE (3) T-28 INSTRUCTOR PILOTS AND THIRTY (30) T-28 MECHANICS. THE C-47 TRAINING WILL INCLUDE [illegible] C-47 PILOTS, THREE (3) C-47 INSTRUCTOR PILOTS, AND TWENTY [illegible] MECHANICS. THESE FIGURES ARE EXPECTED TO INCREASE DUE TO [illegible] (RLAF COMMANDER) ACCELERATED ACTIVITIES TO DEVELOP ADDITIONAL TRAINERS FOR INPUT TO THE UDORN TRAINING FACILITY.

5. RLAF PERSONNEL ARE BEING TRAINED IN THE T-28 AIRCRAFT TRAINING PROGRAM AT THE RATE OF SEVENTY-TWO (72) PILOTS PER YEAR. TO DATE NINETEEN (19) HAVE BEEN TRAINED. APPROXIMATELY FORTY (40) MORE ARE TO BE TRAINED THIS FISCAL YEAR.

6. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE INCREASED NUMBER OF TRAINEES TO BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR TRAINING IN SUPPORT OF THE LAOS OPERATION WILL CONTINUE THE REQUIREMENT FOR MTT TRAINING SUPPORT THROUGH CALENDAR YEAR 1965.

7. SAW DET 6 HAS FURNISHED PERSONNEL TO BOTH VIENTIANE AND SAVANNAKHET TO ASSIST IN T-28 LAUNCHING OPERATIONS. THIS FUNCTION IS TO BE ASSUMED BY THE 333RD AIR BASE SQUADRON AT UDORN DURING FUTURE OPERATIONS TO AFFORD COMPLETE UTILIZATION OF SAW DET 6. PERSONNEL IN THE TRAINING PROGRAM. THERE HAVE BEEN AS MANY AS TWO (2) OFFICERS AND TWENTY-ONE (21) AIRMEN INVOLVED IN THE TWO LOCA-

TIONS. AT THIS TIME ONE (1) OFFICER AND SEVEN (7) AIRMEN ARE AT SAVANNAKHET ASSITING IN TURN-AROUND AND LAUNCHING OPERATIONS.

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

~~SECRET~~

File Jan-June 1-2

Command File udorn 2826-65

DE RUCOGL 4 07/1934Z

P R 071841Z

FM USAFSAWC EGLIN AFB FLA

TO RUMUDN/USAIRA VIENTIANE LAOS

RUMSBJ/2AIRDIV TAN SON NHUT AB REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

INFO RUEAHQ/CSAF

RUEADX/TAC

RUHLKM/PACAF

RUMSDF/DET 6 UDORN AB THAILAND

BT 2CAS-08/1000Z

~~SECRET NORFORN~~ DDP 00189

ODC
IDC
CMO
CEC

(R)

FOR AFXOPI/CSAF AND AFNI /CSAF/, OO/TAC AND 1ADIV/19;S4. OVDRM

1. REF SECRET NORFORN AIRA CITE CX-929, DTG041334Z NOV64.

2. REF MSG IS QUOTED FOR BENEFIT COMDR, 2ADVCF, WHO AS REQUESTED BY RLG IN MAY 64 THE AMBASSADOR HAS CHARGED AIRA WITH RESPONSIBILITY OF COORDINATING AND CONTROLLING T-28 OPERATIONS IN LAOS. DURING THIS PERIOD AIR FORCE UNITS STATIONED AT UDORN HAVE PLAYED A VITAL ROLE IN SUPPORTING THIS OPERATION. IN VIEW OF US GOVERNMENT POLICY NOT TO OPENLY VIOLATE GENEVA ACCORDS WITH REQUIRE AF ENTER LAOS UNDER CONCEPT

MC 11-8-50 (1084)

Col Price
Pls Keep in
ready file, please.

~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

NOFORN

PAGE 2 RUCOGL [redacted]

THAT ALL TDY PERSONNEL AT UDORN [redacted] COME UNDER DIRECT CONTROL OF AIRA UPON ARRIVAL VIENTIANE. IT WAS ALSO BEEN OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT AF UNITS AT UDORN WOULD, WITHIN THEIR CAPABILITIES, PROVIDE MAXIMUM SUPPORT BASED ON REQUIREMENTS SUBMITTED BY AIRA. 5AW DET 6 IN PARTICULAR HAS CONTRIBUTED INVALUABLE TO THIS SUPPORT. MAJ COCKRAN WHO COMMANDED DET 6 UNTIL LATE AUG DID AN OUTSTANDING JOB IN PROVIDING NECESSARY SUPPORT. HE DEVELOPED AN EXCEPTIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THIS UNIQUE OPERATION AND COOPERATED TO THE FULLEST EXTENT. LT COL THOMAS, PRESENT DET 6 CMDR, HAS NOT BEEN WILLING IN ALL CASES TO PROVIDE THE COOPERATION REQUIRED TO CONDUCT AIR OPERATIONS IN LAOS. ALTHOUGH HE HAS DONE A GOOD JOB IN HIS TRAINING PROGRAM IN UDORN HE HAS REFUSED TO RELINQUISH CONTROL OF HIS PERSONNEL AND HAS IMPRESSED UPON THEM THEY ARE WORKING DIRECTLY FOR HIM WHILE TDY IN LAOS. THIS ATTITUDE DOES NOT LEND ITSELF TO HARMONIOUS EFFORT WHEN TDY PERSONNEL FROM DIFFERENT ORGANIZATIONS ARE ATTEMPTING TO WORK TOGETHER AS A TEAM. ON 4 NOV LAIRA REQUESTED THAT LT COL THOMAS PROVIDE A FAC TO WORK WITH FAC OFFICERS AND AN ITELLIGENCE OFFICER IN PAKSANE AREA TO COORDINATE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT PROCEDURES WITH THE ARMY. COL THOMAS REFUSED THIS REQUEST UNLESS ANOTHER OFFICER FROM UDORN ACCOMPANY THE NCO. PERMIS-

INC 11-8-50 (2094)

SECRET

NOFORN

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

PAGE 3 RUCOGL 4 ~~SECRET NOFORN~~

SION MUST BE OBTAINED FROM THE AMBASSADOR PRIOR TO O. K. PERMISSION IS BASED ON INDIVIDUAL JUSTIFICATION AND IN THIS CASE HAD BEEN GRANTED FOR THE NCO REQUESTED DUE TO URGENCY OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THIS TEAM TO BE IN PLACE THEY HAD TO DEPART WITHOUT THE NCO, A REQUIRED RADIO TECHNICIAN, VITAL TO THE MAKE-UP OF THE TEAM. MAXIMUM COORDINATION AND AF COOPERATION IS REQUIRED OF DET 6 IF WE ARE TO CONTINUE OUR MISSION EFFECTIVELY. IN ORDER TO PERFORM THE MISSION IN LAOS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AMBASSADOR'S POLICIES AIRA MUST HAVE GUIDANCE RELATIVE TO AUTHORITY TO REQUEST SUPPORT FROM UNITS IN UDORN. IF AIRA UNDERSTANDING IS CORRECT DET 6, UDORN IS TRAINING AND REPEAT AND PROVIDING SUPPORT OF AIR OPERATIONS IN LAOS, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT ACTION BE TAKEN TO INSURE THAT LT COL THOMAS BE APPRAISED OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES. UNQUOTE

3. COMDR, SAWC, HAS COMPLETE CONFIDENCE IN JUDGEMENT AND ABILITY OF LT COL THOMAS TO CONDUCT TRAINING AND OPERATIONS WITHIN LIMITS OF CAPABILITY OF DET 6. RESPONSIBILITIES OF LT COL THOMAS WITH RESPECT TO AIRA WHERE ORGINALLY STATED IN SECRET USAF AFXOP 98476, DTG 052341Z MAR 64 AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE PARA D. PROVIDE EXPERIENCED

MC 11-8-50 (334)

SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL TO ASSIST AIRA VIENTIANCE IN PLANNING AIR SUPPORT OPERATIONS IF REQUIRED. UNQUOTE

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

4. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN ANY DIRECTIVES OR AGREEMENTS HELD BY THIS HQ OF ANY OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES TO AMB. CMDR, DET 6, IACV, IS OF COURSE RESPONSIBLE FOR EXECUTION OF ALL MILITARY OPERATION DIRECTED BY CMDR, 2ND ADVON. ANY AGREEMENTS REACHED BETWEEN CMDR, 2D ADVON AND AMBASSADOR VIENTIANE SHOULD BE MADE KNOWN TO CMDR DET 6, WHO WILL THEN COMPLY. GP 4.

BT MC 11-8-72 (NSF)



VV MMG791L9D9SS
PP RUMBDF
DE RUMUDN Ø19S
BT
S E C R E T SVC
BT
E RUMUDN 338A
P R Ø2Ø945Z
FM USAIRA VIENTIANE LAOS
TO RUEAHQ/CSAF
RUEAHQ/DIA
RUEAHQ/1127TH USAF FAC
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUCQHK/CINCSTRIKE
INFO RUMBC/AMEMB BANGKOK
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUHLKM/PACAF
RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
RUMALC/13AF
RUADAZ/5AF
RUMBAJ/DEPCHIEFJUSMAG THAI
RUMSBJ/2ND AIRDIV SAIGON
RUMBDF/DET 2 3D TH TAC GP UDORN
RUMSGA/DET 5/6499TH SPTGP BANGKOK
RUMSBJ/DET 6/6499TH SPTGP SAIGON
RUMTBK/USAIRA BANGKOK
BT
S E C R E T AIRA CITE CX-2 3. HQ USAF FOR AFMIN. 13AF FOR ISE C.
REF ØSD MSG DEF8[illegible], *ØI[illegible]SEP (TOTAL).
TOL IS STATUS REPORT REQUESTED REFERENCED MSG.-
1. RLAF T-28 AT SAVANNAKHET, LAOS:
7 - T-28D (ONE ON LOAN FROM SAM DET)
3 - T-28D (ON LOAN FROM SAM DET)
BASED AT UDORN, THAILAND:
14 - T-28B
6 - T-28D
3 - RT 28-D

SECRET

PAGE TWO RUMUDN 338A S E C R E T
2. RLAF HAS 15 QUALIFIED T-28 PILOTS, PLUS 4 IN TRAINING AT UDORN, THAILAND WHO WILL COMPLETE TRAINING 15 SEP. ONE ADDITIONAL LAO PILOT, WHO BROKE A LE 9, 29 AUGUST AT UDORN, WILL COMPLETE TRAINING AFTER 10 WEEKS OF CONVALESCENCE. ANOTHER 4 IN USA, WILL COMPLETE TRAINING 4 AUG 65. THERE ARE 16 QUALIFIED T-28 THAI PILOTS AT UDORN FLYING COMBAT MISSIONS IN LAOS ON A ROTATIONAL BASIS. NINE THAI PILOTS WILL ENTER T-28 TRAINING AT UDORN IN SEP. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THESE PILOTS WILL COMPLETE THEIR TRAINING APPROX 15 OCT. EACH MONTH A NEW GROUP OF THAI PILOTS WILL ENTER T-28 TRAINING AT UDORN IN SUFFICIENT NUMBERS TO MAINTAIN A POOL OF 20 THAI OPERATIONAL T-28 PILOTS AND PROVIDE REPLACEMENTS FOR PILOTS COMPLETING 100 COMBAT SORTIES IN LAOS.
GP-3
BT

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

~~SECRET~~

926-65 File 1-2

THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF 2 PAGES
NUMBER FIVE OF 10 COPIES.
SERIES A....

RECORD OF MEETING

16 September 1964

SUBJECT: (U) Training Program for Royal Thai Air Force Pilots in T-28 Aircraft.

PLACE: Udorn, Thailand

DATE: 15 September 1964

PARTICIPANTS: Air Vice Marshal Panieng Kantarat, Director of Operations, Royal Thai Air Force

Colonel Roland K. McCoskrie, Air Attaché, Bangkok, Thailand

Colonel Jack H. McCreery, Deputy Commander, 2nd Air Division

Wing Commander Rachain Wanarod, Commander, 23rd Composite Squadron, Royal Thai Air Force, Udorn

Lt. Colonel William E. Thomas, Commander, Det 6, 1st Air Commando Wing, Udorn

1. At the meeting decribed above, the following agreements were reached in relation to present and future training of RTAF pilots in the T-28 training program conducted by the SAW Detachment at Udorn, and concerning Thai Pilot participation in operations over Laos.

a. Present and future pilot trainees will be under the control of the Commander, Composite Squadron 23, Udorn, and will retain their RTAF status during training. Upon completion of training, pilots will be returned to Don Muang for a period of four days for processing before engaging in operations over Laos.

b. Training will be divided into two phases. During the first phase, all pilots will be given general academic and flying training. Students will be closely observed to determine which ones have the greatest potential for combat operations. At a point in time two weeks before trainees are due to enter operations, the current class will be screened for those pilots with the highest potential for combat. Pilots selected will continue through a concentrated flying program. Pilots not selected will be re-assigned to Composite Squadron 23 for continuation training. Composite Squadron 23 will furnish from that unit sufficient combat ready pilots for the last two weeks of training, to provide a total number of pilots sufficient to replace the pilots due for relief from operations, and to provide a total of at least 18 but not more than 20 pilots on operations at all times.

c. Operational tour for pilots will be 100 missions in four months, or a total of six months operational flying. Tour will begin on the day after the last day of processing. Pilots who complete 100 missions prior to four months, will receive the pay and allowances due, plus that which would become due up to a total of four months.

[redacted] ~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~SECRET~~
~~LIMDIS~~

d. Pilots selected for operations will be paid a per diem allowance at the prescribed rate for the last two weeks of their training program. Upon entering operations, pilots will receive extra pay at the prescribed rate. Trainee pilots will receive no special pay or allowances, except as paid by the RTAF, prior to being selected for combat operations.

e. Pilots on operations will be scheduled by Commander Composite Squadron 23 on a basis to provide adequate time off, but to provide maximum pilot availability to meet requirements as established by Air Attaché, Vientiane.

f. All matters concerning training and operational committments for Thai Pilots will be resolved locally among Commander, Composite Squadron 23; Commander, Detachment 6, 1st Air Commando Wing, and Air Attaché, Vientiane. Unresolved matters will be referred to Director of Operations, Royal Thai Air Force and the Air Attaché, Bangkok.

2. It has been previously agreed between the Director of Operations, RTAF and the USAF Air Attaché, Bangkok, that the RTAF will supply pilot trainee's for the T-28 program on a schedule mutually agreed upon by these two parties. For the forseeable future, these requirements are:

12 October	3 Pilots
17 October	3 Pilots
23 October	3 Pilots
22 November	8 Pilots.

The above schedule is subject to availability of the pilots, and subject to change by mutual agreement.

ROLAND K. McCOSKRIE
Colonel, USAF
Air Attaché
American Embassy
Bangkok, Thailand

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

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DCH-AF

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Responsible Areas for Thai T-28 Training

1. A conference was convened by the Deputy Chief JUSMAG, in the Capital Hotel, Bangkok, Thailand, on 1 October 1964. The following is a list of attendees:

a. Deputy Chief JUSMAG.

(1) Colonel J. D. Cornett, Deputy Chief.

(2) Lt Colonel Robert A. Ehrig, Chief AF Division

(3) Lt Colonel Ogden R. Fox, Executive Officer

(4) Major Dooley I. Mallory, Admin Officer AF Division

(5) Major George W. Gathen, DCH-AF Liaison Officer

b. Air Attache, APO 152.

Colonel Robert Tyrrell

c. S/G USAID, APO 152.

Mr. C. Putnam

d. Air Attache Bangkok, Thailand.

(1) Colonel Roland K. McCoskrie

(2) Lt Colonel Ray E. Guy

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GROUP-4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.

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e. [illegible] Thailand.

(1) [illegible]

(2) [illegible]

f. [illegible]

[illegible]

g. [illegible]

4. The purpose of this conference was to establish and agree to the responsibility of each agency involved in the Thai pilot training operation (Udorn, Thailand) and to inform all concerned the position that must be maintained by the Deputy Chief JUSMAG in order that the management and supervision of the Laos Military Assistance Program can be carried out.

5. The following items were presented for consideration; the answers, as agreed to, are indicated.

a. Training Objective (Tactical only).

(1) How many tactical pilots will be in the training program?

(2) Answer: We will plan on twenty (20) pilots being available in the program at any one time. We will plan on seventy-two (72) annually for programming purposes.

(3) How many student-pilots will be in the training program?

(4) Answer: There will be an input of nine (9) students each six-weeks.

(5) What is the length of the training program?

(6) Answer: Six weeks each class (approximately 75 flying hours per student).

b. Operational Control of Detachment 6 (Six).

(1) Who will maintain control of the training program?

(2) Answer: 2nd Air Division.

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GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.

(3) Who will maintain operational control of the tactical operations in Laos.

(4) Answer: Air Attache Vientiane, Laos.

c. Who will maintain operational control of:

(1) Students ?

(2) Answer: Detachment 6 (SAW)

(3) Tactical pilots ?

(4) Answer: Air Attache and Detachment 6 (actual selection of mission pilots will be made by Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) after Det 6 submits a request for a mission pilot).

d. Rotation.

(1) How will tactical pilots be rotated ?

(2) Answer: Normally pilots will be rotated upon completion of 100 missions or 6 months, whichever occurs first; however, each pilot is required to serve a minimum of four (4) months. To qualify for rotation in four (4) months, the pilot must complete a minimum of 100 missions. Therefore, they can rotate any time after completion of the 100th mission and after meeting the four-month minimum time requirement.

e. Billeting and TDY.

(1) Who will contract for billeting and fund for the TDY of:

(a) Students ?

(b) Answer: RTAF

(c) Tactical pilots ?

(d) Answer: RTAF

f. Aircraft.

(1) How many aircraft will be required for:

(a) Training ?

(b) Answer: Four (4) T-28 aircraft

(c) Tactical Missions ?

(d) Answer: Thirty-six (36) T-28 aircraft (a maximum of four (4) each RT-28 aircraft are acceptable as a portion of the 36).

GROUP-4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals,
Declassified after 12 years.

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(2) Replacements:

(a) Who will request replacement (attrition) aircraft?

(b) Answer: AIRA Vientiane, through embassy channels.

(c) Who will provide funding for fuel, oil, spares, maintenance, and supply support of owned- and loaned-aircraft?

(d) Answer: Deputy Chief JUSMAG.

g. Who will augment existing transportation to provide the additional transportation needed to support the students and tactical pilots?

Answer: Deputy Chief will instruct Air America to rent an additional vehicle to satisfy the requirement.

h. Who will fund and provide personal and survival equipment for:

(1) Students?

(2) Answer: RTAF

(3) Tactical mission pilots?

(4) Answer: Deputy Chief and R/O USAID Vientiane.

FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF:

ROBERT A. UHRIG
Lt Col., USAF
Chief AF Division

Copies furnished:

Dep Chief JUSMAG, APO 146
Air Attache, APO 152
R/O USAID, APO 152
Air Attache Bangkok, Thailand
CINCPACAF, APO 146
~~Det~~ 2, 2nd ADiv, APO 37
Det 6, 1st Air Commando Sq, APO 37

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

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RUMTBK/AIRA AMEMB BANGKOK THAI
RUMBDF/DET 6 1ST AIR COMMANDO WG UDORN THAI
RUMJFS/RO/USAID AMEMB VTN LAOS
RUMBK/CHJUSMAG THAI
RUMBDC/AF SEC JUSMAG DON MUANG AB THAI
RUMSATA/DET 2 2ND ADIV UDORN THAI
BT
~~S E C R E T EYES~~/DEP CHIEF-AF 20753 VTN 1449.
FOR (LT COL PEZELLE/J-3 JUSMAG; COLONEL MCCREERY/DET 2.
T-28 TRAINING UDORN
1. THE ORIGINAL AGREEMENT FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE T-28 PROGRAM IN SUPPORT OF THE LAOS OPERATION LEVIED SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITIES. QUOTE: "FOR DIRECT SUPPORT OF THE LAOS OPERATION UNDER DEPUTY CHIEF JUSMAG." UNQUOTE. SINCE THIS AGREEMENT WAS ESTABLISHED, THE T-28 PROGRAM NOW APPEARS TO BE POINTED TOWARD TRAINING THAI PILOTS FOR OTHER THAN FLYING IN SUPPORT OF OUR OPERATION.
2. THE PRESENT CONCEPT, AS IT IS UNDERSTOOD HERE, IS TO

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ROTATE THREE (3) OF EACH NINE (9) STUDNETS TRAINED INTO THE TACTICAL OPERATION AND SEND THE OTHER SIX (6) PILOTS BACK TO THE RTAF AS INSTRUCTORS. IN VIEW OK THE ABOVE, IR IS CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL TO CONVENE A NEW MEETING TO CLARIFY OUR PRESENT TRAINING OBJECTIVES AT UDORN AND DEVELOP A NEW AGREEMENT TO AFFIX JOINT RESPONSIBILITIES FOR(
A. PERSONAL EQUIPMENT.
B. BILLETING AND TDY FOR STUDENTS.
C. ROTATION PROGRAM.
D. TRANSPORTATION RESPONSIBILITIES.
E. OPERATIONAL CONTROL FOR TRAINING.
F. OPERATIONAL CONTROL FOR TACTICAL OPERATIONS.
3. REQUEST YOU SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO A MEETING TO BE HELD BY DEPUTY CHIEF JUSMAG AT 1300 HOURS, 1 OCT 64, CONFERENCE ROOM (2ND), CAPITAL HOTEL, TO RESOLVE A NEW MEMO OF UNDERSTANDING.
GP-FOUR
BT

NNNN

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Lt M SECRETARY
Dep CmDR 2nd THAI

Archives

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

HEADQUARTERS
JOINT UNITED STATES MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP TO THAILAND
Office of the Deputy Chief
APO 146, San Francisco, California

File 1-2
928-65

1 OCT 1964

As the representative of CINCPAC, Deputy Chief JUSMAG has the primary responsibility of management and supervision of the Laos Military Assistance Program and will keep CINCPAC informed of the end use of all MAP equipment, funds, and materials. Recent message originating in AIRA Bangkok and AIRA Vientiane, spells out requirements for training, aircraft configuration, and expenditures of MAP Laos funds, none of which has been coordinated with Deputy Chief JUSMAG. In view of the many actions taken place which directly affects the Laos Military Assistance Program without Deputy Chief representation it is impossible to comply with his directed responsibility of "management and supervision" of the Laos Military Assistance Program. This meeting has been called to advise all agencies concerned of the Deputy Chief's position and to discuss the following items of common interest:

a. Training Objective (Tactical)

(1) How many tactical pilots will be in the training program.

(2) How many student pilots will be in the training program.

(3) Length of training program.

(4) Type and length of each course.

535-S-64

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b. Operational Control of Det 6:

(1) Who will maintain control of the training program.

(2) Who will maintain control of the tactical operations.

c. Operational Control of Students and Tactical Pilots:

d. Rotation (Students and Tactical Pilots):

e. Billeting and TDY for (Who will contract for billets; who will provide funds):

(1) Students.

(2) Tactical Pilots.

f. Aircraft:

(1) How many aircraft will be required for:

(a) Training.

(b) Tactical Missions.

(c) What is the attrition rate and who will arrange for replacement aircraft.

(d) Deputy Chief will provide funds for gas, oil, spares, and maintenance and supplies for all owned and loaned aircraft.

g. Transportation for Students and Tactical Pilots:

h. Personal Equipment and Survival Equipment (Who will fund and provide for):

(1) Students.

(2) Tactical Mission.

i. Aircraft:

(1) Configuration.

(2) Replacement.

(a) For training.

(b) For tactical.

(3) How many aircraft are required for support.

(a) Training program.

(b) Tactical mission.



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SECRET LIMDIS
DEPUTY CHIEF
JOINT UNITED STATES MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP
BOX 1000, APO SAN FRANCISCO 96346
DCH-AF

4 Jan 1965

MEMORANDUN FOR: All Concerned (See Distribution)

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Understanding

1. GENERAL:

a. This memorandum establishes an operational concept and provides logistical support for Special Air Warfare Detachment 6 (SAW Det 6), 1st Air Cammando Wing (1st ACW) presently deployed at Udorn, Thailand.

b. This Mobile Training Team (MTT) has been provided by the United States Air Force (USAF), as authorized by Department of Defense (DOD) and approved by Department of State, for support of the Laos Military Assistance Program (MAP). The primary task of SAW Det 6 (MTT) is to provide necessary facilities and to train and up-grade the Royal Laotian Air Force (RLAF) that it may become a self-sustaining national air force.

c. Subsequent military developments and operational needs in Laos, however, have produced requirements for tactical pilots (Royal Thai Air Force) also to be trained in order to meet combat operational needs. Earlier agreements have established a standing operational requirement for twenty (20) combat ready T-28 pilots. Further agreements have provided that sufficient Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) pilots shall receive training to insure timely combat replacements as needed in order to support a twenty-pilot (20-pilot) pool for an indefinite period.

d. Combat requirements in Laos make it necessary to employ certain numbers of T-28's tactically; both by and in support of the RLAF. The American Embassy Vientiane establishes policy guidelines for utilization of aircraft for training vis-a-vis combat; aircraft locations; and assumes direction of combat operations in Laos.

2. EFFECTIVE DATE: The effective date of this memorandum is 4 Jan 1965.

3. RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. American Embassy Vientiane Will:

(1) Establish priority of tasks for available combat ready aircraft, which are to be provided by the air support operations center (ASOC) at Udorn, Thailand.

(2) Provide ASOC at Udorn with daily aircraft/crew requirements necessary to support Air Operations Center (AOC) Vientiane commitments.

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(3) Direct tactical operations in Laos, utilizing these aircraft and personnel placed under his operational control (Para 3c(1) below).

(4) Supervise and operate an AOC at Vientiane, Laos.

(5) Provide policy guidance to Deputy Chief JUSMAG related to mission objectives, tasks, and student inputs.

(6) Select and transport Laotian personnel designated for training to Udorn, Thailand.

(7) Effect apporpriate liaison and coordination with the RLAF for such support by the United States Government of RLAF operations as required.

(8) Arrange for RLAF support of its assigned personnel as required.

(9) As determined necessary, arrange for periodic visits of technically qualified personnel to assist the RLAF in the operations, maintenance and supply procedure of RLAF in-country facilities.

(10) Take action to develop and program for an effective limited organizational maintenance capability when T-RT-28 aircraft are deployed away from Udorn under control of RLAF. Organizational capability to include support of unscheduled and scheduled maintenance requirements, except periodic inspections.

b. Deputy Chief JUSMAG (DCH), as U.S. military representative charged with direction and operation of MAP Laos Program, will:

(1) Coordinate with Requirements Office United States Agency for International Development (RO/USAID) for program changes and requirements affecting MAP Laos operations.

(2) Provide to Deputy Commander 2nd Air Division (Udorn, Thailand) the mission objectives and tasks required of Det 6, 1st Air Commando Wing, excluding contingency missions.

(3) Coordinate with agencies concerned and develop appropriate training requirements for Laotian air and ground crew personnel.

(4) Establish priorities for student inputs to satisfy stated and program requirements. These priorities will include personnel of other than Laotian nationality required to be trained by SAW Det 6, 1st ACW.

(5) Under guidance received from American Embassy, act as their representative with SAW Det in all matters other than operational.

(6) Provide liaison between all agencies associated with or having interest in the MAP training program as conducted by Det 6, 1st ACW.

(7) Program, in coordination with RC/USAID, sufficient funds for aircraft logistical support of all owned and/or loaned aircraft used in support of Laos MAP.

(8) Provide limited field maintenance support for all T/RT-28 aircraft; and IRAN for all Laos owned aircraft.

(9) Responsible for availability of technically qualified personnel to assist the RLAF in their mission objectives. Coordinate with American Embassy Vientiane for permission for such personnel to enter Laos as required.

(10) Coordinate with Requirements Office/United States Agency for International Development for lateral supply support between sites.

(11) Provide for temporary duty funds, billeting and transportation for all Laos students while in training.

(12) As appropriate, provide personal and survival equipment for tactical pilots assigned to the Laos program.

(13) Coordinate arrangements for continuance in future of the Laos training program. Det 6, 1st ACW as required.

c. Dep Comdr 2nd Air Division (THAILAND) will:

(1) Exercise operational control over Det 6, 1st ACW (Ref SAWC OPORD 4-64). This includes supervision of all flying activities and programs conducted by Det 6, 1st ACW personnel in the conduct of their primary mission (for example: Training RLAF personnel). Personnel and aircraft placed on loan or TDY to AMEMB Vientiane will come under the operational control of AMEMB Vientiane upon crossing the Laotian/Thailand border.

(2) Provide interim organizational and limited field maintenance capability to support approximately 40 T/RT-28 aircraft on a 50-hour monthly utilization rate. This interim support will be provided until adequate maintenance support contractor or MAP is available.

(3) Allocate sufficient operational ready T/RT-28 aircraft to satisfy AOC Vientiane tactical requirement within priorities established by Par 3a(1) and 3a(2) and within capabilities of assigned resources.

(4) Provide personnel augmentation as approved in support of the Laotian operation.

(5) Provide all normal on-base support at Udorn, Thailand for Det 6, 1st ACW activities and personnel.

(6) Coordinate activities of Det 6, 1st ACW with Deputy Chief per paragraph b(1) and b(2).

(7) Provide intelligence support as required.

d. Special Air Warfare Detachment 6, 1st Air Commando Wing Will:

(1) Under the operational control of Dep Comdr 2nd Air Division (Thailand) conduct training programs as required, and will supervise and administer students while in training as appropriate.

(2) Provide sufficient personnel for organizational maintenance, OJT, and instructor pilots to satisfy mission requirements.

(3) Provide timely and appropriate advice and suggestions on methods, procedures, and requirements to insure maximum development of the students undergoing training.

(4) Provide technical assistance, training, and operational advice, knowledge, and other professional assistance to the RLAF as required.

e. Chief JUSMAG Thailand will:

(1) Coordinate the use of such Royal Thai Armed Forces facilities as agreed upon between the Royal Thai Government and the United States.

(2) Coordinate with the Royal Thai Government and the AMEMB Bangkok, to arrange selection and input of the Thai pilot trainees to maintain a ready pool of Thai combat pilots to support Laotian operations.

(3) Coordinate replacement program for the Thai Pilots in the combat pool in accordance with appropriate procedures and arrangements between JUSMAG and the RTAF.

J. G. CORNETT, Colonel, GS
Deputy Chief

copies to: CINCPAC (1)
AMEMB VTN (1)
AMEMB BKK (1)
2AD (1)
COMUSMACV (1)
Dep Cmdr 2AD (1)
SAW Det 6 (1)
CHJUSMAG (1)
DCH AFLO (1)
DCH-AF Div (1)

4 Atch
1. AMEMB VTN Msg (S), 1520, Dtg 091000Z Jan 1965.
2. 2AD Ltr, 12 Dec 1964, Subj: Memo of Understanding, with 1st Ind (Dep Comdr 2AD Udorn) undated.
3. J-3 JUSMAG (LtCol Hunter) verbally, 11 Jan 1965.
4. AF Sec JUSMAG (Major Ong) verbally, 8 Jan 1965.

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File Jan-Jun 65 1-2

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FM DEPCHJUSMAG THAI

TO RUMHQ/CINCPAC

INFO RUMJFS/AMEMB VTN LAOS

RUMTBX/AMEMB BANGKOK THAI

RUMUDN/AIRA AMEMB VTN LAOS

RUMJFS/R/O USAID AMEMB VTN LAOS

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RUMBC/CHJUSMAG THAI

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RUMSBJ/2ND AIR DIV TSN AB RVN

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~~S E C R E T~~ DEP CHIEF-AF 20878 INFO VTN 1707

T-28 REQUIRMENTS FOR LAOS (S)

A. DEP CH-AF SECRET MSG/20816 INFO VTN 1554 DTG 070450Z OCT 64(NOTAL)

B. UR SECRET MSG DTG 032325Z OCT 64.

1. DURING THE "HARMONIZING MEETING" AT UDORN ON 28 OCT 64, AMEMB VIENTIANE EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN OVER THE SCARCITY OF T-28 AIRCRAFT NOW AVAILABLE FOR LAOS OPERATIONS. AS OUTLINED IN REFERENCE A, THERE IS A VALID REQUIRMENT FOR A TOTAL OF FORTY (40) T-28 AIRCRAFT (FOUR (4) OF WHICH ARE RT-28 CONFIGURATION). THIS REQUIREMENT COULD BECOME URGENT AT ANY TIME. (192) MC 18-1-65

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PAGE 2 RUMBAJ 27C SECRET

2. AT PRESENT, THERE ARE THIRTY-FOUR (34) AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE; HOWEVER OF THESE, FIVE (5) ARE NORM.

3. WOULD APPRICCRZA ANY INFORMATION REGRADING ACTIONS TAKEN TO PROVIDE FORTY (40) T-28 AIRCRAFT TO SUPPORT THE LAOS PROGRAM. WITH EXCEPTION OF THE FOUR (4) RT-28 AIRCRAFT, THE REMAINING THRITY-SIX (36) SHOULD BE T-28B OR T-28D MODELS. OTHER MODEL WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE PROVIDING THEY POSSESS THE SAME COMBAT CAPABILITY AND COULD BE SUPPORTED BY THE SAME LOGISITIC SYSTEM AS THE T-28B OR D.

GP-FOUR

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(282) MC 11-1-45



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927-6
Jan 9 - 16 Nov 64
file
file 1-2

333rd Air Base Squadron
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Udorn AB, Thailand

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: Maintenance Officer

SUBJECT: Maintenance Support Proposal

TO: Col McCreary
LtCol Thomas

1. The 333rd ABSq must provide aircraft in support of the Laotian effort in two different locations and at the same time provide approximatly sixteen training missions perday at Udorn.

2. The Northern effort requires approximatly six aircraft perday that generate from twelve to eighteen sorties perday.

3. The eastern effort has required four aircraft on perminant loan plus four additional aircraft on temporary loan, a total of eight aircraft.

4. There is a total of thirteen T-28 aircraft located east. Informal information indicates that ~~20~~ sorties per day is generated in direct connection with the Laotian effort. If this is the limit of effort expended East, then the number of aircraft on loan is incompatable with the number of aircraft required to support the northern effort which has the same mission.

5. Maintenance experience has shown that extremely poor maintenance practice exists on 333rd ABSq aircraft returning from Eastern deployment for repair.

6. Supply requirements in support of the eastern effort has increased considerably in the past 30 days. The applicable DLAK account located at the eastern base has the same priority as our local DLAR account.

7. The 333rd ABSq cannot continue to indefinitly support the north and east effort plus the local trainming requirements when faced with battle damage, supply NORS rate, normal maintenance attrition and other limiting factors such as transportation and inadequate communications.

8. Recommendations:

a. Reappraise the eastern effort requirements.

b. Establish a concept of aircraft deployment for both the northern and eastern effort based on anticipated target requirements.

c. Return all 333rd ABSq aircraft to Udorn.

d. Obtain daily operational requirements from both northern and eastern bases.

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e. Deploy aircraft North and East as required.

9. Assuming the primary commander of the Eastern effort desires an all Laotian pilot force and to prevent billeting and other associated problems, the following recommendations are offered:

a. Approximatly eighteen "B" pilots are assigned for the Laotian effort.

b. Approximatly six to nine "B" pilots are required daily in support of the Northern effort.

c. Utillize the required number of remaining "B" pilots as ferry crews for the Eastern aircraft deployment. Ferry crews would remain at the Eastern base during the day and ferry the aircraft to Udorn in the evening for rear echelon maintenance. Rotate this requirement among available "B" pilots.

10. Tasks

a. Call a conference of policy level personnel to establish future 333rd ABSq North and East support policy.

b. Recall all deployed 333rd aircraft to Udorn.

c. Establish appropriate priorities on the East, North and local missions.

d. Clarify the lateral support policy between Udorn and the Eastern base since both activities posses DLA accounts.

11. Twenty seven aircraft are available for the total mission requirements. If the above recommendations are accepted; the estimated aircraft utillization would be as follows:

a. 6 aircraft - North requirement (estimated)

b. 6 aircraft - East requirement (estimated)

c. 6 aircraft - local training requirement

d. 2 aircraft - NORS rate experience

e. 2 RT aircraft - as required locally or North and East

f. 2 aircraft - IRAN

g. 1 aircraft - periodic inspection

h. 2 aircraft - routine maintenance and/or spares

i. 27 Total

j. Above figures based on 80% or Rate.

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12. The Det 6, 1ACW mission is to train and advise. The original requirement has greatly increased and is dispersed over three locations. Integration of 333rd ABSq maintenance personnel with the Det 6, 1ACW personnel at both North and East locations would relieve the furious treadmill pace they now face. A joint effort between both activities would draw the 333rd ABSq more into the total effort. Two maintenance officers are available to rotate as necessary between both the North and East bases to effect maximum utillization of deployed aircraft and personnel. Recommend the following actions:

a. Make a survey of both North and East advisory requirements.

b. Utillize both Det 6, 1ACW and 333rd ABSq maintenance personnel to perform advisory tasks as required.

c. Rotate all personnel on a continuous basis to effect continuity.

d. Since commando personnel are trained to perform this task, 333rd ABSq personnel should be responsible to the particular deployed commando personnel in place at either the North or East base.

e. Integrate all T-28 commando maintenance personnel and 333rd ABSq maintenance personnel into the total T-28 flying and training mission. Training of Laotian and Thailand mechanics would be more realistic if a period of training experience was conducted through all aspects of the maintenance spectrum. Training in the early stages to be under ideal conditions and gradually phased to the flight line where the intensity of meeting mission schedules could be realized.

13. Maintenance tasks:

a. Realign work shifts to meet requirements of increased number of daily deployed aircraft returning from North and East each day.

b. Continued emphasis on Air America Field Maintenance build up capability.

c. Help develope and provide Thailand and Laotian mechanic training assistance with commando personnel as required.

d. Insure necessary number of aircraft are provided for all mission requirements.

e. Rotate predetermined number of personnel to North and East bases.

14. Integrated effort of both Det 6, 1ACW and 333rd ABSq maintenance personnel would not only supplement the overall mission but would provide an insight to common problems. This aspect is seriously lacking at present.

15. Supply tasks:

a. Provide lateral support to 353rd deployed aircraft as required.

b. Provide one supply representative to the Eastern base as required

c. Continue to build up an efficient supply account for the assigned aircraft.

16. DEPCHJUSMAG tasks:

a. Determine lateral support and establish accounting and proceedural policy between Eastern base and Udorn.

b. Determine if adequate utilization of the Eastern DLAR account is being accomplished to preclude the increasing drain on the DLAR 02 account.

c. Continue to build up Air America PR support capability.

d. Provide engine account for DLAR 02 at Udorn.

17. A number of T-28C aircraft are in SEA. These aircraft could be utillized in a training capacity only and would relieve the combat capable aircraft for the Laotian effort. DEPCHJUSMAG Thailand should take immediate action to affect transfer of at least five T-28C aircraft to Udorn.

18. For your consideration.

ALBERT K. DONALDSON
Captain, USAF
T-28 Maintenance Officer



~~SECRET~~

DE RUMSDT 7 04/0415Z

O 040400Z

FM DET 6 1ACWG UDORN APG

TO RUMS3J/2AD TSN AFLD RVN

ZEN/333ABSQ UDORN APRT THAI

RUMBAJ/DEPCHJUSMAG

RUMUDN/AIRA VIENTIANE LAOS

RUMTBK/AIRA BANGKOK THAI

BT

~~S E C R E T~~ ADM 25022. SUBJECT: WATER PUMP OPERATION.

THIS MESSAGE IN 7 PARTS. PART I./5 5 333D AIR

BASE SQUADRON CANNOT PROVIDE SUSTAINEFWATER PUMP

MAINTENANCE SUPPORT WITH THE LIMITED NUMBER OF

AVAILABLE AIRCRAFT UNDER EXISTING CONDTIOF.

EIGHT AIRCRAFT ARE DEPLYED TO RLAF AT SAVANNAKHET

ON LOAN. AT LEAST SIX AIRCAFT ARE DEPLOYED DAILY

TO VIENTIANE. NINE AIRCRAFT ARE PRESENTLY GROUNDED.

OF THEHOTAL OF NINE THREE ARE NORS "G" FOR ENGINES

TWO ARE NORS "G" FOR FUEL CELL; ME IS OUT FOR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

EXTENSIVE REPAIR OF FLAP AND FUSELAGE/STRUT MEMBERS
ONE IS OUT FOR EXTENSIVE BATTLE DAMAGE; ONE IS OUT
FOR IRAN AT ATTLEBORO AND ON X RAYS "B" FOR
MULTIPLE PARTS. THIS LEAVES FOUR OR LESS 3 AIRCRAFTDRAT UDORN TO ACCOMPLISH
APPROXIMATELY SIXTEEN TRAIN-
IN SORTIES PER DAY. PART II. TRES-AVANNAKHET
OPERATION, MAINTENANCE WISE, IS EXTREMELY MARGINAL.
IN-COUNTRY SUPPORTOF THAT AREA IS POOR. IF DET 6
PERSONNEL HAD NOT BEEN ON THE SCENE AND THE 333D
HJ NOT SUPPORTED FROM THIS LOCATION THE OPERATION
WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE. REQUESTS FOCLATERAL
SUPPLY SUPPORT INCREASES DAILY. EXAMPLES ARE: TWO
ENGINE CHANGE , ONE PROPWLER CHANGE, ENGINE

CONDITIONING IS REQUIRED ON EVERY AIRCRAFT FLOWN
INTO UDORN, ONSENGINE HARNESS, ONE CYLINDER KIT,
ONE COMPLETE SET OF 50 CAL GUNS, THREE MUNITIONSRPYLONS AND MANY PARTS BIT
AND PIECES. EVIDENTLY
AIGGRAFT ARE FLOWN"INTO THE GROUN" THEN ARE FLOWN
HERE FOR REPLACEMENT WHILE THE 333D PERFORMS
EXTENSIVE MAINTENANCE ONTHE AIRCRAFT FLOWN IN. MC 11-4-319(2-4)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 3 RUMSDF 7 [redacted] T

PJT III. THREE RAW ENGINES WERE SHIPPED FROM THE 405 FM SQUADRON CAB PT ON 27 OCT54. THEY HAVE NOT ARRIVED AT THIS STATION. WE HAVE FIVE REPARABLE R-1820-86 ENGINES ONHAND NA D ARE PREPARED TO BUILD UP THREE RAW R-1820-86 ENGINES UPON RECEIPT. PART IV. IF WE CONTIN'E TO PROVIDE UNSCHEDULED REPLACEMENT AIRCRAFT TO SAVANNAKHENTHE WATER PUMP TRAINING EFFORT WILL SOON CEASE TO EXIST. PART V. REQUEST THE FOLLOWIV: A. IMMEDIATE ACTION BE TAKEN TO LOCATE THE THREE RAWSENGINES PRESENTLY IN AIRLIFH TAT'S AND E'TABLISH PRIORITY AIRLIFT TO UDORN; B. IMMEDIATE ACTION DE TAKEN TT AIRLKT TWO R/H INBOARD SELF SEALING FUEL CELL TO SATISFY THE NORS "G" CONDTION THAT EXUTS ON T-28B 54-0040 AND T-28B 53-8251. REQ NUMBER DLAR 02°8054013 2EACH STOCKNO 1560-863-9522MF. PART VI. RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING: A. PROVIDE 333D AIR BASE SQUJRON WITH M'RE AIRCRAFT; B. PROV'DE POSITIVE MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY SUPPORT TO SAVANNAKHET C. ESTABLISH PRIORITY OF EFFORTS.

MC 11-4-319(3-4)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 4 RUMBDF [redacted] T

UDORN, SAVANNAKHENVIENTIANE: D. RETURN THE FOUR

RECENTLY LOANED AIRCRAFT JVSAVANNAKHET? TO UDORN.

PARTVII. I CANNOT OVER EMPHASIZE THE POOR

CONDITIONS EXISTING, MAINTENANCE AND COST THIS WISE,

AT THE SAVANNAKH LOCATION. THOMAS SENDS. GP-1.

BT

MC 11-4-319(4-4)

~~SECRET~~



7 w 1-2 7 m 1 am T

932-65

Col 1 - DET 6

~~SECRET~~

12 Nov 64

FOR 12/10855Z/65

874

BDI409VV LBB517BZ486 AJA337
OO RUMBDF
DE RUMBAJ 05C 12/05)0Z
B1204252
FM DEPCH JUSMAG THAILAND
TO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUMUDN/AIRA AMEMB VTN
RUMJFS/R/O USAID AMEMB VTN
RUMBDF/DET 6 1ST AIR COMMANDO WG UDORN THAI
RUMSATA/DEP COMDR 2ND ADIV UDORN THAI
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ /DEP CHIEF-AF 20897 INFO VTN 1753

TBDI409VV LBB517BZ486 AJA337
OO RUMBDF
DE RUMBAJ 05C 12/05)0Z
OP1204252
FM DSFCH JU YWQ THAILAND
TO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUMUDN/AIRA AMEMB VTN
RUMJFS/R/O USAID AMEMB VTN
RUMBDF/DET 6 1ST AIR COMMANDO WG UDORN THAI
RUMSATA/DEP COMDR 2ND ADIV UDORN THAI
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ /DEP CHIEF-AF 20897 INFO VTN 1753
TITLE TRANSFER OF RT-28D AIRCRAFT
DCH-AF MSG/SECRET 20883 VTN 1730 DTG 0509452 NOV 64

1. ABOVE-REFERENCED MESSAGE WAS IN RESPONSE TO CINCPAC SECRET MSG BTG 0102162 NOV WHICH AUTHORIZED TITLE TRANSFER OF FIVE (5) RT-28D AIRCRAFT.

2. THE POOL OF T-28 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT FOR THE LAOS OPERATION IS CONSUDERED BY THE AMEMB VTN AS DANGEROUEQY LOW. ACTION ON THE TRANSFER OF THE FIVE(5) RT-28D AIRCRAFT REQUESTED IN MY MESSAGE IS URGENTLY NEEDED.

~~SECRET~~

PAGE TOW RUMBAJ 000 ~~S E C R E T~~

3.; SHE AIRCRAFT ARE TO BE DELIVERED TO THE COMMANDER. DET6 (SAW) IN THE AIR AMERICA COMPOUND AT UDORN, THAILAND.

4. REQUEST WE BE ADVISED WHEN TO EXPECT DELIVERY.

BP-FOUR

~~SECRET~~



RUMSBJ 210A 251417Z FLASH

2485002
2 AIR DIV TAN SON NHUT AFLD VIETNAM
TO RUMSATA/DEP COMDR 2AD UDORN AB THAILAND
AUMSBDC/DEP CMDR 2AD BANGKOK THAILAND
BT
SECRET 200T 00572
SUBJECT: (C) T-28 AIRCRAFT FOR LAOS OPERATIONS.
REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS ON CSAF MESSAGE QUOTED BELOW; SPECIFICALLY
PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 5. QUOTE "SECRET AFXDC
SUBJECT: T-28 AIRCRAFT FOR LAOS OPERATIONS
1. RECENT ACTION BY CINCP
C WILL EFFECT TRANSFERS OF T/RT-28
FROM VIETNAM TO BRING THE TOTAL AVAILABLE FOR OPERATIONS IN
LAOS TO FORTY-THREE (43). THIS IS ONE SHORT OF THE NUMBER
REQUESTED BY AMBASSADOR UNGER (40 FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS PLUS 4
WATER PUMP FOR TRAINING). MAP DEVIATIONS ACCOMPLISHED BY CINCPAC

FLASH SECRET

PAGE 2 RUMSBJ 210A SECRET
AT THE SAME TIME WILL PROVIDE SIXTEEN (16) ADITIONAL AIRCRAFT FOR
LAOS BY END APRIL. FOR YOUR INFO THESE WILL COME OUT OF THE
TWENTY (20) AIRCRAFT CURRENTLY UNDERGOING MODIFICATION AT COLUMBUS,
OHIO, TO "D" CONFIGURATION WITH AVAILABILITY AS FOLLOWS:
FOUR (4) FEBRUARY
SEVEN (7) MARCH
NINE(9) APRIL (COMPLETION ANTICIPATED BY 15 APR)
3. LAOS IS A GRATIFYING EXAMPLE OF THE EFFECTIVE USE OF AIRPOWER
THUS WE MUST ASSURE THAT ALL SUPPORT NEEDED FOR THAT OPERATION IS
PROVIDED IN A TIMELY MANNER. TWO QUESTIONS ARISE WHEN CONSIDER-
ING THE RECENT REQUEST FROM AMBASSADOR UNGER AND HE ACTIONS
TAKEN TO MEET THE REQUIREMENT: (A) HAS THIS REUEST TAILORED
TO THE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT IMMEDIATLY AVAILABLE; IF SO, WHAT IS
YOUR EVALUATION OF THE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT NEEDED TO PROVIDE
ADEQUATE AIR SUPPORT FOR THE VICTORIOUS ARROW AND ANNIVERSARY
VICTORY OPERATIONS. (B) IF THE FORTY (40) AIRCRAFT PLUS WATER
PUMP IS THE NUMBER REQUIRED. WHAT PROVISION CAN BE MADE TO
COVER UNFORCAST LOSSES PRIOR TO THE TIME AIRCRAFT ARE AVAILABLE
FROM THE MODIFICATION LINE AT COLUMBUS AND INDICATED ABOVE. THE
ONLY IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE SOURCE APPEARS TO BE THE RTAF.

SECRET FLASH

PAGE 3 RUMSBJ 210A SECRET
3. IT MAY BE PRUDENT TO BROACH THE SUBJECT OF ADDITIONAL THAI
AIRCRAFT AND CREWS WITH AMBASSADORS UNGER MD MARTIN FOR EITHER
IMMEDIATE USE, OR FOR UNFORESEEN LOSSES OR OTHER CONTINGENCIES
VOCCURRING IN LAOS BEFORE APRIL.
4. IN THIS REGARD, WE ARE PROPOSING THAT THE PRESENT T-28D
MODIFICATION LINE BE CONTINUED TO RE-ESTABLISH A POOL OF READILY
AVAILABLE STRIKE CONFIGURED T-28'S. THIS WOULD PUT US IN POSIT-
ION TO REPAT ANY TEMPORARY LOANS BY MAY OR JUN 65.
5. REQUEST YOUR EVALUATION OF THE T-28 AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS FOR
LAOS OPERATION AND COMMENTS ON DESIRABILITY OF APPROACH TO
AMBASSADORS MARTIN AND UNGER, REFERENCE QUESTION (B) IN PARA 2
ABOVE GP-4. UNQUOTE. REQUEST YOU DISCUSS THIS
WITH COL TYRELL AND REPLY SOONEST. END.
BT

SECRET FLASH



DEC 1964

~~SECRET~~ DEC 1964 936-65

TOR 221142Z

1892 1 Col McC

→ 1- Master

310B

SAA134 MSA933MA098VV LLM361MBZ232AJA433

PP RUMSATM
DE RUMBAJ 17C 22/69112
P 220939Z
FM DEQCHJUSMAC THAILAND
TO RUHLFS/AEMB VTN
RUVSATA/DEQ COMDR 2ND ADIV UDORN THAILAND
INFO RUMTBK/AEMB BANGKOK
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUMSBJ/2ND ADIV TSN AB RVN
RUMBC/CHJUSMAG THAILAND
RUVUDN/AIRA AEMB VTN
BT
SE CR E T DEQ CHIEF-AF 21044 VTN 1994
T-28 REQUIREMENTS FOR LAOS (SL
A. CINCPAC 2209492
B. DELVNRIEF-AF 21336 VTN 19[illegible] DTG 21[illegible] DEC 64.

1. REFERENCE A LISTED SEERAL COMMUNICATIONS THAT CONCERNED THE NUMBER OF T-28 TYPE AIRCRAFT AAILABLE/REQUIRED FOR THE LAOS OPERATIONS. IN ADDITION, DEPUTY CHIEF WAS REQUESTED TO DISCUSS THE OVERALL T-28 REQUIREMENTS FOR LAOS WITH RO/USAID THEN ADVISE THE AEMB BANGKOK AFD CINCPAC ON NEW REQUIREMENTS ASAP.
2. REF B IS A REQUEST TO AIRA VIENTIANE AFD RO/USAID TO ESTAB-

PAGE 2 RUMBAJ 17C ~~SECRET~~
LISH A TIME, DATEJN A D PLACE TO ENTER INTO THE DISCUSSIONS REQUESTED IN REF A.
3. THE CURRENT INVENTORY OF T/RT-28 B/D AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE FOR THE LAOS MAP IS AS FOLLOWS:

TYPE	QTY	NORMAL OPERATING LOCATION
RT-28D	*13	UDORN
T-28B	**17	UDORN
T-28D	4	UDORN
T-28D	***9	***SAVANNAKHET
	43	

* TWO OF THE RT-28D ACFT HAE NOT BEEN DELIVERED TO THE LSAMAP BY COMUSMACV DUE TO WORS CONDITIONS.
** ONE T-28B HAS NOT BEEN RECEIVED BY THE LAOS MAP. IT IS BELIEVED TO BE IN TYE AIR VIETNAM FACILITY FOR IRAN. DEP CHIEF HAS INQUIRED AS TO ITS WHEREABOUTS FROM COMUSMACV.
*** CONSTANTLY AUGMENTED BY FIVE RTL TO SEE(?) UDORN ACFT.
4. FROM THE PRECEDING, IT IS APPARENT THAT 37 T-28 TYPE AIRCRAFT ARE NORMALLY AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME. THE PENDING IRAN AND MODIFICATION PROGRAM, DUE TO COMMENCE 1 JAN 65, WILL REQUIRE A CONSTANT INPUT OF THREE AIRCRAFT, ASSUMING THAT THE TWO RT-28D AIRCRAFT

PAGE 3 RUMBAJ 170 S E ~~C R E T~~
ARE DELIVERED AND THE MISSING T-[illegible] IS FOUND AND DELIVERED, THIS WILL STILL ALLOW THE SAME NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT TO BE AVAILABLE FOR AIR OPERATIONS AFTER 15 JAN AS EXPERIENCED AT THIS TIME.

5. YOUR MS (894) HAS BEEN CLOSELY REVIEWED AND IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT MAP LAOS FUNDS PRESENTELY AVAILABLE WILL ACCOMMODATE THE COST OF FOLLOW-ON SPARES AND ENGINE OVERHAULS. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THREE SPARE ENGINES TO SUPPORT ELEVEN T-28'S BE INCLUDED IN THE [illegible]OAN NEGOTIATIONS.

6. IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE DEPUTY COMMANDER 2ND ADV IN THAILAND AND HIS APPROPRIATE 333(ABRON STAFF PERSONNEL ATTEND THIS MEETING TO DISCUSS THE IMPACT A SUDDEN AIRCRAFT INVENTORY INCREASE WOULD HAVE ON THE SUPPORT PERSONNEL AS WELL AS ANY FORESEEN LOGISTICAL SITUATIONS THAT REQUIRE ADVANCE ATTENTIONS.

GROUP FOUR

BT

~~SECRET~~

NNNN

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

FM DEP CMDR 2ADIV UDORN AFLD THAI

TO RUMSBJ/2ADIV TSN AB TSN

INFO RUMSATG/AIRA VIENTIANE LAOS

BT 2CAS-0135C/27NOVGY

~~S E C R E T~~ LIMDIS 2DCT 00049. SUBJECT: T-28 ACFT FOR LAOS OPERATIONS. REF A 2ADIV SECRET 20OT-00572, REF B. DEP CHJUSMAG THAI DEP CH-AF 20816 DTD 07/0450Z OCT, CITES REQUIREMANT FOR 40 T/RT-28. REF C. DEP CHJUSMAG THAI DEP CH-20878 DTD 30/1115Z OCT - RESTATES REQ FOR 40 ACFT. THIS MSG IN 3 PARTS.

PART I. COMMENTS ARE FURNISHED AS REQUESTED. COL TYRELL AIRA VIENTIANE WAS CONSULTED.

PART II. REF PARA 2A. REF A.REQUEST FOR 40 T/RT-28 AIRCRAFT AS ORIGINALLY REQUESTED AND JUSTIFIED IS CONSIDERED VALIF AND WAS NOT PREDICATED ON AVAILABILITY OF AIRCRAFT.REQUIREMENTS WERE BASED ON ES-

MC 11-26-469(1-3)

C/N

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TIMATED AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR CURRENT AND PLANNED OPERATIONS AT THE TIME OF THE REQUEST. THESE REQUIREMENTS ARE STILL CONSIDERED VALID AND TOTAL T/RT-28 AIRCRAFT, BASED ON AN OR RATE OF 75 PCT REMAINS AT 36 T-28 AND 4 RT-28. FOLLOWING IS RATIONALE FOR SUBJECT REQUIREMENTS. SUPPORT OF VICTORIOUS ARROW AND PLANNED CORRIDORE INTERDICTION STRIKES AS PRESENTLY BEING FLOWN BY THE RLAF FROM SAVANNAKHET MAKES IT DESIRABLE TO HAVE AVAILABLE 15 OR AIRCRAFT, BASED ON 75 PCT OR RATE THIS WOULD EVENTUALLY PLACE 20 AIRCRAFT AT SAVANNAKHET. THERE ARE PRESENTLY ONLY 13 AIRCRAFT AT THAT BASE, HOWEVER IN VIEW OF PRESENT FACILITIES AND RUNWAY/RAMP CONDITIONS THIS IS THE TOTAL THAT CAN PRESENTLY BE HANDLED. PLANNED RUNWAY AND FACILITY IMPROVEMENT WILL PERMIT BASING OF AN ADDITIONAL 7 AIRCRAFT AT SAVANNAKHET IN LATE JANUARY OR EARLY FEBRUARY 65 IF THEY ARE MADE AVAILABLE. MAINTENANCE ASSISTANCE WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO CONTINUE IF THIS NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT IS TO BE SUPPORTED, THIS ASSISTANCE CAN BE PROVIDED BY THE 333RD AB SQ MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL EITHER THROUGH THE PRESENT TDY PROCEDURE OR ROTATING AIRCRAFT THROUGH UDORN MUCH THE SAME AS THE VIENTIANE EFFORT IS SUPPORTED. IN ADDITION TO THE RLAF SAVANNAKHET EFFORT THE VIENTIANE OPERATION IN SUPPORT OF ANNIVERSARY VICTORY, ROUTE 7 INTERDICTION, CLOSE

MC 11-26-469/2-3

~~SECRET~~

SUPPORT AND INTERDICTION OF THE SAM [illegible] AREA AND MOUNG SOUI, REQUIRES AN ADDITIONAL 20 AIRCRAFT (T/RT-28) TO ASSURE DESIRED AVAILABILITY OF 15 AIRCRAFT ON A CONTINUING BASIS. THESE AIRCRAFT TO BE ROTATED ON A DAILY BASIS AND SUPPORTED AS THEY ARE AT THE PRESENT TIME. PART III. REF PARA 2B AND 3. UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS IT APPEARS THAT REPLACEMENT OF ATTRITED AIRCRAFT WITH A LIKE AIRCRAFT MUST COME FROM THE RTAF AT LEAST FOR THE NEXT THREE MONTHS. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT AMBASSADORS UNGER AND MARTIN BE APPROACHED WITH THIS POSSIBILITY WITH VIEW TOWARD EITHER REPLACEMENT OF TRANSFERRED OR LOANED RTAF T-28'S FROM THE STATESIDE MOD LINE OR A FOLLOW ON AIRCRAFT SUCH AS THE A1-E BE PROVIDED THE RTAF. IN THAT THE RTAF IS PRESENTLY PROVIDING A POOL OF 20 T-28 COMBAT CREWS FOR THE VIENTIANE OPERATION IT IS NOT FELT THAT TH UTILIZATION OF A LIMITED NUMBER OF THEIR AIRCRAFT WOULD ADVERSLY EFFECT THEIR PRESENT STATE OF READINESS FOR THE TIME PERIOD ENVOLVED. GP-4.

BT

MC 11-26-469 (3-3)



[illegible] RUMSATG 0 12/1227Z

~~SECRET~~

file Jan-Jun 65

Laos - Effective 28 CD

INC-A
OOC-T
CEC-P

O 121200Z

FM USAIRA VIENTIANE LAOS

TO RUEAHQ/CSAF

RUEKDA/DIA

RUEAHQ/1127TH USAF FAG

INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

RUHLKM/CINCPACAF

RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT

RUMABA/13AF

RUAUAZ/5AF

RUMSNA/COMUSMACV

RUMBC/DEPCOMUSMACTHAI

RUMBAJ/DEPCHIEFJUSMAGTHAI

RUMBC/CHIEFJUSMAGTHAI

RUMSBJ/2ND AIRDIV

13/3/65/00154/22

RUMTBK/USAIRA BKK

RUMBDC/35 TAC GP DON MUANG ARPT THAI

RUMSATA/333 ABRON UDORN

	ACTION	INFO
ODC		✓
OOT		
OOS		✓
OPR		
OOR		
OOA		✓
OSE		
CP		
AOC		
FILE		

~~SECRET~~

BT 13/3/65/0015?/ ~~SECRET~~

S E C R E T AIRA CITE 02202 MAR 65.

THE ATTACK ON DONG HENE, WD2946 WAS RSLTD IN A DECISIVE VICTORY FOR THE LAO ARMY AND AF. THE ENEMY TROOPS HAVE RETREATED TO THE NORTH AND HAVE BEEN OBSERVED BY FIRENDLY PATROLS CARRYING MANY DEAD AND WOUNDED. FRIENDLY TROOPS WHO DEFENDED DONG HENE BURIED 112 ENEMY DEAD ON 12 MAR THAT WERE LEFT BEHIND IN VONEE IC OF DONG HENE. LT HRANHOUN, RLAF PILOT WAS TOLD BY ONE OF DEFENDERS THAT ENEMY CAME IN WAVE AFTER WAVE THE FIR SFNITE OF ATTACK AND THAT THEIR CMDR COL TANH, TOLD THEM THAT IF THEY COULD HOLD OUT UNTIL DAYLIGHT,

2-2

2-3

~~SECRET~~

GEN MA AND THE T-28'S WOULD SAVE THEM. ACCORDING TO SOLDIER, THIS WAS THE THING THAT KEPT THEM THERE, OTHERWISE THEY WOULD HAVE FILLED OUT AND RUN. THE FRIENDLIES APPARENTLY GOT TO = 899$ 188 S 149. =943=$6 8458=43$ H,. THE SOLDIER ADDED THAT WHEN FIRST T-28'S WERE HEARD THE FRIENDLY TROOPS TOOK A FRESH GRIP ON THEMSELVES AND KNEW THEY WOULD WIN. THE SOLDIER SAID THAT T-28'S CAUGHT THE ENEMY IN OPEN AND LITERALLY CHEWED UP THE BULK OF ENEMY FORCE.

COMMENT: THIS PARTICULAR FIGHT WITH ODDS OF 500 TO 80 IS A FINE EXAMPLE OF LAO ABILITY TO FIGHT IF PROPERLY INSPIRED AND IS CERTAINLY AN OUTSTANDING EXAMPLE OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF GEN MA AND HIS AIR FORCE.6) 2 * =8,& 59 = .URB IKSNERREPORT. THE ENEMY FORCE WAS MADE UP OF A PL BN OF 300 MEN AND A VN BN OF 200 MEN WITH CHINESE CMDRS. IF THEIR PRIMARY OBJECTIVE WAS TO DESTROY THE ROUTE 9 BRIDGE AT DONG HENE, THEY MAY CONSIDER THE ATTACK A SUCCESS, OTHERWISE IT MUST HAVE BEEN A DEMORALIZING DEFEAT FOR THE VM. AN ALL OUT T-28 EFFORT AGAINST NA NHOM, WD7884, THE BASE OF THE ATTACKING FORCE, IS NOW BEING PLANNED FOR 14 MAR.

GP-3

3-3

BT 22



~~SECRET~~

FM [illegible] SAIGON 0556 21 1615Z JAN

TO RUEPDA/DA

INFO RUEANA/DIA

RUEHCR/SECSTATE

RUHPA/CINCPAC

C

RUHLNS/CINCUSARPAC

RUHLRL/FACAF

RUMABA/13 AF

RUMSBJ/2D AD

RUCBOR/CO CONTIC FT BRAGG NC

RUMSMA/ COMU MACV

RUMBC/DEPCOMUSMACTHAI

RUMBC/CHJUSMAG THAI

RUMBAJ/DEPCHJUSMAG THAI

RUMBTK/ALUSNA BANGKOK THAI

BT DCAS-0401/2 Jan 65

~~SECRET~~ AMA CX-39. DA FOR ACSI

SUBJ: MILITARY SITUATION ZONE II.

1.(C) AARMA VISITED ZONE II 19 JAN AND BRIEFED BY GEN KHAM KONG ON MILITARY SITUATION HIS ZONE. THA THOM RELATIVELY QUIET BUT INDICATIONS ENEMY SLOWLY PREPARING FOR OFFENSIVE. IN SAN NEUA PROVINCE ENEMY HAS LAUNCHED OFFENSIVE WHICH HAS CAUSED LOSS SEVERAL AREAS HELD BY BV26.

2.(S) GENERAL KHAM KONG STATED THAT:

A. ENEMY PATROLS HAD AVOIDED DIRECT CONTACT WITH STRONG POINTS GM 13 AND GM14. FRIENDLY PATROLS HAVE BEEN

~~SECRET~~

	ACTION	INFO
ODC		
CAT		
CDS		
CPR		
SOR		
DA	✓	
SE		

DC A
ODC-A
SEC-I
CP-A

File Jan-June 65 I-1

UNABLE FIX REPORTED LARGE CONCENTRATION ENEMY DIRECTLY IN FRONT OF FORWARD EDGE BATTLE POSITION.

B. ENEMY CONTINUES LARGE ENGINEER EFFORT TO IMPROVE ROAD FROM MUONG PHANH UG5228 (1914N/10335E) OUTH TO BAN KHEK UG5225 (1913N/10335E) TO VIC UG5224 (1912N/10335E) AND ROAD NORTHWEST FROM MUONG PHANH TO BAN KHOUANG NAO UG4931 (1916N/10334E).

C. PART OF AN ADC COMPANY UNDER ZV22 WHICH IS LOCATED VIC YG5333 (1917N/10336E) HAS BEEN ABLE REPORT ACCURATELY AN ENEMY WITH RADIO LOCATED ON PHOU PHAK LOL UG5435 (1918N/10336E). ACCORDING TO THIS ADC SEVERAL ARTILLERY PEICES SUSPECTED TO BE 85MM AND 82MM MORTARS HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO THE MUONG PHANH AREA. BELIEF ZONE II IS THAT WHEN ROAD SOUTH IS FINISHED ENEMY WILL

MOVE ARTILLERY TO FRONT WHICH WILL BE ABLE TO FIRE ON PRESENT GM 13 POSITIONS AND STRONG POINTS BI 22.

D. VERY HAPPH WITH T-28 INTERDICTION WHICH IS SLOWING ENEMY ROAD BUILDING.

E. BI 7 (GM 14) DEPARTED PAKSANE (EXCEPT FOR 60 MEN) VIA AIR FOR SENO. HE PUT IN RECLAMA TO RETAIN GM 14 BECAUSE HE CONFIDENT WILL NEED REINFORCEMENT IF THA THOM TO BE HELD. FOR ENEMY ATTACK URE TO COME SHORTLY. HOWEVER GEN STAFF INSISTED ON MOVE.

3. (C) GENERAL KHAM KONG PARTICULARLY WORRIED ABOUT SAM NEUA PROVINC UNDER ZONE II WHERE BV 26 AND 27 LOCATED HE REPORTED ENEMY HAD DONE MUCH WORK ON ROUTE FROM SAM NEUA TOWN VH0358

(2025N/10405E) SOUTH TO MS NAM [illegible] WHERE ENEMY ARTILLERY NOW LOCATED. ENEMY LAUNCHED ATTACK TAKING PNOU LIOU UR8576 (2036N/10353E) ON 14 JAN AND MC KANG UR8456 (2021N/10355E) ON 17 JAN. ANOTHER PROBE OF THIS ATTACK CAME DOWN THE NAM HAT VALLEY AND THREATENED HONG NONG UR 8171(2032N/10352E). (AIR AMERICA CLOSED ACCESS TO AIRFIELD LOCATED THERE).

4. (SGL GENERAL KHAM KONG STATED HE GOING MORNING 20TH TO MAKE ON THE GROUND APPRAISAL HOPES HE CAN ENLIST MYLD GENERAL STAFF BUT IN PAST VEINTAINE NOT VERY KEN ON HELPING. IN FACT GOOD SEGMENT OF GOVERNMENT UNAWARE LAO TROOPS AND IRREGULAR FORCES HOLD GOOD PART OF SAM NEUA PROVINCE.

5. (S) COMMENT: A. ARMA WATCHING SITUATION THA THOM. NO

DIRECT THREAT AT PRESENT.

B. CAN UNDERSTAND GENERAL STAFF RELUCTANCE TO POUR LARGE QUANTITY TROOP AND EQUIPMENT INTO SAM NEUA AREA WHICH IS DEEP IN ENEMY REAR. AIR SUPPORT BEING PROVIDED WITH GOOD RESULTS REPORTED. ATTEMPT TO CLEAR FRIENDLY FROM THIS AREA A LOGICAL MOVE ON PART OF PL AND FORE EN BY FAR GEN STAFF (ARMA CM-37).

COORDINATION: EMBASSY. CAS. AIRA

GP-3

NC-1-23-31

3 of 3



~~SECRET~~

[illegible] 25 CU 65

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[illegible]/DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI

[illegible]/ALUSNA BANGKOK THAI

BT

~~SECRET~~ ARMA CA-350.

SUBJECT: SITUATION AT NA KHANG.

1. (C) AARMA VISITED NA KHANG (UH615093), HQ JOINT LEO-FAR OPERATIONS IN SAM NEUA REGION ON 27 JUL A E DISCUSSED THE TACTICAL SITUATION WITH LT COL PIEM PAH, FAR.

2. (C) LT COL PIEM PAH IS NEWLY ARRIVED; HOWEVER WELL VERSED IN THE RECENT OPERATION AND GAVE BRIEFING. LT COL [illegible] REMAINS AS CO BY 26 AND 27.

3. (C) ALL ELEMENTS HAVE MADE EXCEPTIONAL [illegible] PROGRESS DURING THE WEEK PRECEDING 31 JUL.

BR

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PAGE TWO RUMBSL 6310 [redacted]

THE EXCEPTIONALLY CLEAR WEATHER DURING THE ENTIRE WEEK, PERMITTING CONCERTED AND CONTINUING AIR STRIKES AND AIR SUPPORT, CONTRIBUTED MATERIALLY TO THE SUCCESS.

4. (S) LT COL PIEM PAH ESTIMATE THAT THE MA KHANG FORCES WILL CAPTURE HUA MUONG 6 (SNIPTRAP) BY 5 AUG. THE CLEARING OS THE HUA MUONG REGIO WILL RESTORE A CONTINUOUS FRONT FROM PHOU SWA THI AREA TO MA KHANG.

5. (S) LT COL PIEM PAH STATES THAT GEN VANG PAO HAS INTE TION TO CONDUCT ANOTHER OPERATION IF THE POLITICAL SITUATION PERMITS PROBABLY ON THE SOUTHER FLANK OF THE PLAIN OS JARS PARTICULARLY TO TAKE THE XIENG KHOUANG (UG2547) REGIO THIS OPERATION WOULD BE LAUNCHED AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE HUA MUONG OPERATION NOW IN PROGRESS LT COL PIEM PAH ELABORATED TO SAY THAT IF THE GENERAL STASF IN VIENTIANE DID NOTHING IN A POLITICAL SENSE TO PRECLUDE HIS FREEDOM OF ACTION, VANG PAO WOULD PROBABLY LAUNCH THE SECOND OPERATION.

6. COMMENT (S) A. LT COL PIEM PAH RECENTLY ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN RUNNING FOR OFFICE IN 18 JUL ELECTION. NOT KNOWN IF HE HAD SUCCESS.

B. WHILE HIS BRIEFING IMPRESSED AARMA FACTUAL HIS COMMENTS ON FUTURE MOVES OF VANG PAO ARE NOT CONSIDERED RELIABLE. A MOVE

PAGE 3 DUBOIS 6218 S

AGAINST KEYES KOSOVO [illegible] WOULD RESULT IN

COMPLETE SUCCESS [illegible] AND TWO

OR [illegible] FORCES [illegible] EVACUATION FROM COL PLEM

[illegible] IMMEDIATE AT HAND.

7. WHO IN YEARS [illegible] PERSONAL [illegible] RETTRAINS ON USING POW

[illegible] STAFF UNDOUBTEDLY PERMITTED [illegible] STANDARD DETAINEE IN ZONE IV HQ

NORMALLY INSTITUTE BY BOURSTAFF [illegible] CONVERSATION

WITH GENS QUANG AND [illegible] REVEALED STRONG RESPECT FOR

NGUYEN CAO'S FIGHTING ABILITY, BUT NO EFFORT AT RECONCILIATION

3/13

GP-3

BT

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

FOV 8544

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISM~~

27 JULY 1965

REPORT CALSS CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FOV 8544

SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT ON THE NA KHANG AREA AT 1700 HOURS, 22 JULY 1965

PADA: LAOS VIENTIANE 24 JULY 1965

1. THIS IS A SITUATION REPORT ON THE FRIENDLY OFFENSIVE AGAINST ENEMY UNITS NORTH AND EAST OF NA KHANG (UH 4010) IN SOUTHWEST SAM NEUA PROVINCE AT 1700 HOURS, 22 JULY 1965. (FIELD COMMENT: SEE FOV 8539 FOR THE SITUATION IN THIS AREA ON 19 JULY.)

2. MEO LEADER BRIGADIER GENERAL VANG PAO, COMMANDER OF LAO ARMED FORCES (FAR) MILITARY ZONE 2, AND OTHER FAR OFFICERS COMMANDING UNITS INVOLVED IN THE CURRENT FRIENDLY OFFENSIVE, REPORTED THE FOLLOWING:

A. ON THE EVENING OF 21 JULY, TWO COMPANIES OF FAR VOLUNTEER BATTALION (BV) 25 AND TWO COMPANIES FROM BV 27 ATTACKED A REPORTED TWO COMPANIES OF FRESH TROOPS FROM THE PEOPLES ARMY OF VIETNAM FIRMLY ENTRENCHED ON THE UPPER SLOPES OF PHOU KEO FA MUT (UH 5420), A HIGH GRASS COVERED PEAK 16 KM NORTHEAST OF NA KHANG AND 3 KM EAST OF MUONG LAP (UH 5120). THE ATTACK WAS UNSUCCESSFUL AND THE FAR TROOPS WERE FORCED TO WITHDRAW IN THE FACE OF HEAVY ENEMY SMALL ARMS FIRE AND HAND GERNADES

B. SEVENTEEN SORTIES BY FRIENDLY AIRCRAFT AGAINST ENEMY POSITIONS IN THE VICINITY OF PHOU KEO FA MUT ALSO PROVED INEFFECTIVE.

C. PHOU KEO FA MUT AND THEM SEUA (UH 5624), 20 KM NORTHEAST OF NA KHANG, ARE THE KEY TERRAIN FEATURES IN THE ENEMY DEFENSE OF NUA MUONG (UH 5829), 25 KM NORTHEAST OF NA KHANG, OBJECTIVE OF THE FRIENDLY OFFENSIVE. THE ENEMY REALIZES THIS AND IS PREPARING A STRONG DEFENSE

OF THESE POSITIONS. GENERAL VANG PAO SAID THAT HE WAS DETERMINED TO GAIN THESE POSITIONS WITHIN THE COMING WEEK, THUS ENDING PHASE ONE, I.E., RECAPTURE OF ALL POSITIONS WEST OF THE NAM NEUN AND RECONTACT OF SOUTHERN SAM NEUA UNITS WITH FAR BV 26 AND OTHER FAR UNITS TO THE NORTH, WILL BE COMPLETED. PHASE TWO WILL BE DIRECTED AGAINST ENEMY POSITIONS EAST OF THE NAM NEUM, INCLUDING HOUA MUONG.

D. IN ORDER TO DIVERT A CONCENTRATED ATTACK ON PHOU KEO FA MUT, THE ENEMY, ON 21 AND 22 JULY, MOVED APPROXIMATELY ONE BATTALION OF TROOPS WEST FROM BAN HAK TEP (UH 6117), 22 KM NORTHEAST OF NA KHANG, AND WITH TWO COMPANIES OF THESE TROOPS ATTACKED NEWLY ARRIVED ELEMENTS OF BV 22 MOVING EAST IN THE VICINITY OF UH 5615, 15 KM NORTHEAST OF NA KHANG. THE BV 22 TROOPS WERE FORCED TO RETREAT TO THE EAST AND SOUTH FOR SEVERAL KILOMETERS, AND HAD SEVERAL OF ITS TROOPS WOUNDED AND MISSING. AN ADC BATTALION HELD IN RESERVE AT HOUEI THOM (UH 5312) WAS EXPECTED TO BE MOVED UP TO REINFORCE BV 22 AND CONTAIN THE ENEMY ADVANCE.

E. SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE FRIENDLY OFFENSIVE ON 10 JULY, AT LEAST 17 ENEMY POSITIONS HAVE BEEN CAPTURED. FRIENDLY CASUALTIES HAVE TOTALED APPROXIMATELY 17 KILLED AND 40 WOUNDED.

F. GENERAL VANG PAO SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE LIMITED SUCCESS OF THE FRIENDLY OFFENSIVE TO DATE HAD BEEN THE LAO AIR FORCE T-28 AIRCRAFT STRIKES AGAINST ENEMY POSITIONS IN THIS AREA IN SUPPORT OF THE OFFENSIVE.

G. MORALE OF TROOPS IN VOLUNTEER BATTALIONS 25, 26, AND 27, WHO HAVE BEEN BEARING THE BRUNT OF THE OFFENSIVE HAS REMAINED HIGH, SUPPLY OF THESE BATTALIONS, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN POOR. THEIR WEAPONS ARE IN NEED OF URGENT REPAIR, PARTICULARLY IN THE HEAVY WEAPONS DEPARTMENT, WHERE THEY HAVE ONLY A FRACTION OF THEIR AUTHORIZED REQUIREMENTS. THEIR UNIFORMS ARE IN RAGS AND MANY TROOPS LACK BOOTS. THEIR DIET CONSISTS

SOLELY OF RICE SINCE PURCHASE OF FRESH FOOD IS IMPOSSIBLE.

H. FAR INFANTRY BATTALIONS 1 AND 2, WHOSE MISSION WAS TO ADVANCE TO THE EAST WHILE VOLUNTEER BATTALIONS 25, 26, AND 27 ADVANCED TO THE NORTH, DID NOT REACH THEIR OBJECTIVES AND CONTRIBUTED LITTLE OR NOTHING TO THE OPERATION.

3. (FIELD COMMENT: GRID LOCATIONS AND DISTANCE MEASUREMENTS CITED IN THIS REPORT WERE TAKEN FROM ARMY MAP SERVICE 1:50,000 SCALE MAPS, SERIES L 7012.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY AIR USAID CINCPAC PACAF ARPAC PACFLT USMACV-SAIGON 2ND AIR DIVISION-SAIGON (ALSO SENT BANGKOK)



FOV 8549

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28 JULY 1965





REPORT CLASS ~~CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

FOV 8549

SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT ON THE FRIENDLY OFFENSIVE NORTH AND EAST OF NA KHANG, 25 JULY 1965

PADA: LAOS VIENTIANE 27 JULY 1965

1. THIS IS A SITUATION REPORT ON THE FRIENDLY OFFENSIVE AGAINST ENEMY UNITS NORTH AND EAST OF NA KHANG (UH 4210), IN SOUTHWEST SAM NEUA PROVINCE ON THE MORNING OF 25 JULY 1965. (FIELD COMMENT: FOV 8544 REPORTED THE SITUATION IN THE NA KHANG AREA ON 22 JULY.)

2. MEO LEADER, BRIGADIER GENERAL VANG PAO, COMMANDER OF LAO ARMED FORCES (FAR) MILITARY ZONE 2, WHO IS PERSONALLY DIRECTING THE OPERATION, REPORTED THE FOLLOWING:

A. BY THE EVENING OF 22 JULY, ONE BATTALION OF FRIENDLY TROOPS OCCUPIED A HILL APPROXIMATELY 500 METERS SOUTH OF THE SUMMIT OF PHOU KEO FA MUT (UH 5420), 16 KILOMETERS (KM) NORTHEAST OF NA KHANG (UH 4210), AND TWO UNITS OF THE PEOPLES ARMY OF VIETNAM (PAVN) HAD MOVED ONTO PHOU KEO FA MUT. ONE OF THESE UNITS TOOK UP POSITIONS ON THE WOODED SLOPES ON THE NORTH SIDE OF THE MOUTAIN AND THE SECOND MOVED INTO PREVIOUSLY DUG POSITIONS IN A DENSE CLUMP OF WOODS INTERSPERSED WITH CAVES AND DEEP BUNKERS ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE MOUTAIN, LESS THAN 0 YARDS FROM FRIENDLY BATTALION POSITIONS TO THE SOUTH. THE PAVN UNIT THAT HAD PREVIOUSLY OCCUPIED THIS POSITION HAD BEEN DECIMATED BY FRIENDLY AIRSTRIKES. BETWEEN 21 AND 23 JULY, OVER 40 SORTIES WERE FLOWN AGAINST THIS POSITION.

B. ON 22 JULY TWO COMPANIES OF FRIENDLY TROOPS CIRCLED AROUND THE ENEMY POSITION ON THE SOUTH SLOPE OF PHOU KEO FA MUT AND BY 23 JULY HAD CLEARED THE TOP OF THE MOUNTAIN. DURING THE NIGHT OF 23 JULY, THE REINFORCED PAVN COMPANY-SIZED UNIT ON THE NORTH SLOPE MADE THREE SEPARATE ASSAULTS AGAINST THE TWO COMPANIES OF FRIENDLY TROOPS ON THE MOUNTAIN TOP, ALL OF WHICH WERE REPULSED.

C. AN ENEMY RADIO MESSAGE IN VIETNAMESE MADE AT THIS TIME INDICATED THAT A HIGHER PAVN COMMANDER WAS ORDERING HIS TROOPS TO REGAIN LOST GROUND. A SUBORDINATE REPLIED, HOWEVER, THAT THIS WAS IMPOSSIBLE AND THAT "THE HIGH COMMAND MUST REALIZE THAT WE ARE SOLDIERS AND NOT PIGS."

D. ON 24 JULY, A FLIGHT OF LAO AIR FORCE T-28 AIRCRAFT ATTACKED THE ENEMY TROOPS ON THE NORTH SIDE OF PHOU KEO FA MUT, FORCING THEM TO ABANDON THEIR POSITIONS BACAUSE OF HEAVY LOSSES.

E. FOLLOWING THE AIRSTRIKE, TWO BATTALIONS OF FRIENDLY TROOPS SUPPORTED BY HEAVY WEAPONS FIRE, ATTACKED THE ISOLATED ENEMY POSITIONS ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE MOUNTAIN. AFTER AN INTENSE 30-MINUTE FIRE-FIGHT, ALL ENEMY RESISTANCE ENDED.

F. THE TWO FRIENDLY COMPANIES ON THE TOP OF THE MOUNTAIN WERE REINFORCED ON THE AFTERNOON OF 24 JULY, IN TIME TO REPULSE ENEMY COUNTERATTACKS DURING THE LATE EVENING HOURS OF 24 JULY.

G. BY THE MORNING OF 25 JULY, FRIENDLY UNITS HELD ALL OF PHOU KEO FA MUT AND HAD AMBUSHED A COLUMN OF ENEMY REINFORCEMENTS MOVING WEST FROM SOP LAP (UH 6217), 22 KM NORTHEAST OF NA KHANG. EIGHT ENEMY WERE KILLED AND A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF ENEMY EQUIPMENT WAS CAPTURED.

H. VANG PAO STATED HIS BELIEF THAT, WHEN ONE PAVN UNIT OR ENEMY POSITION IS TAKEN AS A RESULT OF A FRIENDLY ATTACK, THE MORALE OF OTHER ENEMY UNITS IN THE AREA DROPS AND THEIR DEFENSES BECOME WEAKER FOR THIS REASON, THE SUCCESSFUL ASSAULT OF PHOU KEO FA MUT WAS VITAL TO THE CONTINUING SUCCESS OF THE FRIENDLY OFFENSIVE.

3. ACCORDING TO THE COMMANDER OF FAR VOLUNTEER BATTALION (BV) 27, ONE OF THE BATTALIONS PARTICIPATING IN THE ATTACK ON PHOU KEO FA MUT, APPROXIMATELY 60 DEAD PAVN SOLDIERS WERE COUNTED ON THE SOUTH SLOPES OF THE MOUNTAIN ON 24 JULY. FRIENDLY TROOPS CAPTURED 70 SOVIET MADE CARBINES, TWO AK SUBMACHINE GUNS, AND ONE AUTOMATIC RIFLE.

4. (FIELD COMMENT: ALL GRID NUMBER LOCATIONS CITED IN THIS REPORT WERE TAKEN FROM ARMY MAP SERVICE 1:50,000 SCALE MAPS, SERIES L 7012.)

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY AIR USAID CINCPAC PACAF ARPAC PACFLT USMACV-SAIGON 2ND AIR DIVISION-SAIGON (ALSO SENT BANGKOK)



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RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUHLKM/CINCPACAF
RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
RUHPD/PICPAC PEARL HARBOR HAWAII
RUMABA/13AF CLARK AB PHIL
RUAUAZ/5AF FUCHU AS JAPAN
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUMBC/DEPCOMUSMACTHAI BANGKOK THAI
RUMBAJ/DEPCHIEFJUSMAGTHAI BANGKOK THAI
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RUMFUL/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUSMSATK/AAIRA SAVANNAKHET LAOS
BT
~~S E C R E T LIMDIS~~ AIRA 02918 JUL 65. HQ USAF FOR AFMIN. PACAF FOR PFICO. 13AF FOR 13IDG. 5AF FOR 5FITG. CTF 77 FOR CTG COMDRS. PART I. NEGATIVE RLAF T-28 ACTY FM VIENTIANE DUE ADVERSE WX. PARTII. FOR MACV. REUR 25853, 240912Z
SPECIAL AIR EFFORT IN SUPPORT OF FAR OFFENSIVE IN SAM NEUA AREA LAOS. RELIABLE INFORMATON RECEIVED BY AIRA THAT AIR EFFORT INCLUDING BANGO/WHIPLASH FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT HAS BEEN PRAISED HIGHLY BY GEN VANG PAO, THE AREA COMDR. RPTD ENEMY CASUALTIES THUS FOR...270 BY BODY COUNT. NO INFORMATION YET ON THE 10 SORTIES ON 29 6 AND 65. GND UNITS HAVE SURROUNDED

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MUONG LOP AND HAVE CONTROL OF RIDGE LINES WEST AND SOUTHWEST OF MUA MUONG. TACTICS HAVE BEEN TO STRIKE A SPECIFIED AREA THROUGHOUT THE DAY WITH T-28/BANGO/WHIPLASH THEN MOVE INTO THE AREA AFTER ALL STRIKES FOR THE DAY ARE OVER WITH.
PART III. FOR ALCON: A. COORDINATION BETWEEN BANGO/WHIPLASH AND T-28 PATHFINDERS HAS BEEN EXCELLENT. ARTICLE IN BANGKOK WORLD, 28 JULY QUOTES GEN VANG PAO AS SAYING THAT HIS SUCCESS THUS FAR HAS BEEN DUE TO THE AIR STRIKES BY GOVERNMENT FORCES. VANG PAO TOLD AIRA SAME ON 30 JULY 1965. AIRA COMMENTS: ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION OF MACV AND 2AD IN HONORING OUR REQUESTS FOR EXTRA EFFORT IN SAM NEUA GREATLY APPRECIATED.
B. AN AA HELIO ACFT OBSERVED LT CAL. AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE FM TJ1105 ON 25 JULY.



[illegible] SAVANNAKHET [illegible]

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TO THEIR GUNS. WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF A CHAIN OR A VM REPRESENTATIVE NORMAL PROCEDURE IS FOR THE GUN CREW TO HIDE IN ITS HAND DUG CAVES DURING AIR STRIKES.

(5) ON THOSE OCCASIONS WHEN WEATHER HAS ALLOWED JET STRIKES ON HILLTOP STRONGPOINTS RESULTS HAVE BEEN HIGHLY EFFECTIVE. BEYOND THE ZONE OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT TARGETS LIE MANY SUCH STRONGPOINTS EASILY RECOGNIZABLE AND MARKABLE. ON OCCASION THEY ARE PROTECTED BY ANTIAIRCRAFT WEAPONS AND CAN ONLY BE REASONABLY HIT BY JET AIRCRAFT. T-28 RESOUCES ARE SO

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PAGE 4 RUMSATG 14 SECRET EYES ONLY

LIMITED THAT THEY MUST BE USED IN THE MAIN FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT ROLES, RELYING UPON JETS TO RANGE BEYOND THE ZONE OF CONTACT.

7. THE EFFECT OF FRIENDLY GROUND AND AIR ACTIVITY IS SUCH THAT ENEMY FORCES CONDUCT ALMOST NO DAYTIME OPERATIONS. WHAT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, TROOP MOVEMENTS, OR LOGISTICS EFFORTS THE ENEMY ENGAGES IN HAVE BEEN REDUCED TO STRICTLY NIGHT AFFAIRS. THE GROUND WAR IS A NIGHT WAR. WE HAVE BEEN HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL, IN QUALITY IF NOT IN QUANTITY, IN SOLVING MANY PROBLEMS OF THE DAY AIR WAR. NIGHT AIR SUPPORT SHOULD BE PROVIDED. UPON THE ADVENT OF LAST LIGHT COMMUNIST TROOPS BEGIN THEIR MOVEMENTS FOR THEIR NIGHTLY ACTIVITY. FROM THEIR COVER IT IS POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH A VIRTUAL TIME-DISTANCE PATTERN WHICH THEY MUST OBEY. FOR EXAMPLE, THE CURRENT FAC POSITION IS NORMALLY STRUCK TWO OR THREE TIMES PER NIGHT. APPROXIMATELY THREE HOURS IS REQUIRED AFTER DARKNESS BEFORE THE ENEMY CAN POSITION HIMSELF FOR AN ATTACK, MEANING FIRST ACTION NEAR MIDNIGHT. VM FORCES MUST RETURN TO THEIR SHELTERING HOLES BY 0500 HOURS, OR BE CAUGHT OUT IN DAYLIGHT. THIS RETURN DEADLINES IMPOSES A DEPARTURE NOT LATER THAT 0430 HRS. FROM THE CURRENT AREA OF ATTACK. SUCH PATTERNS OF ACTIVITY WILL OCCUR IN ALL OUTPOST AREAS AND BY FUNDAMENTAL TIME-DISTANCE ESTIMATES IT IS POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH AREASOF HOSTILI

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PAGE 5 RUMSATG 14 SECRET EYES ONLY

TROOP MOVEMENT RENDERING THEM HIGHLY VULNERABLE TI AIR ATTACK AND HARRASSMENT DURING DARKNESS.

8. BOTH THE 500 LB GP BOMBS WITH 14 AND 44 HOUR DELAY FUSES AND THE "BUTTERFLY" BOMBLET HAVE BEEN NOTICABLY EFFECTIVE IN KEEPING THE VM IN THEIR HOLES. DETONATIONS OF "BUTTERFLY" BOMBLETS ARE AVERAGING 45-50 PERCENT OF THOSE DROPPED.

GP-3

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

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FM USAIRA VIENTIANE LAOS
TO RUMSEJ/CAD
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
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[illegible] 3274 SEP 65.
EARLY REPORTS ENEMY FORCES BEHIND LINES IN SAM NEUA PLACING SITE 36 UNDER MORTAR ATTACK. COMPLETE DETAILS UNKNOWN THIS TIME. THIS MSG CONFIRMS TELECON REQUESTS FOR BARREL ROLL MISSIONS TO DIVERT TO BANGO/WHIPLASH FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT. DETAILS TO FOLLOW.
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

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RUCJHK/CINCSTRIKE
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RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
RUHPD/FICPAC PEARL HARBOR HAWAII
RUMABA/13AF CLARK AB PHIL
RUAUAZ/5AF FUCHU AS JAPAN
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUMBC/DEPCOMUSMACTHAI BANGKOK THAI
RUMBAJ/DEPCHIEFJUSMAGTHAI BANGKOK THAI
RUMBC/CHIEFJUSMAGTHAI BANGKOK THAI
RUWTBTA/HQ SAW EGLIN AFB FLA
RUWTBSA/HQ 1ACW AUX FLD NINE EGLIN AFB FLA
RUMSBJ/2ND AIR DIV TAN SON NHUT AFLD RVN
RUMTBK/USAIRA BANGKOK THAI
RUMBDC/6236 CSG DON MUANG ARPT THAI
RUMFCR/CTF 77
RUMBDF/6232 CSG UDORN THAI
RUMBDK/44 TFS KORAT THAI
RUMBDA/6235 CMBT SPTGP TAKHLI THAI
RUMBC/DET 5 6499TH SPTGP BANGKOK THAI
RUMSBJ/DET 6 6499TH SPTGP SAIGON RVN
RUAUBUL/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUMSATK/AAIRA SAVANNAKHET LAOS
BT

~~S E C R E T LIMDIS~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 AIRA 02976 AUG 65. HQ USAF FOR AFNIN. PACAF FOR PFICO. 13AF FOR 13IDC, 5AF FOR 5FITG. CTG 77 FOR CTG CMDRS. SUBJ: SPECIAL-AIRA REPORT ON SAM NEUA PROVINCE, COMPLIED BY USAF FAC OFFICER ON THE SCENE.

1. IN THE CURRENT OFFENSIVE TO RETAKE TERRITORY 20-60 KM SOUTHWEST OF SAM NEUA CITY, GEN. VANG PAO HAS STATED IN CONFIDENCE THAT WITH HIS FORCES OUTNUMBERED APPROXIMATELY 3 TO 1, THE COMBINATION OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT BY T-28'S STRIKES, OF JET AIRCRAFT STRIKES ON TROOP AND GUN EMPLACEMENTS AWAY FROM IMMEDIATE LINES OF CONTACT, AND OF THE HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL INTERDICTION PROGRAM HAS NOT ONLY

~~SECRET~~ ~~LIMDIS~~

PAGE 2 RUMSATG ~~1 S E C R E T LIMDIS~~

OVERCOME THE ACUTE MANPOWER INBALANCE BUT HAS ALLOWED LAUNCHING OF A SUCCESSFUL, SUSTAINED OFFENSIVE NOW IN IT'S FIFTH WEEK.

2. CURRENT GROUND POSITION:

A. AT PRESENT ALL ENCOUNTERS WITH ENEMY FORCES IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA OF CONTACT ARE WITH NORTH VIENTNAMESE MILITARY UNITS. VIET MINH CONCERN FOR THE RELIABILITY OF PATHET LAO FORCES HAS RESULTED IN WITHDRAWAL OF PL UNITS FROM DIRECT CONTACT WITH GEN VANG PAO'S UNITS. THAT ENEMY UNITS IN CONTACT WITH FRIENDLY UNITS ARE VIET MINH IS ATTESTED TO BY VIRTUALLY ALL ENEMY VOICE TRANSMISSIONS BEING VIETNAMESE, PAPERS, LETTERS, ETC. TAKEN FROM DEAD ENEMY AND THE STUBBORNNESS OF ENEMY RESISTANCE (NOT A CHARACTERISTIC OF PL FIGHTING).

B. THE IMMEDIATE TACTICAL GOAL OF FRIENDLY FORCES IS REMOVAL OF PL/VIET MINH FORCES WEST OF NAM NEUA (THE RIVER RUNNING THROUGH HOUANMUANG UH577660). UPON COMPLETION OF THIS OBJECTIVE PLANS EXIST TO RETAKE SITE 58 (UH 568684) WITH ITS AIRFIELD AND THEN SECURE ALL TERRITORY FOR A RADIUS OF APPROXIMATELY 10 KM FROM SITE 58.

C. FOURBLAO COMPANIES ARE CURRENTLY IN THE PROCESS OF MOVING NORTH OF HIT POSITION HELD BY TLO VM BATTALIONS CLUSTERED AROUND

UH533433. UPON LINK-UP OF THESE TWO COMPANIES, GROUND ACCESS TO THE VM HILL POSITIONS WILL BE SEVERED WHILE FRIENDLY UNITS WILL REMAIN ON THE WEST, SOUTH, AND EAST FLANKS OF THE MOUNTAIN. THE ENEMY HAS GIVEN EVERY INDICATION THAT HE WILL HOLD HIS POSITION AT ANY COST. TO AVOID HIGH LOSSES IN LIMITED FRIENDLY MANPOWER, RESISTANCE WILL BE DESTROYED BY T-28 AIR STRIKES.
D. TO THE SOUTH BETWEEN 7 AND 12 KM ARE LOCATED 8 VM COMPANIES CURRENTLY HELD IN CHECK.
E. FRIENDLY LAO FORCES OCCUPY TERRITORY 12-20 KM NORTH OF SITE 36 WITH THE INTENTION OF MOVING TO THE SOUTHWEST TO ISOLATE THE SITE 36 AREA FROM ANY EXTERNAL SUPPORT.
3. RESULTS OF T-28 AIR STRIKES:
A. T-28 STRIKES WERE OBSERVED ON 28 JULY WHEN A HILL, UH533404, WAS TAKEN AFTER SEVEN DAYS OF AIR STRIKES CONSISTING PRIMARILY OF 500 LB GP AND 100 LB WP BOMBS. TWO FULL STRENGTH COMPANIES OF VM WERE DIRECTED TO HOLD THIS POSITION AT ALL COSTS. DURING THE FIRST FIVE DAYS TWO VILLAGERS WHO HAD ESCAPED FROM A SITE CONTROLLED BY VM FORCES OBSERVED AN ESTIMATED 200 DEAD AND WOUNDED VM BEING CARRIED THROUGH THEIR VILLAGE.
B. MONITORING OF ENEMY VOICE TRANSMISSIONS REVEALED AN ACUTE

SHORTAGE OF AMMUNITION AND FOOD BY THE FIFTH DAY, AS WELL AS LOW MORALE. MORALE OF FRIENDLY LAO FORCES, CONVERSELY, IMPROVED WITH EACH AIR STRIKE TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT IT BECAME A DIRECT CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIGHTING SPIRIT OF FRIENDLY SOLDIERS.
C. ON 28 JULY, WHEN FAR OCCUPIED THE HILLTOP THERE WAS NO RESISTANCE, 83 ENEMY BODIES WERE FOUND WITH AN ESTIMATED 40 STILL IN FOXHOLES AND CAVES COLLAPSED BY BOMBS. WITH THE STANDARD PRACTICE OF CARRYING AWAY AS MANY DEAD AS POSSIBLE AND POSSESSING ORDERS TO HOLD TO THE END IT IS GEN VANG PAO'S OPINION THAT BOTH COMPANIES WERE EXTERMINATED. NO PRISONERS WERE TKANE.
D. OFFENSIVE ACTION TO TAKE THIS HILL COST THE LAO 4 KEAD, 33 WOUNDED.
E. SINCE 1 JULY THREE VM COMPANIES HAVE BEEN VIRTUALLY DESTROYED TO THE MAN. FRIENDLY LOSSES DURING THIS PERIOD HAVE BEEN 20 KILLED, 93 WOUNDED.
4. RESULTS OF JET STRIKES: EFFECTS OF JET STRIKES AGAINST TRANSPORTATION AND ENEMY POSITIONS OUTSIDE THE IMMEDIATE ZONES OF CONTACT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERABLE.
A. THE BEST MEASURE OF SUCCESS AGAINST ENEMY TRANSPORTATION

HAS BEEN: (1) THE ALMOST COMPLETE LACK OF MORTAR AND RECOILLESS RIFLE FIRE FROM VM POSITIONS. DURING THE PERIOD 26 JUL - 4 AUG, ALTHOUGH THE FAC POSITION WAS AT ALL TIMES WITHIN RANGE OF KNOWN MORTARS AND RECOILLESS RIFLES, NOT ONE ROUND WAS RECEIVED.
(2) ASPROGRESS IS MADE TO EACH NEW TARGET, GROUND FIRE IS HEAVY DURING THE FIRST DAY, MODERATE THE SECOND, AND BY THE THIRD OR FOURTH DAY IT IS LIGHT TO NON-EXISTANT. THIS INVARIABLY DECREASING GROUND FIRE PATTERN IDICATES GREAT CONCERN FOR CONSERVING AMMUNITION.
(3) THAT AN ENEMY WITH SUPERIOR MANPOWER IS RE-TREATING STRONGY SUGGESTS HE HAS TOO LITTLE TO FIGHT WITH.
(4) ON 23 JUL TWO DEFECTORS FROM THE PL 27TH CO, 65 AAA BN WERE DEBRIEFED AT SITE 36. WHAT FEW COMMUNIST SUPPLIES ARE GETTING THROUGH ARE GIVEN ONLY TO VM FORCES. FOODSTUFFS OF ALL VARIETIES ARE IN SHORT SUPPLY WITH PL UNITS RECEIVING A RAPIDLY DECREASING DIET. THE FINAL DECISION TO DEFECT WAS MADE AFTER FIVE OF THE SEVEN MEN ON THE ADJACENT 37MM AAA WERE KILLED IN A JET STRIKE. MORALE OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN CREWS IS SO LOW THAT WHEN POSSIBLE VIET MINH OFFICERS OR NCO'S KEEP AAA CREWS ON STATION AT GUNPOINT. AT OTHER TIMES PL CREWS HAVE BEEN CHAINED

FM USAIRA VIENTIANE LAOS
TO RUEAHQ/CSAF
RUEKDA/DIA
RUCJHA/CINCSTRIKE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUHLAM/CINCPACAF
RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
RUHPD/PICPAC PEARL HARBOR HAWAII
RUMABA/13AF CLARK AB PHIL
RUAUAZ/5AF FUCHU AS JAPAN
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUMBC/DEPCOMUSMACTHAI BANGKOK THAI
RUMBAJ/DEPCHIEFJUSMAGTHAI BANGKOK THAI
RUMBC/CHIEFJUSMAGTHAI BANGKOK THAI
RUWTBTA/HQ SAW EGLIN AFB FLA
RUWTBSA/HQ 1ACW AUX FLD NINE EGLIN AFB FLA
RUMSBJ/2NB AIR DIV TAN SON NHUT AFLD RVN
RUMTBK/USAIRA BANGKOK THAI
RUMBDCX6436 CSG DON MUANG ARPT THAI
RUMFCR/CTF 77
RUMBDF/6432 CSG UDORN THAI
RUMBDK/44 TFS KORAT THAI
RUMBDA/6435 CMBT SPTGP TAKHLI THAI
RUMBC/DET 3 6499TH SPTGP BANGKOK THAI
RUMSBJ/DET 6 6499TH SPTGP SAIGON RVN
RUAUBUL/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUMSATA/AAIRA SAVANNAKHET LAOS
BT
~~S E C R E T LIMDIS~~ FINAL SECTION OF 2. AIRA 02976
TO THEIR GUNS. WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF A CHAIN OR A VM REPRESENTATIVE NORMAL PROCEDURE IS FOR THE GUN CREW TO HIDE IN ITS HAND DUG CAVES DURING AIR STRIKES.
(3) ON THOSE OCCASIONS WHEN WEATHER HAS ALLOWED JET STRIKES ON HILLTOP STRONGPOINTS RESULTS HAVE BEEN HIGHLY EFFECTIVE. BEYOND THE ZONE OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT TARGETS LIE MANY SUCH STRONGPOINTS EASILY RECOGNIZABLE AND MARKABLE. ON OCCASION THIY ARE PROTECTED BY ANTIAIRCRAFT WEAPONS AND CAN ONLY BE REASONABLY HIT BY JET AIRCRAFT. T-28 RESOUCES ARE SO

SECRET LIMDIS

PAGE 2 RUMSATG ~~S E C R E T LIMDIS~~
LIMITED THAT THEY MUST BE USED IN THE MAIN FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT ROLES, RELYING UPON JETS TO RANGE BEYOND THE ZONE OF CONTACT.
3. THE EFFECT OF FRIENDLY GROUND AND AIR ACTIVITY IS SUCH THAT ENEMY FORCES CONDUCT ALMOST NO DAYTIME OPERATIONS. WHAT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, TROOP MOVEMENTS, OR LOGISTICS EFFORTS THE ENEMY ENGAGES IN HAVE BEEN REDUCED TO STRICTLY NIGHT AFFAIRS. THE GROUND WAR IS A NIGHT WAR. WE HAVE BEEN HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL, IN QUALITY IF NOT IN QUANTITY, IN SOLVING MANY PROBLEMS OF THE DAY AIR WAR. NIGHT AIR SUPPORT SHOULD BE PROVIDED. UPON THE ADVENT OF LAST LIGHT COMMUNIST TROOPS BEGIN THEIR MOVEMENTS FOR THEIR NIGHTLY ACTIVITY. FROM THEIR COVER IT IS POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH A VIRTUAL TIME-DISTANCE PATTERN WHICH THEY MUST OBEY. FOR EXAMPLE, THE CURRENT FAC POSITION IS NORMALLY STRUCK TWO OR THREE TIMES PER NIGHT. APPROXIMATELY THREE HOURS IS REQUIRED AFTER DARKNESS BEFORE THE ENEMY CAN POSITION HIMSELF FOR AN ATTACK, MEANING FIRST ACTION NEAR MIDNIGHT. VM FORCES MUST RETURN TO THEIR SHELTERING HOLES BY 0200 HOURS, OR BE CAUGHT

~~SECRET~~

TOR 17/

NNNVVV BDI632 LDB939MBZ231 AJA697
PP RUMBDF
DE RUMBAJ 16C 260/1220
ZNY SSSSS
FM DEPCJUSMAG BANGKOK THAILAND
TO RUHLHS/ CINCUSARPAC
INFO: RUHLHQ/ CINCPAC
RUMSMA/ MACV
RUMBC/ CHJUSMAG
RUMTBK/ AMEMB BANBKOK
RUMBSL/ ARMA VTN
RUMBDF/ DEP CDR 2AD UDORN AFB ~~THAILAND~~
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ T/ DCH-I 20672 MACV FOR J262 AND SOG; AMEMB VKK FOR SA, POLMIL AND ARMA; CHJUSMAG FOR SA
OB UPDATING (U)
A. LTR DEP CHIEF JUSMAG THAILAND DEP CH-I SUBJ OB FRIENDLY ~~FORCES~~
DTD I JUL 65 (S)
B. MSG CINCPAC DTG090411Z SEP 65 (S)
1. (S) WEEKLY UPDATING MESSAGE FRIENDLY OB IN LAOS FOLLOWS. INFO ADDRESSEES ARE REMINDED THAT THE USARPAC OB IS CONSIDERED TO BETHE SINGLE AUTHORITATIVE PACON LAOS OB STUDY.
2. (U) CHANGES ARE THOSE REPORTED SINCE II SEP 65 AS OF

ACTION
2 OCT

~~SECRET~~

PAGE TWO RUMBAJ16C ~~S E CRE T~~
170800 SEP 65 LOCAL.
3. (S) GENERAL:FAR ATTEMPTS TO RETAKE PSNS ALONG RTE 6 ARE MEETINGWITH INCREASED RESISTANCE. FRDLY ELMS ARE ATTEMPTING ENCIRCLEMENT OF EST 3 PAVN BNS AND 2 PL COS VIC HUA MUONG UK6239. EVIDENCE EXISTS THAT EN FORCE SW OF SAM NEUA VH0257 IS ENCOUNTERING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS, BUT THAT LINES OF COMMO/ SUPPLY ARE APPARENTLY NOT SEVERED. RECENT EN SEIZUREOF SMALL BUT INPORTANT PSNS VIC LUANG PRABANG TH0102 MAY POSSIBLY INDICATE SPOILING ATK TO OFF-SET TIMING ON FAR CLEARING OPN N OF MEKONG. PLANNED MOVEMENT OF I BN FROM GM 17 AND GM 21, RESPECTIVELY, DEEMED SUFFICIENT TO STABILIZE SITUATION (CLOSE-IN DATE II SEP). IN NAM HIN BOUN VALLEY VE5497-VYIOPAND NAM THEUN VALLEY WE0479-WE1568, FRDLY ELMS CONSOLIDATING AND MOVING INTO BLOCKING PSNS. PL COS TRAPPED AT NAM HANG VE6298 AND IN NAMHIN BOUN VALLEY. ELSEWHERE IN LAOS, NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.
4. (S) DETAILS:
A.ZONE I
FAR
GM II
B
2 VIC BAN MOK POIT RC1292

~~SECRET~~

PAGE THREE RUMBAJ 16C ~~S E C R E T~~
BI3 VIC BAN LAM KAI PC9423
BV 13 VIC BAN KONG Y QC5325
B. ZONE III
FAR
GM 12
BI8DISPERSED VIC NA XA KONG VF4601, BAN PHA KON KO VF4702, BAN KOH CO VE5399
B
23 (2COS) VIC BAN HUOI KHOI VE2597
BR 340 (W/2 COS BI 23) IN BLOCKING PSN NAM HIN BOUN VALLEY VE5497-;36890
1ST ADC CO IN PSN S NAM THEUN RIVER VIC BAN KENG KANR VF7606 BLOCKING EN REINFORCEMENTS FROM KAM HEUT AREA VF7219
2D ADC CO VIC BAN KHOUA VE9065
3D ADC CO VIC BAN HA TAM VE8085
GP-3
BT

~~SECRET~~



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DI - A
NLS - F
[redacted]
DCO - K
RTS - L

FM [illegible] VIENTIANE LAOS

TO RUEKDA/CIA

INFO RUEPLA/DIA

RUEHOO/SECSTATE

RUEHNO/USMISSION

RUNCAN/AMCONSUL

RUNABK/CE AF

RUMSSJ/21 AD

RUMSNA/CINCPAC

RUMBC/DEPCOMUSMACTHAI

RUMBC/CHJUSMAGTHAI

RHMJM/DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI

RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK THAI

BT

[redacted] CITE ARMA CX-374.

SUBJ OFFENSIVE ACTIVITIES MUONG SOUI

1. CITE 3 SUCCESSIVE DAYS OF US JET AIRCRAFT STRIKES ON PHOU KOUT TG 9216 HAVE REDUCED ENEMY BUNKERS TO POINT WHERE NEUT TROOPS CAN SEIZE AND HOLD THIS LOG STANDING "THORN IN THE SIDE"

2. SO PILOT AND GROUND REPORTS SHOW GOOD RESULTS AND ACCURATE BOMBING DESPITE HEAVY 7MM AND AW FLAK STIKES PLANE TO CONTINUE 13TH AND 14TH POSSIBLY 15TH.

3. CITE COL SING, NEUT CO MUONG SOUI, PLANS ATTACK PHOU KOUT FOLLOWING AIR STRIKES 14TH OR 15TH DEPENDING UPO PADL

[redacted]

SECRET

SECRET

FROM: USARMA VIENTIANE LAOS

TO: DIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SITE ARMA CX-355. SUBJ: Contemplated and Current FAR Military Operations (U)

1. (C) FAR military operations during current rainy season and projected operations for coming dry season visualize clearing own rear areas, retaking key lost territory in SAM NEUA area, and in general improving defensive posture along with possible raids in corridor. Certain of these operations previously reported in part. This message recaps.

2. (C) Operations as follows:

a. Clearing operation NW SAYABOURY Province controlled from XIENG LOM PB 9274, elements of BI 2, BV 62, and miscellaneous regional ADC and other units have been engaged in an operation to clear PL elements which for some time have occupied the general vicinity of PB 9787, have harassed traffic along the Mekong for several years, and utilize the area freely as crossing points from North to South. Operation virtually completed with most enemy dispersed or pushed north of Mekong.

b. SAM NEUA Operation toward HOUA MUONG (VH 6329), Controlled from NA KHANG VH 4212. Friendly elements BV 22, BV 26, BV 27, BR 250, BI 1, BI 12 plus Meo ADC and SGU involved. BV 27 and BI 1 attacking general Northeast to seize Mg. LAP then on to HOUA MUONG. Elements BV 26 attacking Southeast toward HOUA MUONG. Other elements conducting offensive points. Progress slow but steady. Friendly forces held up at Mg LAP but BV 26 reported within approx 6 KM of HUA MUONG from Northeast. All out effort by T-28's assisting friendly progress and taking heavy toll of

enemy who appears attempting to reinforce. General Vang Pao believes will retake HOUA MUONG but may be over optomistic if enemy reinforcement successful.

c. Reconnaissance in force north of THAKHEK. Controller from Thakhek by GM 12, operation envisages employment Commando Co GM 12, 2 ADC supported by several Special Force Teams. These units to infiltrate KARST NE of THAKHEK and clear lightly held valley running roughly parallel to Mekong and to KARST along base of NAKAY PLATEAU up to KONG LO VE 7585. If operation successful one BN GM 12 to be committed to seize RAN KHEN VE 4297. General area held by enemy since Feb 1964. Operation expected to get underway in next two weeks as soon as signal equipment shortage overcome.

d. Clearing operation NE of DONG HENE: Controlled from Dong Hene, elements GM 21 with flanks protected by BR 370 on north and GM 15 on south moving north and northeast to clear PL/VM and secure high ground south of SE NOI River. Operation moving slowly hampered by weather, terrain, enemy guerilla tactics, and severe lack logistical support, first phase completed with second phase delayed for present. Initial objectives seized USAID contemplates cluster program NE DONG HENE when evidence received reasonable security as result this operation. For firm success GM 21 requires brought to strength in armament and equipment. GM 21 not over 50% effective due shortages. RO working on this.

e. BAN HOKEI MUN: Area currently under friendly control or void of any troops friendly or enemy. Requires stationing of one regional battalion in area to insure security as prerequisite

to development of USAID supported Village Cluster which can serve as base for recruiting and expansion of intel and other opns into corridor. (CAS also has interest this cluster.) BR 350 expected to be moved to this area within month, unit require some reequipping. RO has under study.

f. Clearing operations along SEKONG River southwest of ATTOPEU. Controlled by GM 16, main attack by BI 14 and BI 25 moving SW along Se Kong Valley, BI 26 supporting from high ground north of river. BR 450 conducting diversionary attack NE of ATTOPEU. Operation to jump off 29th. Excellent chance success. AARMA's and AATRA's presently with Gen Phasonk who commanding operation personally. RLAF providing support with 10 T-28's.

g. Clearing operation North of Plateau des Bolovens: Operation in early planning stages visualizes clearing area bounded by KHONG SEDONE-SARAVANE-RAN THATENG (XC 4807) - PAKSONG (XB 3078)-PAKSE. Operations would require one additional GM in Zone IV and reequipping one or more regional Bnm. Operation if successful would eliminate a long standing PL concentration north of LAO NGAM XC 2510, add to security of SARAVANE, close existing gap between Bolovens and Saravane, give secure base for operations to out Seking River and into corridor.

h. Attack to cut Route 92 and Sekong River vic BAN PHONE: Opn only in proposal stage for study only. Would require minimum 3 GM's, one to attack north from vic ATTOPEU to seize BAN PHONE XC 8305, one to attack generally east along axis PAKSONG-CAN THATENG-BAN PHONG. These two GM's to continue to seize BAN BAC XC 9052 with third GM in reserve vic SARAVANG. Due to depth of pene-

tration into corridor, this plan, if implemented, would most probably provoke a reaction by PAVN troops.

i. Raid on BAN BAC area: Approximately 2 conpamy sized raid in planning stage for end of rainy season. Commando elements of Zone IV to be parachuted/or helicopter landed via BAN BAC. Concept to destroy equipment and supplies capture POW and documents and walk out ahead of enemy reinforcements which will certainly be called in. Operation has good chance of success with a little luck.

3. (C) Comment: a. In ARMA opinion most of the above listed operations within realm of FAR capabilities except operation against BAN BAC (para 2h) which though might be initially successful could not be held in face of almost certain enemy reinforcement and strong counter attack. Also operation against HOUA MUONG doubtful if enemy chooses to strongly reinforce.

b. Clearing operation BE DONG HENE and occupation HOUEI MUN area are in support of forward area MU BAN SAMAKI. Program should be given maximum immediate support.

c. Operation SW of ATTOPEU along SE KONG in essence a relatively simple clearing operation which should serve to disrupt PL efforts at subverting and intimidating population in that area.

d. Most important of entire series is clearing operation north of Bolovone which when combined with other proceeding it to north should establish a reasonably sound unbroken security line from BAN KHEN south to ATTOPEU. Securing this line would in effect allow consolidation of rear areas, expansion and protection of existing and contemplated movement BAN SAMAKI cluster areas in south Laos, plan establishing a firm base for future developments

in corridor.

e. CT developing coordinated plan to support the above as indicated except 2h and attempting to concentrate FAR efforts in same direction. Reasonable success expected even if unfortunately piecemeal.

GROUP-3



~~SECRET~~

AUG 1965

FROM: USARMA VIENTIANE LAOS

TO: RUEKDA/DIA

DATE: 011115Z AUG 65

SECRET CITE ARMA CX-360

SUBJ: SUBJECT VISIT TO MIL REGIONS III AND IV (U).

1. ~~(S)~~ AARMA'S VISITED MIL REGIONS III AND IV DURING PERIOD 26-29 JULY. BRIEFED BY GENERAL PHASOUK CG AND COL BOUNTENG DEP CH STAFF OPNS MIL REGION IV RE OPERATIONS SW OF ATTOPEU, BY COLONEL LATTANA BANLANG CO GM 12 MIL CEG III RE PROPOSED OPERATIONS NE OF THAKHEK, COL THAO LY CO GM 21 MIL REG III RE OPERATIONS NORTH OF DONG KENE.

2. ~~(S)~~ COLONEL BOUNTENG DEP CH STAFF MIL REG IV REPORTED THAT FRIENDLY FORCES LAUNCHED ATTACK SW OF ATTOPEU EARLY AFTERNOON 28 JULY. LINE OF DEPARTURE GENERALLY XB 625352 TO AB 352320. BI 4 ATTACKING NORTH OF SE KONG RIVER REPORTED LEADING ELEMENTS VIC XB 796317 EVENING 28 JULY. 3 ADC COMPANIES ATTACKING SOUTH OF SE KONG REPORTED LEADING ELEMENTS VIC XB 838290. BI 4 REPORTED ENEMY CONTACT AFTERNOON 28 JULY VIC 825325. GENERAL PHASOUK, LOCATED AT HIS CP ON A BLUFF OF THE BOLOVENS OVERLOOKING THE AREA OF OPERATIONS, REPORTED LEADING ELEMENTS VIC 784263 TO VIC 786312 AFTERNOON 29 JULY. TWO 105'S HELILIFTED TO THE CP LOCATION FIRED 60 RDS IN SUPPORT OF THE ADVANCE. WEATHER AND TERRAIN BIGGER OBSTACLES TO PROGRESS OF ATTACK THAN PL, SOME OF WHOM HAVE WITHDRAWN TO NORTH, OTHERS (EST 200) TO EAST AND SW ACROSS SE KONG RIVER. GENERAL PHASOUK EXPECTS TO COMPLETE OPERATIONS BY 6 AUG. SIX RLAF T-28'S ARE STATIONED AT PAKSE SUPPORTING OPERATION. SEE CURRENT AIRA CX'S

~~SECRET~~

FOR DETAILS.

3. ~~(S)~~ COLONEL LATTANA BAN LANG CO GM 12 REPORTED THAT OPERATIONS NE OF THAKHEK WILL COMMENCE APPROX 6 AUG. FRIENDLY FORCE CONSISTING OF 3 COMMANDO COMPANIES, ADC'S, AND SPECIAL TEAMS (TOTAL FORCE APPROX 450) WILL ESTABLISH OPERATION BASE VIC BAN KHOUN KA TIA VE 6775. FORCE WILL MOVE EAST ACROSS KARST TO STARTING POSITIONS VIC BAN PHA DANG VE 8380 AND VIC BAN TIEU VE 7334, WHICH COL LATTAMA BAN LANG ESTIMATES WILL TAKE FIVE DAYS. ONE COMPANY WILL MOVE FROM BAN TIEU VE 7384 NW ALONG THE NAM HIN BOUN TO FINAL OBJECTIVE VIC BAN NA HIN NOK VF 5211. A SECOND COLUMN WILL MOVE FROM BAN PHA DANG VE 8380 NW TO FINAL OBJECTIVE VIC BAN NONG KOK VF 6113. SPECIAL TEAMS WILL ESTABLISH BLOCKING POSITIONS TO PREVENT ENEMY REINFORCEMENTS NE AND SE. ESTIMATED PL BN DEFENDS BAN KHEN VE 4398. ESTIMATED PL BN DEPLOYED IN SQUAD AND PLATOON SIZE DETACHMENTS DEFENDING IN AREA OF OPERATIONS. GM 12 HAS REPORTS THAN VM IN AREA HAVE WITHDRAWN THRU NAPE WF 0924. IF FRIENDLY OPERATIONS ARE SUCCESSFUL, AND DEPENDING ON PL REACTION, ADDITIONAL FRIENDLY FORCES OF GM 12 MAY BE COMMITTED TO SEIZE BAN KHEN TO SECURE THE NAM HIA BOUN VALLEY.

4. ~~(S)~~ COLONEL THAO LY CO GM 21 REPORTED THAT BP 99 HAS SECURED THE HIGH GROUND VIC WD 3782. ESTIMATED 2 PL BNS HAVE WITHDRAWN TO POSITIONS ALONG THE SE NOI RIVER. GM 21 IS NOW ENGAGED IN FINAL PHASE OF OPERATION TO SEIZE BAN KHAM HOUEI NEUA WD 3687, DONG KHUANE WD 3485 AND HOUIE MATHAU WD 4187. RLAF HAS CLOSELY SUPPORTED THESE OPERATIONS. SEE CURRENT AIRA CX'S. COL THAO LY ESTIMATES THAT THIS FINAL PHASE WILL BE COMPLETED IN LESS THAN 1 WEEK. ELEMENTS BR 370 WILL RELIEVE BP 99 AND GM 21 (LESS ONE

BATTALION WHICH WILL REMAIN IN RESERVE VIC PHAKKA NIA WD 3763) WILL RETURN TO SENO FOR RE-EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING. COL THAO LY STATED THAT HIS GREATEST NEEDS WERE:

A. EQUIPMENT. GM21 HAS APPROX 400 MEN WHO HAVE NOT BEEN ISSUED INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS. OTHER PROBLEM AREAS ARE INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT, SUPPORTING WEAPONS AND RADIOS.

B. GM DESIGNATION. THAO LY STATES THAT PRIME MINISTER APPROVED DESIGNATION OF GM 21. FAR GENERAL STAFF HAVE NOT RECOGNIZED GM 21 DESIGNATION. HE DOES NOT A SH TO BE DESIGNATED GM 14 BECAUSE OF ITS PREVIOUS BATTLE FAILURES AND FACT THAT THE PL HAVE NO RESPECT OR FEAR OF COMMANDERS OR UNITS OF GM 14.

C. RECOGNITION OF GM 21 AS AN AIRBORNE UNIT. COL THAO LY WANTS TO CONDUCT PARACHUTE TRAINING FR ALL PERSONNEL NOT NOW QUALIFIED. ONLY FORMER DNC PERSONNEL IN GM HQ AND BP 33 ARE PRESENTLY QUALIFIED.

5. ~~(S)~~ COMMENT. IN COORDINATION WITH FAR GENERAL STAFF AND BY DIRECTION OF THE AMBASSADOR, USAID/RO WILL RE-EQUIP GM 21 WSAP NO RPT NO AIRBORNE EQUIPMENT WILL BE ISSUED AT THIS TIME USAID/RO HAS RECOMMENDED (ARMA CONCURS) THAT INDIVIDUALS WEAPONS, SUPPORTING WEAPONS AND RADIOS BE ISSUED DIRECTLY TO GM 21 UPON RETURN TO SENO. PROBLEMS OF GM DESIGNATION AND PARACHUTE TRAINING ARE IMPORTANT MORALE PROBLEMS ON WHICH THE FAR GENERAL STAFF MUST ACT PROMPTLY. ARMA WILL PUSH THE CENTRAL STAFF FOR DECISION ON THESE MATTERS.

Jul-Dec 65 1.

NNNNKVV TKA791
PP RUMBC RUMBDC RUMBDA RUMTBK RUMBDK RUMBAJ RUMBDF RUMFCR RUMBDFG
DE RUMSATK 203C 2661010
ZNY SSSSS
O P 231005Z
FM AAIRA SAVANNAKHET LAOS
TO RUEAHQ/CSAF
RUEKDA/DIA
RUEAHQ/1127TH USAF FAG FT BELVOIR VA
RUCJHK/CINCSTRIKE
INFO RUMSATG/USAIRA VIENTIANE LAOS
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUHLKM/CINCPACAF
RUHLHL/
NNCPACFLT
RUHPD/PICPAC PEARL HARBOR HAWAII
RUMABA/13AF CLARK AB PHIL
RUAUAZ/5AF FUCHU A S JAPAN
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUMBC/DEPCOMUSMACTHAI BANGKOK THAI
RUMBAJ/DEPCHIEFJUSMAGTHAI BANGKOK THAI
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RUWTBSA/HQ 1ACW AUX FLD NINE EGLIN AFB FLA
RUMSBJ/2ADIV TSN AFLD RVN
RUMTBK/USAIRA BANGKOK THAI
RUMBDC/6236 CSG DO MUANG ARPT
RUMFCR/CTF 77
RUMBDF/6232 CSG UDORN AB THAI
RUMBDK/44TFS KORAT THAI
RUMBDA/6235 CMBT SPTGP TAKHLI THAI
RUMBC/DET 5 6499 TH SPTGP BANGKOK THAI
RUMSBJ/DET 6 6499TH SPTGP SGN RVN
RUMFCR/COMSEVENTHFLT
BT

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

AAIRA A00319 SEPT 65.
USAF FOR AFNIN, PACAF FOR PFICO,
13AF FOR 13IDC. 5AF FOR 5FITG. CTF 77 PASS TO CTG'S
PART I: ON 23 SEPT RLAF T-28'S FROM SAVANNAKHET FLEW 12 CAS SORTIES
AS FOLLOWS:
SIX SORTIES SUPPORTING GM-12 STRUCK WE 022 273 EXPENDING 12X500 LB
GP, 12X100 LB FRAG AND 3850 X .50 CAL. RESULTS UNKNOWN.
THREE CAS SORTIES TRRUCK AT VE 512 008 EXPENDING 6X500 LB GP,
6X100 LB FRAG AND 2100 X .50 CAL.
THREE CAS SORTIES STRUCK VE 513 980 EXPENDING 6X500 LB GP, 6X100
LB FRAG AND 2100 X .50 CAL.

PART II: FRIENDLY TROOPS HAVE MOVED UP NAM HIA BOUM VALLEY AND NOW
OCCUPY BAN KHEN (VE 4389). THEY REPORT FINDING 47 ENEMY DEAD DUR-
ING THE ADVANCE ALL APPARENTLY DUE TO T-28 STRIKES DURING PAST
FEW DAYS. FAR LIAISON OFFICER TO RLAF REPORTS THAT THE THREE
SORTIES WHICH STRUCK AT VE 483 994 ON 21 SEPT OBTAINED EXCEL-
LENT RESULTS. TROOPS OF BI 8 REPORTEDLY FOUND SEVERAL ENEMY DEAD
AS THEY ADVANCED AFTER THE STRIKE (REF AAIRA A00308 SEPT 65).
GP-4.
BT

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T-28 1125 545

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

DE RUHLKM 1026B 20/0127Z

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FM CINCPACAF

TOSORUAUJY/5AF FUCHU AS JAP

RUMABWJXQEAF CLARK AB P I

INFO RUMSBJ/2

WIV TAN SON NHUT RVN

RUABAB/313ADIV KADENAB OKI

RUWAF/39ADIV MISAWA AB JAP

RUEADX/TAC

BT 2CA 09104/21Jan65

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ODC - A
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(R)

~~SECRET~~ VC 00082 JAN 65. SUBJ: (U) DEPLOYMENT OF AN RF-101 RTF TO THAILAND.

5AF FOR 5FOOT; 13AF FOR 130DX; 2ADIV FOR 20DC; 313ADIV FOR 31300T.T

REFS: A. 13AF/130DX 22955, DTG 17/0800Z DEC 64 MC 12-77-474

B. PACAS /DO 92053, DTG 25/0200Z DEC 64 MC 12-26-77

C. 130DX TELECON NBR 8, DTG 02/0412Z JAN 65 (PASEP)

D. 5AF/5FCCS 0005, DTG 13/0642Z JAN 65 N/R

1. REF A IS 13AF RECOMMENDATION TO CINCPACAF FOR DEPLOYMENT OF AN RF-101 RTF TO THAILAND. REF B IS CINCPACAF QUERY TO 13AF REGARDING DETAILS OFSATF DEPLOYMENT. REF C IS 13AF ANSWER TO MC 1-21-77 (106)

[redacted]

2 RUHLKM 1026B SECRET

, REF D IS JCS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT OF AN
1 RTF TO THAILAND.
S IS INITIAL NOTIFICATION TO PREPARE TO EXECUTE NECESSARY DEPLOY-
TO REALIGN SOUTHEAST ASIA RECONNAISSANCE FOR CE POSTUE AND
NSIBILITIES AS FOLLOWS: (A) THE 432RS WILL DEPLOY AN RTF TO AND
CT ABLE MABLE OPERATIONS FROM TAN SON NHUT. THIS RTF, WHICH WILL
RARILY BE MAINTAINED AT A MINIMUM OF EIGHT AIRCRAFT, WPFL ALSO
NA YANKEE AM/BARREL ROLL AND/OR SUCH OTHER DAY OGH GHT RECONN-
NCE MISSIONS WHICH CAN MORE FEASIBLY BE CONDUCTED FROM TAN SON
(B) THE 15PRS WILL DEPLOY AN RTF TO,HAND CONDUCT YANKEE TEAM
TIONS FROM, DON MUANG. THE PRIMARY FORCE TO CONDUCT THESE OPERATION
MC 1-21-77 (Agt)
S

SECRET

BE AIRCREWS, SUPPORT PERSONNEL & 6RF101 AIRCRAFT FROM AFSTR RTF
RCES CURRDCTLY ASSIGNED TO 13TRS. THIS DEPLOTMENT WILL BE CONSIDERED
D

NORMAL EXTENSION OF PREVIOUS INTERMITTENT ABLE MABLE RECONNAISSANCE
TIONS FROM THAI BASES, RATHER THAN AS A NEW CONCEPT, AND SHOULD
ECUTED WITH A MINIMUM OF PUBLICITY.
TH RTF'S WILL BE UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF COMD2DIV AND
D BE ASSIGNED RECONNAISSA CE TASKS IAW THE GENERAL POLICY EXPRESSE
ABOVE RATHER THAN A CLEAR DIVISION OF PROJECT RESPONSIBILITIES, I.E.,
E
E TEAM OR IN-COUNTRY MISSIONS. A JUDICIOUS ASSESSMENT OF THE

3 RUHLKM 1026B ~~SECRET~~
T AREA, SORTIE REQUIREMENTS, COORDINATION/RENDEZVOUS WITH ESCORT
RNE AIRCRAFT AND TIMELINESS OF RESPONSE TO INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMEN
MCI-21-77 (396)
T

OULD DETERMINE WHICH RTF IS TASKED FOR DAILY RECONNAISSANCE SORTIES
COM2ADIV. TBRFACILOTE PACAF REPORTING, SORTIE IDENTIFICATION, AND
ZNSJAVK C MVER SESRY RTF AT TAN SON NHUT WILL BE DESIGNATED ABLE MAE

LPHA) AND RTF AT DON MUANG WILL BE ABLE MABLE (BRAVO). MISSION
PORTS WILL CONTINUE OO CONTAIN APPROPRIATE FLAGWORD SUCH AS YANKEE
AM WHEN THESE MISSIONS ARE FLOWN.
THE RTF COMMANDER AT DON MUANG WILL SUPERVISE THE OPERATIONAL
RTION OF THE REPONNAISSANCE MISSION CYCLE WHICH BEGINS WITO MISSIONT
NKING
AN ING AND RISK ASSESSMENT AND EXTENDS THROUGH MISSION EXECUTION,
OCESSUGG, FIRST-PHASE INTERPRETATION AND IMMEDIATE REPORTING OF SIGNI

I

IT RECONNAISSANCE INFORMATION. THE 13TRS WILL DEPLOY NECESSARY PROCES

G. INTERPRETATION AND REPORTING PERSONNEL/EQUIPMENT TO PERFORM THOSE
CTIONS WHICH ARE OUTLINED IN PARA 5, REF A. THE TACTICAL PPC AT
MUANG WILL BE UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE RTF COMMANDER,
UNDER THE 13RTS AS PROPOSED IN PARA 7 REF A. THE DAILY FRAG
ER FROM 2ADIV SHOULD INCLUDE PROVISIONS FOR COURIER PICK-UP OF
CESSED FILM AT DON MUANG FOR SUBSEQUENT DUPING, REPORDUCTION/ENLARGA
AND DETAILED REPORTING BY 13RTS. THIS CONCEPT OF INITIAL PROCESSING
MC 1-21-77 (406)

RUHLKM 1026D SECRET

: TACTICAL UNIT IS IAW CURRENT PACAF CONCEPTS AND THE PROVISIONS

1 33-6, 5 AUG 64M.

LIGNMENT OF CURRENT RECONNAISSANCE FORCE POSTURE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

)ERS 3AF/13AF RECOMMENDATIONS IN THIS AREA AS WELL AS GWP REQUIRE-

, IRAN PROGRAM, KS-72/KA-43 CONFIGURATIONS AND SUPPORT THEREOF.

IER, ASSUMPTION OF TAN SON NHUT RESPONSIBILITY BY 45TRS WILL ENHANCE

E

INCREASE OF ABLE MABLE (ALPHA) TO TWELVE AIRCRAFT STRENGTH CUR-

: AUTHORIZED WITH A MINIMUM OF CONFUSION AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT

:MS DUE TO KS-72/KA-43 MIX AT SAME STATION. THIS FORCE INCREASE,

UIRED, WILL BE DIRERGED BY CINCPACAF BASED ON 13AF/2ADIV RECOM-

'IONS.

IUEST 13AF INITIATE ACTION NECESSARY TO EFFECT PRELIMINARY COOR-

ION WITH COMUSGACTHAI/AMAMB, THAILAND FOR ROUTINE DEPLOYMENT OF

)N OF ABLE MABLE AIRCRAFT TO DON MUANG CONTINGENT UPON CINCPAC

'AL. ASSUMPTION OF TAN SON NHUT TASK BY 45TRS WILL BE ACCOMPANIED

'PORARY OVERLAP OF CERTAIN 13TRS PERSONNEL WHO HAVE INTIMATE KNOW-

ABLE MABLE AND YANKEE TEAM PLAN ING

)URES AND COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS. LENGTH OF OVERLAP RECOMMEND-

13 DAYS HOWEVER THIS MAY BE ADJUSTED BY COM2ADIV. 13TRS PERSONNEL

) ACT IN ADVISORY CAPACITY TO 45TRS AND SHOULD FLY RF-101 'Y TO ASSIST

MC 1-21-77 (S)(6)

S

T

SECRET

5 RUHLKM 1026B ~~S E C R E T~~

EA FAMILIARIZATION, AND MISSION EXECUTION, AS MAY BE REQUIRED BY
MDER2ADIV.

QUEST 13AF/5AF COORDINATE ON CAPABILITY OF PROCESSING/INTERLTETAIO
N
NNEL AND EQUIPMENT NOW DEPLOYED WITH TAC RTFHTO ASSUME RESPONSI-
Y FOR PROCESSING/INTERPRETATION/REPORTING FUNCTION THROUGH PREPARAT
I
O

ISPATCH OF THE IPIR AT DON MUANG.

QUEST 2ADIV DRAFT PLAN BE FORWARDED TO THIS HDWDQUWSETIED AT
EST PRACTICABLE DATE FOR COORZMNATION AND APPROVAL. EXECUTION DUR
EPLOYMENT OF TAC RTF WILTRBE DETERMINED BY TIME REQUIRED FOR PRE-
ION AND APPROVAL OF A SUITABLE PLAN FOR SPLIT RF-101 OPERATION AND
TIME REQUIRED FOR LOGISTICAL SUPPORT COORDINATION. 1 FEB
BE DESIRABLE TARGET DATE FOR DEPLOYMENT IN CONJUNCTION WITH DEPLOY

OF 45TRS MOD 1151 AIRCRAFT.

MC 1-21-77 (6JC)

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

2510152 ZEA

M US AIR ATTACHE BANGKOK

O RUMALC/13TH AF CAB PI

NFO RUHLKM/CINCPACAF

UMSAL/2ND AD TSN RVN

UAUAL/315 AD

UAUAAK/5TH AF

UMBDC/35TH TAC GP

UAMBC/CHJUSMAG THAI

AF GRNC

ODC-A
CP-X
CEC-X
IOC-X

	ACTION	INFO
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2

BT 2CHS/23074/25 JAN 65

~~S E C R E T~~ CITE C-056A JAN 65.

REFER 13AFCVC/CC 01-117 DTG 241211Z JAN 65.

FROM MC COSKRIE FOR GEN PIERCE.

WE HERE OPERATING IN DARK AS FAR AS OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS CONCERNED, BUT STORY FROM MAJ MURPHY INDICATES PACAF REQUIREMENT IS FOR ENTIRE CASF RECCE PACKAGE, TO INCLUDE 6 RF-101'S, 100-130 PEOPLE, PPC'S AND OTHER SUPPORT TO BE LOCATED AT DON MUANG ON INDEFINITE BASIS TO SUPPORT YANKEE TEAM, PRIMARILY FOR UN-REFUELED CAPABILITY NORTH OF 20 DEGREES. ACCORDING TO CMDR, 35TH TAC, IMPOSSIBLE TO ACCOMMODATE THIS SIZE OPERATION ON SUCH SHORT NOTICE. THERE IS

CFN C-056A 65 13AFCVC/CC 01-117 241211Z 65 6 RF-101'S 100-130 2035TH

MC 1-29402 (1-3)

~~SECRET~~

FFICIENT SPACE IN BELL TONE AREA TO PARK 6 RF-101'S, HOWEVER
COULD BE OVERCOME BY PARKING SOME AIRCRAFT ON NEW TRANSPORT
AT OPPOSITE END OF FIELD. THIS ONLY POSSIBLE ON INTERIM BASIS.
.ISHING CASF PPC'S ON DON MUANG MORE COMPLICATED DUE TO SITING
EMS (COORDINATION WITH RTAF) AND SPECIALIZED REQUIREMENTS FOR
(ON ORDER OF 500 GALS PER DAY OF SOME SPECIAL TYPE) WHICH
BE AVAILABLE AT PPC SITE. HOUSING FOR UNIT THIS SIZE BEYOND
ILITY OF 35TH TAC GP AT PRESENT AND WOULD INVOLVE MOVING SOME
E OFF BASE TO QTRS WHICH HAVE NOT YET BEEN ARRANGED.
AND ABOVE ALL THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS IS MATTER OF RTG
VAL. GROUP OF THIS SIZE WILL BE CONSIDERED BY THAI AS UNIT
REGARDLESS OF WHAT WE CALL IT; WILL REQUIRE RTG APPROVAL AND
HAS BEEN NO APPROACH TO THAI ON THIS SUBJECTZ.
WE DO HAVE IS (1) APPROVAL FROM THAI TOCONDUCT YANKEE EAM
FROM THAI BASES (2) PAST APPROVAL FROM THAI TO OPERATE 2
I'S FROM DON MUANG TO DO LIMITED FILM PROCESSING PRIOR TO FORWARDING
URIER TO AN SON NHUT FOR COMPLETION.

ARE TALKING ABOUT 2, EVEN UP TO 6 RF-101'S AT DON MUANG
CT TO PARKING INCONVENIENCE NOTED ABOVE, ON SHORT TERM TDY
, ACCOMPANIED BY MINIMUM SUPPORT (NO PPC'S), BELIEVE WE CAN
RF-101'S 500 35TH (1) (2) 2 RF-101'S 2 6 RF-101'S

E 1-25-402 (2-3)

SECRET

GET LOCAL APPROVAL IN MATTER OF HOURS.

IF WE ARE TALKING ABOUT INTIRE CASF RECEE PACKAGE AS DESCRIBED TO US BY MAJ MURPHY IN THAILAND ON INDEFINIETE BASIS, LOCATING AT DON MUANG WOULD BE A LONG TERM PROCESS IF EVER, AND EVEN NEGOTIATION ON SUBJECT COULD CONFLICT WITH IMMINENT KC-135 DEPLOYMENT.

POSSIBLE TO GET IT AT TAKHLI, UDORN, OR UBON, BUT AGAIN WILL REQUIRE SOME NEGOTIATING TIME WITH RTG, PLUS PROVISION OF FACILITIES WHICH DO NOT NOW EXIST AT ANY OF THREE LOCATIONS.

WILL TRY FOR ANYTHING YOU ASK. IF YOU WANT DON MUANG, RECOMMEND NUMBER OF PEOPLE AND AIRCRAFT BE KEPT AS LOW AS POSSIBLE.

GP-3

CFN KC-135 GP-3

BT

MC 1-25-482 (3-3)



DE RUHLHQ 3070 21/0105Z

Aug 64

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Jan-Jun 65
T-23
3

P 210105Z
FM: ADMINO CINCPAC
TO: RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUMSBJ/2ND AIRDIV
RUHLKM/CINCPACAF
RUEKDA/JCS

~~SECRET~~

~~FLASH~~

BT

~~S E C R E T~~

YANKEE TEAM (U)

1. EXECUTION AUTHORITY AND APPROVAL OF INDIVIDUAL YANKEE TEAM PHOTO MISSION IS RETAINED AT HIGH LEVELS IN WASHINGTON. AUTHORITY TO LAUNCH WEATHER AIRCRAFT IN SUPPORT OF YANKEE TEAM MISSIONS HAS BEEN DELEGATED AND DOES NOT REQUIRE APPROVAL.

2. LAUNCHING RF-101 AIRCRAFT AS WEATHER RECCE AND ACCOMPLISHING PHOTOGRAPHY OF TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY AND IN PRIMARY TARGET AREA HAS CAUSED QUESTIONS FROM WASHINGTON LEVEL. UNDER CURRENT GROUND RULES THESE MISSIONS WOULD REQUIRE STATE, DEFENSE AND JCS APPROVAL.

3. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO LAUNCH WEATHER RECCE FLIGHTS IN SUPPORT OF YANKEE TEAM PHOTO MISSIONS. YOU ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO LAUNCH WEATHER RECCE FLIGHTS AND ACCOMPLISH YANKEE TEAM PHOTOGRAPHY WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL FOR EACH MISSION.

4. WEATHER RECCE FLIGHTS MAY BE CONDUCTED AS REQUIRED UTILIZING AVAILABLE IN-COUNTRY AIRCRAFT OR ~~FLEET~~ AIRCRAFT BY COORDINATION WITH CTF 77. FLY WEATHER RECCE AT ALTITUDES AND IN AREAS THAT AIRCRAFT WILL NOT BE SUBJECTED TO GROUND FIRE. DO NOT CONDUCT PHOTOGRAPHY ON THESE MISSION. OP-3

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

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File
Jan-Jun 65

PRIORITY
PRIORITY X AF

2 AIR DIV TAN SON NHUT AFLD RVN

13AF CLARK AB PHIL

INFO: PACAF

~~2 SECRET~~/20DC 00315 JAN 65. YANKEE TEAM

INFORMAL INFORMATION HERE FROM MAJ PARKS WHO RECENTLY DEBRIEFED #9 CSAF AND JCS ON BARREL ROLL MISSION/INDICATES JCS UNAWARE WE UNABLE TO PHOTO TGTS OF OPPORTUNITY ON YANKEE TEAM WX RUNS. WE HAVE BEEN UNSUCCESFUL IN PAST IN OBTAINING MACV AND UP LINE APPROVAL TO DO THIS. SINCE MAJ PARKS INDICATES THIS MAY NOT BE IN ACCORD WITH JCS THINKING, REQUEST ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING PERMISSION TO PHOTO TGTS OF OPPORTUNITY ON WX MISSIONS. FOLLOWING MSG QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

QUOTE

DE RUHLHQ 3070 21/1052Z

P 211052Z

26 JAN 1965

20DC

Col Price/nb

Originator	2414	1	2	Office	H. L. PRICE Colonel, USAF Director of Operations

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Message Guide | Form Line

PACAF Form 40a MAY 60 FC4730 RECORD COPY Previous editions may be used.



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Jan

Dec

22 JUN 6

2ODC

Report of Staff Visit

2OCR 2IDC 2WEA 2EDC AOC/SAR

1. On 15 June 1964, Lt Col Scott, 2ODC-A accompanied Capt Whisler, Cmdr Blevins, and Cmdr Hudson (USN), on a visit to Udorn. Purpose of the visit was supposedly to attend a briefing by USAIRA Vientiane on Yankee Team Operations. Upon arrival it was learned that the briefing was a discussion of SAR capabilities and responsibilities in Laos. Major Saunders, AOC/SAR, was not present at the discussions but arrived later in the day.

2. Udorn/Vientiane personnel contacted during the visit were:

Col Tyrell, USAIRA, Vientiane

Capt McShane, LACW, Udorn

Mr. Ben Moore, Air American, Udorn

Mr. Ray Stitt, Air American, Vientiane

Mr. Earl Jones, CASS (Intelligence)

3. From the discussion it became apparent that Air American has a c siderable SAR potential, but that all activities in SAR must be coo nated and controlled through a single agency. Col Tyrell was emphat on this point, stating that an on-scene SAR commander was vital for successful pick-ups. He said the pick-up of the second Navy pilot went very smoothly when the military, represented by his office and SAR personnel, assumed responsibility for coordination and control the search.

4. Mr. Moore at Udorn runs the Air American rotary wing program wit five H-34s. He stated he needed five more H-34s for good SAR coverag The H-34s and the three Caribous are the only Air American aircraft equipped with UHF. The fixed wing aircraft, including the helio co iers (STOL ACFT) plus the Caribous, would be used mainly for search and are VHF and HF equipped. Air American needs to upgrade their fl with UHF equipment, including the ARA-25 airborne homing device. T Gannet program is directed by CINCPAC and funded by DOD. Mr. Ray S

SECRET

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR
DECLASSIFIED AFTER
DOD DIR 520

2OOC-3579-64

who directs the fixed wing program at Vientiane, stated that Commander, 2d Air Division and Commander Seventh Fleet should establish the requirement with CINCPAC who would then take action to get funding to support up-grading their equipment.

5. Air America is not presently staffed or equipped to provide round-the-clock, all-weather SAR coverage. They need more personnel, aircraft, and equipment to provide complete coverage and this, again, would require CINCPAC action. They have the capability of maintaining mobile TACAN stations at Udorn and at two of their Laos sites if the USAF can provide the equipment.

6. For the immediate future, it was suggested that an airborne controller, "Charlie One," be on station whenever a large scale operation is planned for the PDJ area. (SA-16 now planned for use.) Primary Air America company frequency of 119.1 mc can be used for this and USN can provide an A-3B (UHF/VHF/HF equipped) for relay of emergency calls. Air America states they have been using the word "KNOCKICK" rather than "MAYDAY" for emergencies to avoid alerting the enemy that a rescue attempt was imminent. It was emphasized that the use of an emergency "squealer" or "beeper" homing device was the pilot's best assurance that he would be found by SAR aircraft.

7. Colonel Tyrell stated that he urgently needs a complete USAF/USN rescue plan to present Ambassador Unger for approval. He stated the Ambassador was appreciative of the military's concern for rescue of downed personnel but that any plan involving U.S. aircraft would require State Department approval, particularly if armed escort were involved.

8. The subject of weather reports from the target areas was discussed. Considerable weather information is available from Air America FIREFLY and some is also picked up from the 40-plus covert radio sites in operation. The problem lies in analyzing and transmitting the data to 2d Air Division and CTG 77.6. 20th Weather Squadron is planning to send an officer to Udorn 19 June to investigate this.

9. The problem of lack of detailed ground intelligence at 2d Air Divisi and CTG 77.6 was discussed. It was apparent that Air America intelligen personnel have much more details and more up-to-date information than is available at Saigon or on the Constellation. A suggestion was made that 77.6 and 2d Air Division each send an intelligence officer to Udorn once a week for briefing and up-dating on the ground situation. This would be helpful generally for Yankee Team planning and more specifically would provide aircrews with better E & E information. The Air America intelligence officer cited the first Navy bailout as an example of the latter. He said the pilot would have had a much better chance of rescue if he had turned north instead of south when hit. Much of the area just a few mil north of Route 7 is controlled by friendly Meo tribesmen.

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DOD DIR 5200.10

10. Attached are two lists furnished by Air America with information on airfields and sites in the PDJ plus STOL sites and radio facilities in Laos.

WILLIAM T. MAHONEY
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Operations

2 Atch
1. Sites in PDJ
2. STOL sites

3

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

FF RUMSAT[illegible]
DE RUMSBJ 55A 16/0631Z
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FM 2 AIR DIV TAN SON NHUT AFLD VIETNAM
TO RUMSATA/DET 2 55 TAC GP UDORN AB THAILAND
RUMUDN/AIRA VIENTIANE LAOS
BT
S[redacted] T/2ODC 1221 64.
DET 2, 55 TAC GP FOR DEP CMDR 2AD THAI.
SUBJECT SAR IN LAOS.
1. REF A. UR MSG SECRET 2 DCT 032 DTG 0215332 —
B. MSG SECRET JCS 8115 DTG 272025 —
2. THIS MSG IN TWO PARTS.
PART I. AUTHORITY TO COMMIT US FORCES INTO LAOS FOR SAR CAP IS HEREBY DELEGATED TO DEP CMDR 2AD THAILAND UPON REQUEST OF AMBASSADOR LAOS. YOU SHOULD EXERCISE THIS AUTH ONLY WHEN THE CONDITIONS OF PARA 1 AND 2 OF REF B

SECRET

PAGE 2 RUMSBJ 55A S E C R E T
EXIST. NOTIFY 2AD IMMEDIATELY UPON DECISION TO LAUNCH AND PROGRESS OF MSNS VIA INFO CY OF OP 2, 3, AND 4 RPTS.
3. PART II. FOR AIRA LAOS VIENTIANE. REQUEST YOUR CONCUR AND/OR RECOMMENDATIONS DIRECT TO 2AD PERTAINING TO PART II OF REF A. THIS REF REQUESTS AUTHORITY TO MOVE AIR REFUELING AREA CLOSER TO TARGET AREA (INTO LAOS) IF NECESSARY. THIS AUTH NEEDED ONLY WHEN TGT AREA IS LONG DISTANCE FROM THE USAF BASE LAUNCHING THE RESCAP. GP 4.
BT

SECRET

NNNNTAJ SAA40[illegible]

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED



JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE

PRECEDENCE

ACTION: PRIORITY

INFO:

DTG:

DECLASSIFIED

FROM: DEP CMDR 2 AIR DIV UTAPAO THAI

TO: [illegible]

[redacted]/2 OCT 1965. EXPERIENCE HAS PROVED THE VALUE OF USING AN AIRCRAFT FOR SAR RESCAP IN LAOS. IN THE PAST THESE AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN PROVIDED BY THE NAVY. ROCKEYE FOR USN HAS CONCURRED WITH OUR ONE TIME REQUESTS TO RECYCLE THE AIR'S FROM UDORN, HOWEVER, OUR CAPABILITY TO COMPLETELY RE-ARM THEM IS LIMITED BY LACK OF AN APPROPRIATE ARMAMENT STOCK PILE AND T.O.'S. A CAPABILITY TO TURN-AROUND AIR'S IN THE RESCAP CONFIGURATION WILL SIGNIFICANTLY AID US TO SUSTAIN SAR EFFORTS. YOUR ASSISTANCE IS REQUESTED. ARMAMENT PERSONNEL ARE AVAILABLE AT UDORN.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

File 1 HW

DATE	TIME
02	0700Z
MONTH: MAY	YEAR: 1965
PAGE NO.: 1	NO. OF PAGES: 1

DRAFTER — TYPED NAME AND TITLE: [illegible] PHONE: 115/116

RELEASER — SIGNATURE: [signature]

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: JACK E. [illegible], COLONEL, USAF
DEP CMDR 2 AIR DIV THAILAND

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: [redacted]

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS: GP-4

DD FORM 1 NOV 63 173 — REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 65 WHICH MAY BE USED

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GPO : 1964 O—724-401



DECLASSIFIED

FROM: Dep Cmdr 2nd Air, Thai (AFCS-DC) APO US Forces

SUBJECT: Rescue Airborne Command Post

TO: 2nd Air Division
APO US Forces 96307

1. (U) The following paragraphs are classified secret.

2. (S) The HC-54 aircraft stationed at Udorn, Thailand do not have the necessary communications to adequately perform their mission as now employed. The following are the participants in the rescue of a downed pilot in Laos and/or North Vietnam:

a. Tactical Air Control Center/Rescue Cordination Center Udorn.

b. HC-54 Airborne Command Post.

c. Rescue helicopters.

d. A1E aircraft for helicopter escort, and Forward Air Control for Rescue Fighters.

e. High performance jet aircraft for top cover (Rescap) and fire suppression.

The TACC/RCC Udorn has overall responsibility for the rescue effort. This center commits the forces and controls the execution of the rescue effort. The HC-54 as the airborne command post serves as an extension of the TACC/RCC and from it is provided the on-scene direction of all forces committed, both rescue and supporting tactical aircraft. The Airborne Command Post and TACC/RCC must be in continuous and uninterupted radio contact. The present HC-54 has one single side-band radio to maintain this contact too vital to be dependent upon one radio link. A back-up must be provided. During the rescue operation the Airborne Command Post needs to maintain continuous radio contact with the participating forces and at the same time frequently needs to communicate with CRF's and relief forces on different frequencies. The one UHF set to do this job has proven inadequate, an additional one is required.

3. The "on-scene director" in the HC-54 is also the aircraft commander and performs his duties from the pilot's seat. This has also proven unsatisfactory. It must be stressed that the "on-scene director" is not a radio relay point, he is a battle director as well as rescue director. He commits forces to ground attacks in order to make a recovery possible and makes immediate decisions pertaining to the ground attack and rescue. He needs a Command Post arrangement with consoles, communications, display boards, and a minimum of two assistants. It is felt that the necessity for this arrangement has been amply demonstrated. Attached is a schematic

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slowly possible arrangement. If made portable with quick attachment and disconnect for communications, two "pods" would suffice for the A/HC-54's and could be used, also, in the programmed replacement HC-130's.

4. Request that your headquarters effect the necessary coordination with PACAF and Air Rescue Service to either modify existing aircraft to accomplish the above or provide a different aircraft. The present rescue airborne command post is considered to be the weakest link in our present rescue operation.

JOHN A. MURPHY, Colonel, USAF
Deputy Commander

1 Atch
Schematic Airborne Command Post

Copy To:
38th ARS

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

[redacted]

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ATTACHMENT # 1

AIRBORNE COMMAND POST

1. The requirement for radios, with 100% backup located in the airborne command post section, of the following type is mandatory;

a. ARC-34

b. KWM-2A (Single Side Band)

c. 61831 (High Frequency)

2. These radios would be terminated at a radio operators position located in the cargo compartment adjacent to the "On Scene Director's Position with both speaker and headset output capability.

3. It is invisioned that the radio operator, "On Scene Director", and one Operations Specialist (Plotter) would be located in the cargo compartment. A typical location layout is depicted as Tab B to this attachment.

4. Tab A is a suggested plotting board to be used by the "On Scene Director". This board would be maintained in an up to date status by the operations Specialist/"On Scene Director".

5. Exact size and dimensions of boards and the desk cannot be determined at this headquarters due to lack of personnel familiar with the particular airborne equipment, etc. The work area should be large enough to facilitate free access and movement, but compact enough to permit the "On Scene Director" to have access to the other two positions.

TAB A: Force Available
TAB B: Console Layout

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

65

[redacted] DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 1.5

Jan-Jun 65

2AD
DEP CMDR 2AD THAI
160036Z
[redacted] TELECON NBR 562, Jun 65
PERSONAL GEN SIMLER TO COL MURPHY SUBJECT SAR
YOU ARE AWARE OF EXTENT WE RELY ON AIR AMERICA TO
SATISFY SAR REQUIREMENTS IN LAOS AND ADJACENT DRV AREAS. WE HAVE BEEN
REQUESTING PREPOSITIONING SAR FORCES IN CLOSEST PRACTICAL PROXIMITY
TO SPECIFIED AREAS THROUGH DAILY MESSAGES TO
YOU AND AIRA. TWO RECENT INCIDENTS OF DELAYED RESPONSE TO SAR
REQUIREMENT BY AIR AMERICA REVEALS THAT AIRCRAFT ARE NOT BEING
PREPOSITIONED AND HELD IN READINESS FOR PURPOSE OF SAR. READY
RESPONSE OF SAR AIRCRAFT IS ESSENTIAL, CANNOT AFFORD DELAYS ASSOCIATED
WITH AFTER THE FACT ASSEMBLY OF FORCES. DESIRE THAT YOU COORDINATE WITH
THE AIRA AND PRESS FOR THE COMMITMENT AND PREPOSITIONG OF HELICO-
pters FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF ENGAGING SSAR ENDEAVOR DURING PERIODS
ANNOUNCED IN OPS AND FRAG ORDERS.
BT

DE [redacted]

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

SECRET

JUL 1965

DEP CMDR 2AD THAI
2AD
SECRET/2DCT11393. PERSONAL TO GENERAL SIMLER FROM COL MURPHY. SUBJ: USAF SAR STATUS LAOS. A. OUR 2DCTO 11380 (S) 020650Z JULY 65. (1) NO USAF SAR CURRENTLY OPERATING OR STAGING FROM LAOS. SAR H-43 ALERTS BEING RUN FROM UDORN AND NAKON PHANOM. (2). FAMILIARIZATION FLIGHTS CONDUCTED 27 JUNE- 1 JULY 65 SERVED TO SHOW H-43 TEMPORARY STOP-GAP AT BEST DUE TO OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS. ALSO, 10-20 DAYS TERRAIN FAMILIARIZATION REQUIRED FOR AIRCREW TO OPERATE THROUGH MOUNTAINS WITHOUT A GUIDE IS EXPERIENCE OF AIR AMERICA AND CONFIRMED BY USAF PILOTS. THIS IS DUE TO NON-PRODUCTION OF SMALL SCALE MAPS AND REQUIREMENT FOR ABSOLUTE FAMILIARITY OF PASSES, BOX CANYONS, ETC. TO AVOID BEING TRAPPED BY WEATHER OR WANDERING OVER HOSTILE FORCES. (3). STATUS OF OPERATIONS BY AIR AMERICA AND BIRD AND SON UNCHANGED. THEY WILL CONTINUE TO PERFORM IN-COUNTRY OPERATIONS AS REQUESTED. OUT OF COUNTRY WILL BE FURNISHED TO REALISTIC DISTANCES AND LOCATIONS IN EMERGENCY WHEN REQUESTED BUT STRONGLY DESIRED USAF PERFORM. OUT OF COUNTRY MAY BE PERMITTED NO LONGER THAN REASONABLE TIME FOR US TO BECOME OPERATION WITH CH-3 AND CREWS FAMILIAR WITH TERRAIN. (4). UNFORTUNATELY ALL CURRENT H-43 AIRCREWS TDY AND DUE FOR ROTATION NEXT 4-6 WEEKS. NEVERTHELESS IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE H-43'S BE PLACED NOW ON A ROTATIONAL DEPLOYMENT TO SITE 98 FOR PREPOSITIONING FORWARD ON RT MISSIONS. THIS WILL NOT ONLY PROVIDE KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE TO BE PASSED ON TO LATER CH-3 OPERATIONS BUT WILL ASSURE AMEMB LAOS OUR INTENTIONS.
GP-4

SECRET



SAR TASK FORCE PROCEDURES

PURPOSE: (U) STANDARD PROCEDURES FOR THE CONDUCT OF SAR RECOVERY OPERATION IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT. ALL TACTICAL PILOTS IN SEA MUST BE THOROUGHLY FAMILIAR WITH THESE PROCEDURES SO THAT FORCES COMMITTED TO A SAR RECOVERY MISSION CAN BE UTILIZED TO THEIR MAXIMUM CAPACITY IN A COORDINATED MANNER, THUS INCREASING THE PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS.

REFERENCES:

1. AFR 55-7.
2. 2AD OPLAN 502-65.
3. 2AD SEA SAR OPORD 402-65.
4. 2AD REG 55-20.

GENERAL: (U) THESE INSTRUCTIONS ARE DIVIDED INTO FIVE SECTIONS AS FOLLOWS:

SECTION I: PRECAUTIONARY SAR.
SECTION II: EMERGENCY PROCEDURES FOR PILOTS IN DISTRESS.
SECTION III: IMMEDIATE ACTIONS FOR OTHER TACTICAL AIRCRAFT IN THE SEA.
SECTION IV: PRINCIPLES OF COMBAT AIR PATROL (RESCAP).
SECTION V: RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DOWNED AIRCREW (IMMEDIATE).

1. PRECAUTIONARY: (S)

A. DURING HIGH RISK MISSIONS APPROPRIATE SAR FORCES ARE PLACED IN A PRECAUTIONARY ALERT STATUS. THE DEGREE OF ALERT, TARGET LOCATION, NUMBER AND TYPE OF SAR AIRCRAFT PLACED ON ALERT FOR A PARTICULAR MISSION ARE DEPENDENT ON A NUMBER OF VARIABLES; AMONG THEM THE CALCULATED RISK, AVAILABILITY OF SAR AIRCRAFT, SUPPORT FORCES, LOCATION OF THE TACTICAL TARGET, OTHER SIMULTANEOUS MISSIONS AND LOCAL TIME (DAYLIGHT/DARKNESS). THE POSITION AND CALL SIGN OF SAR FORCES ARE PUBLISHED IN APPROPRIATE FRAG ORDERS FOR EACH TACTICAL MISSION.

B. HC-54 AIRCRAFT OPERATE OVER THAILAND AND LAOS IN AN AIRBORNE ORBIT POSITION AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO THE STRIKE BEING CONDUCTED. THE PRIMARY FUNCTION IS TO MONITOR SAR FREQUENCIES AND GUARD CHANNEL, TAKE OVER "ON SCENE COMMAND" OF FORCES IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE AND FORCES SUBSEQUENTLY MADE AVAILABLE TO CONDUCT A SAR MISSION. FROM THE INSTANT A RESCUE AIRCRAFT COMMANDER BECOMES AWARE OF AN AIRCRAFT IN DISTRESS HE IS IN CHARGE OF THE SAR OPERATION. AS THE ON SCENE COMMANDER HE IS THE KEY TO EVENTUAL SUCCESS OF THE OPERATION. HE WILL IMMEDIATELY ASSESS FORCE REQUIREMENTS, DEPLOY THE FORCES AVAILABLE AND CALL APPROPRIATE AGENCIES FOR ADDITIONAL FORCES AS NECESSARY. HE IS IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH THE JOINT SEARCH AND RESCUE CENTER (JSARC) AT TAN SON NHUT AND THE SAR CONTROL CENTER IN THE TACC UDORN. FOR THE ON SCENE COMMANDER TO BE EFFECTIVE THE MOST VITAL REQUIREMENT IS CLEAR, CONCISE AND ACCURATE INFORMATION. UNNECESSARY DELAY AND UNNECESSARY RISK OF SAR FORCES CAN OCCUR IF THE RADIOS ARE JAMMED WITH CONFUSING IRRELEVANT CONVERSATION. FACTS, EXACTLY WHAT WAS HEARD AND EXACT POSITION ARE ESSENTIAL.

C. HU-16 (ALBATROSS) AMPHIBIAMS OPERATE OVER THE GULF OF TONKIN.

THE ASSIGNED TASKS ARE IDENTICAL TO THAT OF HC-54'S EXCEPT THEY HAVE THE ADDITIONAL CAPABILITY OF LANDING ON WATER TO MAKE RECOVERY.
D. HH-#C HELICOPTERS ARE LONG RANGE HIGH SPEED AIRCRAFT. THEY ARE PREPOSITIONED AT FORWARD OPERATING LOCATIONS ON IMMEDIATE GROUND OR AIR ALERT FOR AIRCREW RECOVERY MISSIONS DURING TACTICAL OPERATIONS. ON CERTAIN VERY HIGH RISK MISSIONS HELICOPTERS MAY BE PLACED IN AIRBORNE ALERT AS CLOSE TO TARGET AREA AS POSSIBLE. AIRBORNE ALERT HELICOPTERS WILL BE UNDER THE CONTROL AND DIRECTION OF ACCOMPANYING FIXED WING AIR RESCUE AIRCRAFT COMMANDERS.
E. HH-43B/F AND H-34 HELICOPTERS LOCATED AT UDORN AND NAKHON PHANOM IN THAILAND AND DA NANG AB, RVN, SERVE IN A SHORTER RANGE RECOVERY ROLE. HELICOPTERS IN THAILAND OPERATE FROM HOME STATION OR FROM LIMA SITES IN LAOS. HELICOPTERS STATIONED AT DA NANG DEPLOY TO QUANG TRI AND MAINTAIN GROUND ALERT DURING TACTICAL OPERATIONS. HELICOPTERS WILL BE PROVIDED WITH ESCORT AND RESCAP AS NECESSARY WHILE PROCEEDING ENROUTE TO THE RECOVERY SCENE.
F. VICTOR CONTROL (AIR AMERICA) MAY EXERCISE ON SCENE COMMAND. ALTHOUGH ACTUAL COMMAND OF US FORCES CANNOT BE FULLY ASSUMED BY AIR AMERICA, SAR FORCES ARE INSTRUCTED TO BE RESPONSIVE TO AIR AMERICA DIRECTION. THEY ARE HIGHLY SKILLED, EXTREMELY KNOWLEDGEABLE OF THE GROUND SITUATION IN LAOS AND ARE EXPERIENCED IN THE PROSECUTION OF THE SAR MISSION.
II. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES FOR PILOTS IN DISTRESS (S).
A. PILOTS CONFRONTED WITH AN EMERGENCY, THE NATURE OF WHICH DOES NOT DICTATE IMMEDIATE ABANDONMENT OR CRASH LANDING OF THE AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THE GULF OF TONKING AND THAILAND PROVIDE AN ENVIRONMENT WHICH WILL ACCOMODATE TO THE PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL AND ULTIMATE SUCCESS OF RECOVERY. CERTAIN PORTIONS OF LAOS OFFER A SIMILAR PROBABILITY. IN OTHER PORTIONS OF LAOS AND DRV THE PROBABILITIES OF SUCCESS BECOME MORE DEPENDANT ON PROXIMITY TO UNPOPULATED AREAS, DISTANCE FROM AAA AND OTHER WEAPONS. ETC. A GOOD KNOWLEDGE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WILL HELP THE PILOT DECIDE HIS BEST COURSE OF ACTION.
B. REGARDLESS OF THE TYPE OF EMERGENCY, TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTION IMMEDIATELY, TIME AND CONDITIONS PERMITTING.
1. SQUAWK EMERGENCY ON IFF.
2. BRIEFLY GIVE NATURE OF EMERGENCY TO WINGMAN AND ADVISE GOING TO SAR FREQUENCY.
3. ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH SAR AND GIVE:
    a. TACTICAL CALL SIGN.
    b. INTENDED COURSE, SPEED AND ALTITUDE.
    c. NATURE OF DIFFICULTY AND INTENTIONS.
C. IF POSSIBLE FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS OF THE RESCUE AIRCRAFT. THE RESCUE AIRCRAFT INITIALLY ANSWERING YOUR CALL MAY HAND YOU OVER TO ANOTHER AIRCRAFT THAT IS IN A BETTER POSITION TO ASSIST. THE HC-54 AND HU-16'S CAN HOME IN ON YOUR UHF TRANSMISSIONS AND CAN DETERMINE BEARING AND DISTANCE ON YOUR IFF SIGNAL.
D. ONCE THE POSITION OF DISTRESSED AIRCRAFT IN RELATION TO THE RESCUE AIRCRAFT IS ESTABLISHED THE LATTER WILL ADVISE DIRECTION AND DISTANCE TO A SAFE AREA OR TO RECOVERY HELICOPTERS AS APPROPRIATE IN THE EVENT THAT BAILOUT IS IMMINENT.

III. IMMEDIATE ACTIONS FOR OTHER TACTICAL AIRCRAFT IN THE AREA (S).
A. IN THE EVENT OF AN IMMEDIATE BAILOUT OR OTHER OCCURRENCE THAT MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE DISTRESSED AIRCRAFT TO COMPLETE A CALL ADVISING OF HIS PROBLEMS IT IS INCUMBENT ON THE WINGMAN OR OTHER MEMBERS OF THE FLIGHT AND OTHER FLIGHTS IN THE AREA TO PROVIDE WHATEVER ASSISTANCE THEY CAN. USUALLY ONE MAN IN THE FLIGHT WILL SEE THE PARACHUTE. THIS MAN AUTOMATICALLY GOES TO LOW COVER AND FOLLOWS THE CHUTE DOWN TO FIX THE DOWNED MAN'S POSITION. THE OTHER ELEMENT CLIMBS TO ALTITUDE AND THE FLT LEADER OR ALTERNATE FLT LEADER OF THE FLIGHT WILL EXERCISE COMMAND. HE WILL CALL THE FLIGHT TO GUARD CHANNEL, SQUAWK EMERGENCY AND INITIATE SAR WITH THE NEAREST GCI OR RELAY THROUGH THE FIRST RADIO CONTACT, GIVING TACTICAL CALL SIGN, CALL SIGN OF THE DOWNED PILOT, NATURE OF EMERGENCY, LOCATION AND FUEL STATE OR ESTIMATED BINGO TIME. UPON COMPLETION OF TRANSMISSION ONE OF THE HIGH COVER AIRCRAFT WILL REPLACE THE LOW COVER AIRCRAFT AND INSTRUCT REPLACED AIRCRAFT TO PROCEED TO UDORN AB THAI FOR DEBRIEFING, THE LOW AND HIGH COVER AIRCRAFT REMAINING ON SCENE WILL ALTERNATE TO CONSERVE FUEL. EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO REMAIN ON SCENE UNTIL RELIEVED BY ADDITIONAL RESCAP OR THE RECOVERY FORCES.
B. THE LOW COVER ATTEMPTS TO FIX THE EXACT LOCATION OF THE DOWNED PILOT AND PASSES THIS TO THE HIGH COVER FOR RELAY. IF RADIO CONTACT CAN BE ESTABLISHED WITH THE DOWNED PILOT THE LOW COVER WILL PASS THE ETA OR RESCUE HELICOPTER, IF KNOWN. IF THE LOW COVER DETERMINES THERE IS UNFRIENDLY ACTIVITY WHICH IS A THREAT TO THE DOWNED PILOT HE SHOULD ATTACK BUT ONLY IF IT IS NECESSARY IN HIS JUDGEMENT. THE DOWNED PILOT WILL ACT AS A FORWARD AIR CONTROLLER, IF POSSIBLE, DIRECTING THE STRIKE AGAINST ENEMY FORCES. DO NOT MAKE INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS AGAINST PEOPLE IN THE AREA AS THEY MAY NOT KNOW A DOWNED PILOT IS IN THE AREA. DO NOT ATTACK AAA POSITIONS UNLESS A THREAT TO THE RESCUE HELICOPTERS. IF THIS BECOMES NECESSARY ATTEMPT TO SUPPRESS AAA ONLY DURING THE TIME THE HELICOPTER WILL BE MAKING THE RESCUE ATTEMPT. RESCAP PILOTS SHOULD BE ESPECIALLY ALERT FOR FLAK TRAPS ORIGINATING FROM JUNKS OR LARGER SHIPS WHEN OPERATING NEAR WATER AREAS. UPON ARRIVAL ON THE A1 AIRCRAFT, THE LOW COVER WILL LEAD THE A1'S TO THE SCENE. IF THE LOW COVER REACHES BINGO FUEL BEFORE THE A1'S ARRIVE THE HIGH COVER AIRCRAFT WILL DESCEND AND ACT AS LOW COVER UNTIL REACHING BINGO FUEL OR BEING RELIEVED. NEVER LEAVE AN AIRCRAFT ALONE IN THE AREA. DO NOT ORBIT DIRECTLY OVER THE DOWNED PILOT AS IT MAY GIVE AWAY HIS POSITION. WHEN THE DOWNED PILOTS FLIGHT IS RELIEVED BY OTHER RESCAP THEY SHOULD RETURN TO HOME STATION ASAP WITH THE FLIGHT LEAD LANDING AT UDORN AB THAI FOR DEBRIEFING.
C. COVERING FLIGHTS SHOULD REMAIN IN THE AREA OF THE DOWNED PILOT AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, MAINTAINING A VISUAL SIGHTING. LISTEN FOR EMERGENCY SIGNALS AND PASS TO THE AIRBORNE CONTROL POTENTIAL HAZARDS TO RECOVERY FORCES. WHEN POSSIBLE, CONFIRM EXACT POSITION AND OBSERVE RELATIONSHIPS OR PROMINENT LANDMARKS SO THAT THE POSITION CAN BE READILY LOCATED AGAIN.
D. OTHER AIRCRAFT IN THE AREA LEARNING OF THE EMERGENCY SHOULD RENDER ASSISTANCE IF THEY HAVE FUEL, ORDNANCE, ETC. FLIGHT SHOULD CHECK IN WITH THE ON SCENE COMMANDER AND FILE THE FOLLOWING

INFORMATION:
1. TACTICAL CALL SIGN.
2. NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT IN FLIGHT.
3. FUEL STATE AND ESTIMATED BINGO.
4. ORDNANCE LOAD.

IV. PRINCIPLES FOR COMBAT AIR PATROL (RESCAP). (S)

A. THE CRITICAL ELEMENT AT THIS TIME IS KEEPING SOMEONE OVER THE DOWNED PILOT. FLIGHTS MAY HAVE TO SPLIT, HALF GOING TO THE TANKER AND THE OTHER HALF REMAINING IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. EXERCISE CAUTION, EXTENDED SEARCHES IN HOSTILE AREAS ARE EXTREMELY HAZARDOUS AND DIFFICULT UNDER THE BEST OF CONDITIONS. IF IT BECOMES NECESSARY FOR ALL AIRCRAFT TO LEAVE THE AREA, THE LAST PILOT HAVING CONTACT WITH THE DOWNED PILOT SHOULD BE TURNED AROUND AS FAST AS POSSIBLE TO ENHANCE THE POSSIBILITY OF RE-LOCATING HIM.

B. REGARDLESS OF THE SPECIFIC TYPE OF RESCAP DUTY ASSIGNED, CERTAIN GENERAL PRINCIPLES APPLY. IGNORING ANY OF THESE COULD EASILY CAUSE MISSION FAILURE AND ALSO HOPELESSLY COMPOUND AND ALREADY SERIOUS EMERGENCY SITUATION.

C. CHECK IN WITH ON SCENE COMMANDER WHEN ARRIVING IN AREA, GIVE TACTICAL CALL SIGN, NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT IN FLIGHT, ORDNANCE LOAD AND ESTIMATED BINGO TIME.

D. FOLLOW INSTRUTIONS OF THE ON SCENE COMMANDER.

E. DO NOT ENGAGE OR EXPEND ORDNANCE UNLESS THERE IS A DEFINITE THREAT TO THE DOWNED PILOT OR TO RESCUE FORCES ENGAGED IN THE MISSION.

F. CONSERVE FUEL, IN RESCUE OPERATIONS ONE OR TWO MINUTES CAN MAKE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SUCCESS OR FAILURE.

G. CONSERVE ORDNANCE FOR THE SAME REASONS, USE SHORT BURSTS OF AMMO WHEN FIRING. A RESCAP FLIGHT OUT OF ORDNANCE IS OF LITTLE VALUE.

H. MAINTAIN RADIO DISCIPLINE, PASS INFORMATION RELATING TO THE MISSION DIRECTLY TO THE ON SCENE COMMANDER. IRRELEVANT CONVERSATION BETWEEN OTHER ELEMENTS WILL ONLY SERVE TO JAM THE FREQUENCY.

V. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DOWNED AIRCREW (IMMEDIATE): (S)

GENERAL: THIS SECTION COVERS ACTION THAT THE MAN ON THE GROUND CAN TAKE TO AID HIS OWN RECOVERY. FIRST AID, SURVIVAL TECHNIQUES AND EVASION ARE SEPARATED SUBJECTS DEALT WITH EXTENSIVELY IN OTHER PUBLICATIONS. OMITTING THEM HERE IN NO WAY DOWNGRADES THEIR IMPORTANCE TO THE MAN ON THE GROUND.

A. HIDE, TALK TO AIRBORNE AIRCRAFT ON THE UHF RADIO AND IF NO AIRCRAFT ARE IN SIGHT ACTIVIATE YOUR UHF BEACON. THE UHF BEACON IS GOOD FOR 24 HOURS. HIDE IN THE AREA AT LEAST 24 HOURS, TRY TO STAY IN THE MOST DENSE COVER YOU CAN FIND AND CONTACT NO ONE. IF YOU HAVE NOT MADE CONTACT OR SIGHTED SEARCH AIRCRAFT AFTER 48 HOURS START TRAVELING TOWARDS A SAFE AREA AT NIGHT.

B. IF ABLE TO MAKE CONTACT AND PICK-UP IS ARRANGED, POSITION YOURSELF NEAR A CLEARING OR AN OPEN AREA WITH LOW TREES. AT THE SAME TIME TRY TO PROVIDE CONCEALMENT FROM PEOPLE IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA. ESTABLISH TWO WAY RADIO COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE SURVIVAL RADIO AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. DESCRIBE YOUR CONDITION AND ANY HAZARDS IN YOUR AREA SUCH AS PERSONNEL OR FLAK POSITIONS, BEST LINE OF APPROACH TO YOUR POSITION, ETC.

C. USE THE PERSONNEL LOCATOR BEACON INTERMITTENTLY AND FOR SHORT PERIODS. IT IS EASY TO TELL WHEN AIRCRAFT OVERHEAD HAVE SPOTTED YOUR POSITION BY THEIR ACTIONS. ONCE YOU HAVE BEEN SPOTTED USE THE BEACON EVEN MORE SPARINGLY AS IT JAMS UHF AIRCRAFT RADIOS MONITORING GUARD. IF YOU HAVE CONTACT WITH THE RESCAP ANNOUNCE YOUR INTENDED SCHEDULE OF BEACON OPERATION.



FROM: 35TH TACGP DON MUANG AB THAI

TO: CHIEF JUSMAG BANGKOK THAI

DATE: 12 NOV 1964

SECRET NOFORN SLE 00012. SECTION 1 OF 2. SUBJ: INSTALLATION SECURITY IN THAILAND

A. CHIEF JUSMAG MESSAGE DTG 03/1015Z.
B. 2DCT MESSAGE 00022.
C. DET 1, 35 TAC GP, 35-1CAP 00690-64.
D. 507TH TAC CON GP (CRP), NKPC-00059.
E. 331 ABRON, 331A 00766.
F. 332 ABRON, 332 UBAMB 00327.
G. 333 ABRON, 333 CR 00074K.
H. AFM 207-1.

THIS MESSAGE IN THREE PARTS. PART I. FOLLOWING MESSAGES ARE QUOTED CITING SECURITY DEFICIENCIES AND SUGGESTED MEANS OF UPGRADING THE SECURITY STATUS FOR USAF RESOURCES. QUOTE. REFERENCE C. SECRET/NOFORN N35-1 CAP 00690-64. (1) SECURITY IS CONSIDERED MINIMUM. (2) THE INCREASE OF INDEGINOUS PERSONNEL IS NOT CONSIDERED FEASIBLE DUE TO THE LARGE AMOUNT OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL PRESENTLY HERE. DURING ALERT CONDITIONS AND/OR EMERGENCIES, ARMING OF AUGMENTEES IS ADEQUATE FOR SHORT PERIODS OF TIME. THE IDEAL SOLUTION IS TO INCREASE THE AIR POLICE FROM OUT OF COUNTRY PERSONNEL. WITH THE AMMO STORAGE AREA ADJACENT TO THE FLIGHT LINE. EIGHTY-THREE (83) AIRMEN ARE REQUIRED; IF THE AMMO AREA IS MOVED FIVE (5) MILES AWAY NINETY-SIX (96) AIRMEN WILL BE REQUIRED. THERE IS NO FENCING OR LIGHTS AROUND THE AMMO OR FLIGHT LINE AREA. THE TYPE OF FENCE SHOULD BE SEVEN (7) FEET CYCLONE FENCE WITH A THREE STRAND OUT RIGGER AND THE PERIMETER LIGHT SHOULD BE FRESNAL LIGHT FOR THE CANTONEMENT, FLIGHT LINE AND AMMO STORAGE AREAS. GP-4. END QUOTE. QUOTE. REFERENCED D. SECRET NKPC 00059. A. SECURITY AT THIS INSTALLATION GROSSLY INADEQUATE. ONLY THREE (3) AIR POLICE ASSIGNED. NO INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL ASSIGNED AS GUARD AUGMENTEES. WE REQUESTED ADDITIONAL AIR POLICE. B. RECOMMENDATIONS: THAT AN ADDITIONAL TWELVE (12) AIR POLICE BE ASSIGNED AND THAT THEY BE AUGMENTED BY AT LEAST TWELVE (12) INDIGENOUS GUARDS. (2) THAT PERMISSION BE GRANTED ON A PERMANENT BASIS TO ARM TEN (10) ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL AS NEED ARISES. C. INTERIOR LIGHTING COMPLETELY INADEQUATE. URGENT NEED EXISTS FOR FLOOD LIGHTS IN HOUSING, POL, TRANSPORTATION, POWER AND CRP AREAS. PROTECTIVE FENCE OF THE CONCERTINA TYPE SHOULD BE INSTALLED AROUND ENTIRE BASE. D. OTHER PERTINENT INFO: THIS BASE IS COMPLETELY SURROUNDED BY DENSE FOLIAGE, THEREFORE THE PERSONNEL I HAVE MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPHS A AND B WOULD SERVE ONLY TO RETARD SABOTAGE AND PILFERAGE. TO WITH STAND AN ACTUAL ATTACK WOULD REQUIRE AT LEAST A RE-ENFORCED RIFLE COMPANY. END QUOTE. QUOTE. REFERENCE E. SECRET/331A 00766. THIS MESSAGE IN SIX (6) PARTS. PART I. SECURITY CONSIDERED INADEQUATE. PART II. RECOMMEND TOTAL OF FORTY (40) AIR POLICE

PERSONNEL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION OF BOTH PRIORITY "A" AND "B" RESOURCES DURING BOTH NORMAL DAY TO DAY AND EXPANDED SECURITY OPERATIONS FOR THIS STATION. INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL NOT CONSIDERED FEASIBLE, ADDITIONAL TDY OR PCS PERSONNEL ARE REQUIRED IN THE AMOUNT OF TWENTY-TWO (22) TO SUPPLEMENT FIVE (5) PCS AND THIRTEEN (13) TDY AIR-POLICEMEN NOW IN PLACE. UMD PROPOSAL HAS BEEN SUBMITTED. PART III. RECOMMEND INTERIOR LIGHTING TO PROPERLY SUPPORT AIR POLICEMEN ASSIGNED TO PRIORITY "A" AND "B" RESOURCES. FRESNAL UNITS SHOULD BE FURNISHED TO ADEQUATELY LIGHT REQUIRED AREAS WHICH WOULD REQUIRE EXTENSIVE ELECTRICAL INSTALLATIONS. PART IV. DUE TO INADEQUATE FACILITIES AT THIS INSTALLATION, ALARM SYSTEMS WOULD NOT BE PRACTICAL; HOWEVER CONCERTINA TYPE FENCING IS RECOMMENDED IN SUFFICIENT QUANTITY TO INCLOSE TACTICAL AND SUPPORT AIRCRAFT. PART V. RECOMMEND ADEQUATE RADIO NET AND EQUIPMENT TO SUPPORT THE AIR POLICE MISSION. THERE ARE NO RADIOS IN PLACE AT THIS TIME; HOWEVER, RADIO EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED AND IS ON ORDER. PART VI. INCREASED ARMING OF AIR POLICE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE THE M-16 RIFLE. END QUOTE. QUOTE. REFERENCE F. SEIET 332 UBADAM 00327. (1) USAF CONTONEMENT AREA AND ASSOCIATED RADAR SITE HAVE ADEQUATE SECURITY FOR THREAT AS KNOWN TO US. (2) A TRAINED INFILTRATOR/ SABATOUR CAN PENETRATE EIGHT ERAREA. FENCING FOR BOTH AREAS INADEQUATE. PERIMETER LIGHTING FOR CONTONEMENT AREA NON-EXISTANT. GUARD STRENGTH IS ONLY ADEQUATE FOR ACCESS CONTROL. (3) I AM UNABLE TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS WITH OUT A CLEAR PICTURE OF THE THREAT AND THE DEGREE OF SECURITY DESIRED. (4) ALL AREAS AT THIS BASE ARE PRIORITY C. END QUOTE. REFERENCE G QUOTE. SECRET NOFORN 333CR 00074K. THIS MESSAGE IN FOUR PARTS. PART I. CONFERENCE AND COORDINATION ACCOMPLISHED WITH THOROUGH DISCUSSION OF ENTIRE SECURITY PROBLEMS EXISTING THIS INSTALLATION. PART II. CONCLUSIONS ARE THAT SECURITY THIS BASE WOEFULLY INADEQUATE ESPECIALLY AGAINST DETERMINED SABOTAGE ON AND NEARBY FLIGHT LINE. THAI INSTALLATION COMMANDER VERY CONCERNED AND INDICATES NO PERSONAL OBJECTIONS TO SMALL ARMS ARMING OF US FORCES PERSONNEL. INFACT AM ADVISED HE HAS REQUESTED THIS FROM HIS HIGHER HQ. PART III. RECOMMENDATIONS (1) THAT IMMEDIATE AUTHORIZATION BE GRANTED FOR LIMITED SMALL ARMS ARMING OF US FORCES PERSONNEL TO BE UNDER STRICT CONTROL OF US BASE COMMANDER IN COORDINATION WITH THAI INSTALLATION COMMANDER. (2) THAT SECURITY TEAM BE DISPATCHED THIS INSTALLATION ASAP TO STUDY AND COMPILE DETAILED DOCUMENT TO INCLUDE CORRECTIVE ACTION NEEDED AND PRIORITY OF ACTIONS FOR ALL LEVELS OF COMMAND. THIS IS ESPECIALLY NEEDED IN THE AREAS OF FLIGHT LINE AND CANTONEMENT LIGHTING, FENCING BOTH INTERIOR AND PERIMETER, AS FENCES ARE PRACTICALLY NON-EXISTANT.

FROM: 35TH TACGP DON MUANG AB THAI

TO: CHIEF JUSMAG BANGKOK THAI

DATE: 120810Z NOV 64

SECRET NOFORN SLE 00012. FINAL SECTION OF 2.
(3) THAT QUALIFIED AIR POLICE OFFICER BE SENT TDY IMMEDIATELY THIS INSTALLATION PRESENTLY NONE ASSIGNED OR AUTHORIZED AND POSITION IS ADDITIONAL DUTY. END QUOTE. PART II. SECURITY AT DON MUANG IS INADEQUATE DUE TO LACK OF AIR POLICE WITH ONLY SIX (6) ASSIGNED. NO FENCING OR ADEQUATE LIGHTING AROUND PRIORITY "A" AREA. ONE (1) AIRCRAFT CARGO LOADING RAMP APPROXIMATELY ONE (1) MILE BY ONE FOURTH (1/4) MILE CONTAINING PRIORITY "C" RESOURCES IS UNFENCED AND WITH ONLY ABSOLUTE MINIMUM LIGHTING. A LIMITED NUMBER OF INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL PRESENTLY PROVIDE SECURITY FOR OUR RESOURCES. RECOMMENDATIONS: (1) AN INCREASE IN INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL FOR PERIMETER CONTROL IS FEASIBLE HOWEVER THEY WOULD REQUIRE TRAINING TO INSTIL AN AGGRESSIVE ATTITUDE. (2) A CHANGE TO THE UMD HAS BEEN SUBMITTED FOR FIFTY-TWO (52) ADDITIONAL AIR POLICEMEN FROM OUT OF THAILAND TO PROVIDE FULL SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT COVERAGE. (3) ARMING OF ON-DUTY AIR POLICEMEN IS REQUIRED. (4) LIGHTING AND FENCING (CHAIN LINK AND CONCERTINA TYPE) IS REQUIRED FOR PRIORITY "A" AND "C" RESOURCES. PART III. REFERENCE YOUR PARAGRAPH C. THE FOLLOWING AREAS ARE OF PRIME INTEREST: (1) ARMING OF ON-DUTY AIR POLICE IN THAILAND. (2) A CLEAR STATEMENT OF POLICY AND PROCEDURES IS REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH PARAGRAPH 4C. AFM 207-1 WHICH IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION. QUOTE. WHEN USAF FORCES ARE LOCATED OVERSEAS ON BASES OF FRIENDLY NATIONS, AEROSPACE SECURITY ACTIVITIES MUST BE IN CONSONAGE WITH THE TERMS OF NATION-TO-NATION OR MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE INDIVIDIUAL COUNTRIES INVOLVED. IN SUCH INSTANCES IN APPLYING THE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED BY AFR 207-1 AND THIS MANUAL, IF DIRECT CONFLICT OCCURS WITH AGREEMENTS THAT ARE IN FORCE, THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT WILL PREVAIL. IF USAF MEMBERS ARE INVOLVED IN D RAFTING DETAILED PORTIONS OF NATION-TO-NATION OR MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS, THEY WILL BE GUIDED BY THE PROVISIONS OF AFR 207-1 AND THIS MANUAL. IF ELEMENTS OF FINALIZED AGREEMENTS DIFFER FROM THE PROVISIONS OF AFR 207-1 AND THIS MANUAL, SUCH DIFFERENCES MUST BE REPORTED TO HQ USAF AND THEN BE INCORPORATED INTO APPROPRIATE SUPPLEMENTS PUBLISHED BY THE MAJOR AIR COMMAND INVOLVED. END QUOTE. GP-4



[redacted]

CHFCO THAI
288-6

Colonel Jack E. McCreary
Deputy Commander
Second Air Division Thailand

Duty Station: Udorn Air Base, Thailand

Tour of Duty: 18 July 1964 - 4 June 1965

27 MAY 65

The Reporting Officer, having been assigned to Udorn Air Base, Thailand for approximately eleven months has seen or been made aware of an increasing tempo in what is generally accepted to be communist inspired subversive activity. Prior to and immediately following the initial build up of USAF forces in Thailand, little if any information was available regarding subversive insurgency in Thailand. Since this time however there has been an alarming increase in the number of reports concerning such activities. Police informants and city officials have been murdered, eight total murders in the last ten months attributed to subversive elements, weapons caches being established, guerrillas being trained for operation in Thailand, new communist cells organized and illegal radio transmitters in operation are all indications of the increased tempo of communist activity in Thailand.

The Northeast Provinces of Thailand are considered to be the center of present communist subversive activity. It is here that some 35,000 to 40,000 displaced Vietnamese reside. Ninety percent of these are considered to be loyal, in varying degrees, to North Vietnam, and virtually all of these make monthly contributions to Hanoi. It is this relatively large concentration of communist controlled or influenced people that is the cause for concern in Thailand.

The Royal Thailand Government recognizes this increased communist activity and has taken some very positive actions in an attempt to counter these actions. Their Mobile Development Units (MDU's) are very active throughout these rural areas, land development projects are under way and active measures consisting of "Sweeps" through known or suspected areas of communist activity by Royal Thai Police Forces, though to date unsuccessful, indicate increased concern and emphasis in this area.

Indications are that the communist time table in Thailand is being stepped up as a result of recent increased Thai involvement in the Vietnamese situation. It is obvious to any trained observer that USAF forces located on Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) installations are actively participating in armed strikes against North Vietnam and Laos. The collection of such intelligence information and its transmission to Hanoi and Peking is a simple matter indeed. The RTAF air bases and installations involved are all very accessable and observable, being located on or near heavily travelled highways and population centers.

[redacted]

20CT-0011 Catch 15

I believe that the most important and immediate threat posed by communist insurgents in Thailand today is not one of open insurgency and overthrow of the Royal Thai Government but one of organized acts of sabotage and terrorism against USAF installations, equipment, and personnel. I believe that the only reason such acts have not been carried out already is the fact that the build up of forces in Thailand and escalation of the air war in North Vietnam were so rapid that these subversive elements were not ready to react. I also believe that the time for initiation of such action is rapidly approaching and in all probability can be carried out, at the offset, with considerable success. This statement is based on the following facts and observations: (a) All USAF units are tenant on RTAF installations which are without exception very vulnerable to penetration, (b) Airfield and site security in all cases is the responsibility of the RTAF, utilising insufficient numbers of relatively inexperienced and poorly equipped RTAF personnel and some unarmed civilian guards, (c) Ambassadorial policy prohibits the arming of USAF security personnel, (d) The rapid influx of USAF units into Thailand in support of the increased air activity in Laos and North Vietnam, has resulted in extremely crowded and vulnerable conditions, cite Bien Hoa, DaNang and Tan Son Nhut, (e) The traffic of arms, ammunitions and explosives into Thailand can and is being carried on with relative ease, (f) The long, poorly patrolled Lao-Thailand border permits practically free movement of personnel to and from North Vietnam and Laos. These factors all add up to a golden opportunity and adequate capability for communist insurgents to deal a devastating blow to US forces and national prestige in the form of coordinated acts of sabotage if they are indeed ready and willing to escalate the present conflict in this manner.

Time in this case I believe is on our side. Airfield construction will provide adequate operating facilities and dispersal of aircraft, increased security measures, active and passive, will make our position more tenable (Note: Ambassadorial approval must be obtained if USAF security personnel are to be armed) and given time, Royal Thailand Government efforts to control such activities should become more effective.

JACK H. MCCREERY
Colonel, USAF
Dep Cmdr 2 Air Div Thai

JDCT-0011

6232SI

TDY Trip Report - 24 through 26 Sep 65. 27 Sep 65

Commander, 6232nd Combat Support Grp

1. The Group Information Officer proceeded from Udorn to Bangkok, Thailand on Courier Flight 918R, 23 Sep 65, for the purpose of attending the United States Information Service Field Representatives Meeting.

2. The meeting was held at 0800 hours, 24 Sep 65 at the USIS Field Office in Bangkok with Mr. Jack O'Brien, Director of USIS in Thailand, as moderator. All major USAF and Army installations were represented as well as all Field Offices of USIS and the American Consulates. Mr. Ralph Jans, American Counsul, Udorn; Mr. Edward Shulick, USIS Field Agent, Udorn and Captain James Doyle, 6232nd Combt Supt Gp IO were present.

3. Mr. O'Brien and his assistant, Mr. Jerry Novick(Director of Press and Radio Activities), discussed the primary mission of USIS in Thailand, which is now to assure the acceptance of U.S. Military forces by the Thai community.

4. Several problem areas were discussed:

A. In recent months, there has been a lack of cooperation in certain areas(not Udorn) between the USAF, the Army and USIS. This has brought about several touchy situations that have provided fuel for the Thailand Independence Front's subversive radio and political-military programs.

(IO Commentary: The four-point program of the Manifesto of the Thailand Independence Front(Thai Communist Party) has recently undergone a change in emphasis. The four aims of the manifesto, as published on 1 November 1964(See Atch 1), are as follows:

1) To drive the U.S. imperialist agressors out of the territory of Thailand.
2) To overthrow the dictatorial and traitorous Thanom government and replace it with a government composed of political parties and patriotic and democratic members that follow a policy of neutrality and peace.
3) To struggle for salvaging and safeguarding the genuine rights and liberties of the people.
4) To struggle for a policy of neutrality, peace, democracy, and for the prosperity and hapiness of the people.

Up until very recently, the emphasis of Radio Free Thailand, or the Voice of Free Thailand as it is sometimes called, has vacillated between points 2 and 3 with aim #1 relatively lightly treated. The presence of the Americans was, for the most part, treated as an example of the "tyrannical Sarit-Thanom clique" efforts to "remain faithful henchmen of the U.S. imperialists". Evidently the Independence Front has recently determined that:

1) Their attempts to alienate the people and the Central Government in Bangkok had reached a certain state of development, and that
2) The increasing numbers of Americans "up-country" required a shift in program emphasis.

The number one ploy of the propaganda section of the Thailand Communist machine is now - "Drive the U.S. imperialist agressors out of the territory of Thailand".

This theme is now being pushed over the radio outlets of Hanoi, Pieping and Radio Free Thailand(which we thought for a while was in Laos, but is now thought to be relatively close to Hanoi). Although Americans are, for the most part, ignorant of the volume of propaganda beamed into Thailand by these Communist radios, even those who had some kn wledge of the extent and contents of these broadcasts, were caught short.

All three stations are monitored by military and civilian agencies both in-country and out(ie. Army Intercept, 5th RRU, Okinawa). Translations of these Thai and Vietnamese language programs were provided to Embassy and USIS officials. Mr. Shulick would give his to Captain Doyle when they were received(see Atch 2.). The USIS and Embassy staff officials were well aware of the large listening audience that these stations reached. Even the most remote mountain village has 2 or 3 transistor radios. But our people were not overly concerned in this area, because all three program formats were aimed over the heads of the Northeast Thai villager. The programs would discuss politics or Marxism or nationalism or idealistic concepts of Marxism and Leninism. This program matter would appeal to the intelligentia or the urbanized, educated Thai, but the villagers did not know what they were talking about. They listened to the stations for entertainment. What ever station played the most appealing music was the one they listened to. The USOM-Thai station at Khon Kaen is the most popular, but it has a limited broadcast fan. So most Thai villagers had to listen to Peiping or Hanoi with their political haranges and speeches. During the last week in June, the speech translations stopped coming. After a period of several months, USIS Bangkok finally got them started again last week. The increased emphasis on the American presence was immediately apparent. Mr. Novick has assured me that we will receive script summaries from now on. This switch in Communist approach means and increased troop education and information program. It is becoming increasingly easier for our daily activities to seriously jeopardize our position here. This point must be hammered home to our personnel.

B. Captain Richard Lamb, JUSMAG representative to the meeting, informaed the gathering that General Stillwell would be shortly re-issuing the letter orders designating the senior military officer in a given area as the JUSMAG Area Representative. This publication will clearly define military relationships and responsibilities in areas of joint occupancy.

(IO Commentary: Lt Col Bryan Jolley was designated JUSMAG Area

Representative in JUSMAG Reg 10-1. When Col James E. Trask became Commander, a letter was sent to JUSMAG requesting the regulation be changed to reflect Col Trask as the Udorn area representative. Capt Lamb admitted that they had slipped on these requests for name changes, but that the new regulation would be published shortly.

C. Just as the above area of concern was predicated on a lack of knowledge of specific responsibilities, the following areas of discussion also became trouble spots for the affected personnel or bases because of an ignorance of existing rules or guidance.

1. Harmful Civic Action Projects - Ubon, NKP, Korat

2. Individuals Disrupting Healthy Community Relationships - Chiang Mai, Korat

3. Unilateral Actions Affecting Other Agencies Existing Programs.

(IO Commentary: Udorn has one civic action area which could cause some concern. That is in the area of Air Commando Medical Civic Action. The intent is commendable and the results have been good to date. However, the local contact for the Medical Section of Det 6 is not the proper one. Mr. Shulick and myself were made aware of the fact in June, that the Commando Doctor was working in the area under the auspices of the Governor's Office. The Lt Governor was furnishing a Thai doctor to accompany our medical team to the villages. We were advised however, that the Thai official charged with the overall health of the provinces, namely the Public Health Officer, had not been contacted, and felt that his area was being encroached upon by the Governor's Office. Mr. Shulick and myself went and discussed the matter with the Public Health Doctor and it was agreed that we would not attempt to disrupt the program as it existed, but would try to change the local point of contact when the Air Commando personnel rotated in May-June. The feelings of the Public Health Officer were relayed to our own medical people at this time. When the new Air Commando Unit arrived on 15 June, the IO, DSLE and OSI went to Det 6 and gave a 2½ hour newcomers briefing. At that time, however, the new medical team was not there. About 15 July, we were informed that the new Air Commando team was operating under the same sponsorship as the previous one, namely the Lt Governor's office. Our medical people had again taken the new team to the Governor's Office. Now it has been brought to the attention of Mr. Jans, the American Counsul, that the Governor's Office is starting to regard the Air Commando team as a burden and is trying to get out of furnishing the Thai Doctor to accompany the team. This matter was brought to Mr. Shulick's and my attention on Friday , in Bangkok, by Dr. Jans. Mr. Shulick and myself will meet on Wednesday to try to resolve the best course of action. This is not a problem yet, merely a matter of getting



the Thai officials to agree on the proper point of contact. As a matter of information, the Air Commando Doctor has not been too active in this program for the past month or so, because he has confined his activities mainly to the area across the river. Our Dr. Burton is going on a village trip this Thursday, 30 Sep, with the Public Health Doctor, who is the individual that both the USIS people and myself feel is the proper point of contact for the medical community.

D. The majority of the meeting was devoted to clearing the air regarding joint and individual responsibilities in Thai community relations, and in informing the newly assigned up-country information people of the diplomatic implications of their activities. All USAF Bases, with the exception of Udorn, have received full time IOs within the last two weeks. Some of these people have been placed in areas where past problems existed, and were not aware of how they were solved or how they could have been prevented. Udorn is in good shape, because of the quality and accessability of our Consular and USIS representatives. Some of the other bases do have problems, however. Most of the AF IOs were unaware of the role of JUSMAG in in-country activities, and were unaware of COMUSMACTHAI Regulation 360-1(see Atch 3).

5. The meeting was ended at 1100 hours, 24 Sep 65. After the meeting, Captain Doyle met with the graphics production people to try to obtain some English language USIS films on permanent loan to use in Commanders Call and New-comers Briefing programs. The USIS library branch promised to try to get us some films.

6. At 1300 hours, 24 Sep 65, Captain Doyle and Captain Buchbaum, IO at Don Muang, met with Mr. Bob Uhrich, co-publisher of the Bangkok World, to discuss the operation of the up-country newspaper program. Mr. Uhrich was informed of the delays and non-delivery problem, and promised to do his best to resolve them.

7. Following the meeting with Mr. Uhrick, Captain Doyle talked with the Bank Of America officials regarding the establishment of a Baht account for the Group Unit Fund. The bank provided the required paper work to establish the account and we discussed the transfer and conversion of funds. As soon as the Council votes on the size of the account, it can be established by mail.

8. At 1530 hours, Capt Buchbaum and Capt Doyle met with Capt Lamb at JUSMAG to discuss responsibilities for up-country incident reporting and JUSMAG requirements. We subsequently met again with Mr. O'Brien and Mr. Novick of USIS and again discussed the problem of immediate, factual reporting. After explaining the duties and position of the representative of the Deputy Commander, 2nd Air Division(Thailand) to the USIS people, they agreed to use him as the main source of immediate information. USIS has been receiving initial flash messages of incidents from JUSMAG, but were unaware that the 2ADiv representative at the JUSMAG compound had "hot-line" communications with the TACC at Udorn. USIS will henceforth query JUSMAG for initial follow-up information and has relieved up-country IOs of initial reporting responsibilities.

9. At 0800, 25 Sep 65, Captain Doyle met with other AF representatives to the meeting and discussed various USAF projects currently in being.

A. The proposed 13th AF Band Tour of Tahiland in October - No up-country IO could guarantee 30 available billets without firm advance notice of the playing dates, so 13th AF will be asked to stage the band out of Don Muang. The band will be asked to proceed to an up-country station early in the morning, play a concert both on and off-base that same day, and depart the base at about 2200 hours for Don Muang. The operational control of in-country C-47s was discussed and 13th AF will be asked to have 2nd Air Div levy the requirement for airlift on a specific aircraft. Don Muang is pretty sure they can commit their C-47, but will require another for the airlift. Udorn made no commitment forhousing, airlift or available dates. This shall be the responsibility of Don Muang, 2nd Air Div and 13th Air Force.

B. Base Brochures - 13th Air Force has agreed to print Base Brochures. Captain Doyle will present a draft of the proposed Udorn Brochure to his Commander on 1 October. Clark AFB will print the approved brochure.

C. Up-Country IO Manning - In addition to the UMD manning package which the Combat Support Groups have submitted, Col Tillay of PACAF and Col Roth of 13th AF have evidently initiated action on their own. PACAF Manpower has approved a package and has also requested "Top Dog" assistance for Udorn, Korat, Takli and Ubon(see Atch #4). We have no knowledge of the size of the PACAF requested package.

D. BotheJUSMAG and AF channnels are working on obtaining closed circuit radio and television service for up-country stations. In the interim, Col Roth has requested Video Sports Films of current sports for use in 16mm theatres(see Atch #5).

10. At 1300 hours, 25 Sep 65, Captain Doyle went to the Bangkok Region Procurement office to discuss the mechanics of the swimming pool project. None of the knowledgeable people on the project were available. After discussing the problem, the procurement people were asked to assemble a list of vendors and catalogs for the Unit Fund. These vendors will be available sources of special services and sports equipment in the Bangkok area. Bangkok procurement purchase sports equipment for all up-country stations but Udorn. If they are unable to furnish catalogs, we will write to the Bangkok vendors direct.

11. Captain Doyle returned to Udorn on the Sunday morning, 26 Sep, Ration Flight #923.

JAMES K. DOYLE
Captain, USAF
Base Information Officer

5 Atch

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Declassified IAW EO 13526
By ~~AFHRA SAFE PAPER Office~~ PACAF
Date 12/15/14 Reviewer [signature]

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Team